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ABSTRACT 
The study set out to explore how small exporting firms coordinate production functions 
and the extent to which the chosen path of institutional arrangements enable them to 
reduce market imperfections, access resources, meet export market requirements and 
succeed in the export market. The literature posits that in the absence of effective state 
institutions, informal and private institutional arrangements tend to govern market 
transactions. However, little is known about the effectiveness of these arrangements in 
supporting distant and expanding trade transactions, especially, in Africa. Using the 
Ghanaian craft export sector as a case, the study showed that the small-scale exporters 
rely predominantly on informal institutions and subcontracting ties in their export 
transactions. Yet these informal and subcontractual relations remain inadequate 
coordination mechanisms for engendering greater export success. Under conditions of 
market imperfections and endemic opportunism, the informal trade arrangements and 
loose arm’s length subcontracting relations only enable the small firms to achieve 
imperfect results even in modestly complex and expanding trade transactions. 
Notwithstanding, informal subcontractual ties potentially offer the platform for the 
small enterprises to succeed in the export market given improvements in the socio-
cultural and the microeconomic environments. 
The emergence of “in-house contracting” in the industry is linked to the move by some 
of the exporters to reduce transaction costs and meet quality standards. By this 
arrangement, the entrepreneur has some level of control (albeit less rigid) necessary to 
reduce transaction costs, meet quality requirements, and flexibly adjust to fluctuations 
in export market demands. The in-house exporter maintains multiple informal and trust 
building relationships with segmented buyers and subcontractors to keep the production 
system operational.  
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                          CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
This project is about the costs to transactions in the export market and the local 
institutional responses by market participants to reduce these costs. The study is 
premised on the perspective that there are costs to transacting in the market and 
therefore institutions are required to mitigate the costs to market transactions. This is 
the postulation that is found in the intellectual works of new institutional theorists 
(Coase 1937; Williamson, 1975; North, 1990). This forms a major critique to the neo-
classical economic theory that assumes costless economic exchange. An agent 
involved in market transactions may fail to comply with trade agreements he has 
entered into with another partner due to capability constraints, information problems, 
and exogenous economic factors or purely due to indiscipline and dishonesty. In this 
instance, the market may be imperfect. The works of these leading authors have 
inspired other studies that have looked at the various dimensions of institutions that 
support the operations of the market in both the developed and developing countries.  
 
There is now overwhelming support in favour of the argument that unbridled ―getting 
the prices right‖ policies based on neoclassical economic theory do not sufficiently 
enable markets to realize their full potentials (Fafchamps, 2004; Parker et al. 1995, 
World Bank 2001; Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002). In fact, there is the recognition that the 
post-SAP economies continue to experience endemic market imperfections and 
failures at the microeconomic level despite some moderate improvements in the 
  
 
2 
macroeconomic environment. The persistence of market imperfections in many of 
these economies, according to some commentators, reinforces the insufficiency of 
neo-classical economic model in addressing those imperfections and to effectively 
support the operations of the market. This weakness gives strength to the role of 
institutions in addressing market imperfections. Thus goes the proposition that 
institutions are required as instruments to reduce market imperfections and promote 
economic growth. Stein (1995), for example, maintains that the neo-classical 
economic model remains largely a-institutional and therefore ill-equipped to promote 
the development of markets, particularly, in Africa. 
 
There is no substitute for effective institutions that support market exchange. The 
inability of societies to develop effective and low cost enforcement institutions is 
argued to be the most important source of both historical and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the Third World (North, 1990). Some observers attribute 
underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa to the fact that many countries on the 
continent possess ineffective formal institutions and suggest that Africa‘s economic 
experience should be looked at beyond the availability of factors of production and 
attention directed at seeking institutional explanations to African economic problems 
(Aron, 2000). The linkage between institutions and development within African 
context is often not described in palatable terms. Institutions in Africa are regarded as 
underdeveloped; consisting of ineffective contract enforcement mechanisms with the 
consequence of restricting the expansion of trade and market development because 
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ineffective institutions make Africa a high risk and unattractive environment for 
business (Luiz, 2009).   
  
Posner (1998) draws attention to the need for formal legal institutions like the courts 
to ensure compliance with contractual obligations and deter opportunism in 
developing and transition economies. There are those authors who argue for formal 
institutions that provide third party business services to be strengthened with the 
appropriate internal tools so as to support many firms in developing economies to 
overcome technical and informational constraints they face at the micro level 
(Jackson, 2002; Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002). These studies labeled as meso-level 
institutional analysis of economic problem are inspired by the recognition that there 
are deep seated constraints existing at the microeconomic level that critically impede 
the operations of, especially, small enterprises in developing and transition countries. 
Meso-institutions (formal and quasi-government agencies) are therefore proffered to 
enable entrepreneurs to address micro-economic constraints. Without denying the 
importance of some of these institutions, other arrangements stressing the enabling 
role of inter-firm relations and other informal institutional arrangements both in 
developing economies as well as in advanced countries in dealing with market 
imperfections are also noted (Woodruff, 1998). Macaulay (1963), for instance, 
demonstrated how businessmen in the USA preferred to rely on inter-personal 
relations to achieve compliance to contractual obligations instead of resorting to 
formal enforcements like the courts.    
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The general consensus in the literature is that in economies where formal third party 
enforcement systems and service provision agencies are weak or non-existent, 
economic agents tend to resort to informal institutional arrangements and inter-firm 
relationships to address their capability constraints and deal with other market 
imperfections. The lack of effective state-sponsored institutions to provide trade 
support services and also enforce commercial contracts encourages entrepreneurs to 
restrict their dealings to those persons they know (Pedersen and McCormick, 1999). 
This idea is also found in the works of authors that have investigated institutions that 
supported markets in pre-industrial societies and developing economies (Ensminger, 
1996; Greif, 1993; Milgrom et al. 1990). They made similar claims about the 
availability of informal institutional mechanisms to actors engaged in some sort of 
economic exchange whether among the Pastoralists in Orma village in Kenya or the 
medieval traders in Europe. Brautigam (1997), for example, argues that indigenous 
institutions and personalized relations represent a good substitute and fill the gaps left 
by failures of both the market and the state in the African context.            
 
1.2 Research Problem 
How much do we know about institutions that support market operations in 
developing economies and especially Africa? There is a lot more to do regarding our 
understanding of how institutions of their various forms support market exchange. 
Fafchamps (2004) underscored this need and points to the little knowledge that exists 
about the institutions that support market exchange and how markets are structured 
over time, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. He makes a case for studying African 
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markets and institutions, and arguing that the analysis of markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa within the framework of new institutional economics is not a misplaced 
venture. The problem of agency arising from the failure of trade partners to commit 
to trade agreements that plague markets in Sub-Saharan Africa is the very same issue 
that we find in developed markets and are at the core of the analysis of new 
institutional economics (Fafchamps, 1997; 2004). It is not in dispute that the 
imperfections that bedevil markets in developing economies are also commonplace in 
developed economies but what explains the differences in the operations of these 
markets is the nature and endowment of the country‘s institutions. The debate about 
the appropriate institutional forms for dealing with market uncertainties and risks is 
raging and unsettled particularly in developing and transition countries. This study 
seeks to contribute to the discourse on markets and market institutions and takes as its 
starting point the instrumental role of informal institutional mechanisms and inter-
firm relations in addressing market imperfections. This study adopts a tone that is less 
optimistic about the effectiveness of informal and private institutional arrangements 
in fostering firm growth as the complexity of trade increases in the context of risk-
prone environment. The pervasive opportunism and other forms of market 
imperfections may be counter-productive to fostering collaborative trade behaviour 
and thus limit the extent to which agency problems can be reduced.   
 
The general view is that informal mechanisms are effective in more localized markets 
in which parties to a trade transaction have good information about the market and 
know each other. Posner (1998) draws attention to the fact that there are ―hidden 
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costs‖ to the reliance on informal mechanisms as substitutes for formal legal 
enforcement mechanisms. One such hidden cost, according to Posner, is the bias of 
informal ties and networks in favour of simple economic exchanges over complex 
transactions. He accepts that when third party enforcement is weak or nonexistent, 
economic transactions will be governed by familial alliances but adds that such 
informal alliances may be dysfunctional in the conditions of a modern economy.  
 
Trade across geographical boundaries brings with it new challenges, which do not 
lend themselves easily to more localized market arrangements and informal 
institutional practices. Woodruff (1998) observes that as local enterprises produce 
and sell over long distances they are confronted with the contractual obligations of 
meeting large order volumes, tight delivery timelines and quality standards. Trade 
linkages with international clients may as well expose local enterprises to new 
opportunities, including access to new market information, product designs and 
financial resources. Granovetter (1983) observes that market actors who develop 
acquaintances with new economic agents in distant places stand to gain from new 
ideas and information. The counter argument to this is that individuals who lack ties 
with outsiders and are confined to their ―provincial news and views of their close 
friends‖ are deprived of latest ideas and information (ibid, p202). Building trade 
relationships with external agents such as international buyers may serve as new 
sources of information and learning for local producers to innovate and upgrade their 
processes.  
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The current global value chain literature frames the challenges and opportunities that 
confront exporting firms from developing countries to encompass either inclusion or 
exclusion from international trade. The ability by small firms in developing countries 
to adapt their products and organizational forms to export market pressures and buyer 
demands may lead to their inclusion in global trade whereas failure to respond to the 
market demands and buyer requirements may lead to exclusion from global value 
chains. The available empirical evidence shows how inter-firms relationships with 
global buyers have opened new opportunities for firms in developing countries, 
especially, Asia and Latin America to upgrade their production processes and 
compete in international markets (Schmitz, 2004). The global value chain analysis 
focuses largely on how global retailers and wholesalers, wielding enormous market 
power, coordinate the global chains and how their actions and decisions determine 
who participates in those chains (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001, 2002;). There is little 
knowledge about how local inter-firm relations and local market practices utilized by 
small enterprises, particularly in Sub-Saharan-Africa, enable them to effectively 
engage in performance-enhancing trade arrangements with international clients 
(Bigsten et al. 1998). This study looks at the effectiveness of local institutional 
responses and market practices in enabling small-scale exporters to reduce domestic 
market uncertainties and meet export market requirements in their participation in 
transnational commodity chains.  
 
The study attempts to address the question: what sort of institutional arrangements 
and coordination activities make the market work well given that markets are 
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imperfect? Within the context of this broader question, the study explores the nature 
and effectiveness of local institutional responses and market strategies to local market 
imperfections and export market requirements.      
1.2.1 Research Objectives 
The specific objectives of this study are to: 
 identify the specific socio-economic circumstances at the micro-level (i.e. 
market imperfections) and export market forces that influence the activities of 
the small-scale exporters; 
 understand the nature of  the institutional mechanisms and the inter-firm  
relationships utilized by the small enterprises in coordinating production 
activities and;  
 explore the extent to which the market arrangements and institutional forms 
adopted by the small-scale exporters sufficiently enable them to overcome 
domestic production challenges, reduce transactions cost and address market 
requirements. 
 
1.2.2 Argument of the Study 
Based on North (1991) this study posits that: 
The reliance on informal and inter-firm subcontractual relations is useful for 
coordinating production activities yet it remains inadequate in engendering greater 
business success in an environment characterized by market imperfections and 
endemic opportunism. 
 
The new institutional theorists take market coordination as their starting point and their 
position has been that when it is costly and risky to transact in the market, economic 
actors may rely on institutions (either  formal institutions or informal relations, or both) to 
provide stability to economic activities and exchange. Coordination of market activities 
assumes different forms but as demonstrated above, formal institutional mechanisms are 
  
 
9 
often weak or non-existent in developing economies and as a result firms in these 
economies tend to rely on informal (private) institutional arrangements to overcome 
market imperfections (Biggs and Shah, 2006). Private coordination arrangements mean 
that emphasis is placed on inter-firm linkages encompassing subcontracting arrangements, 
which are underpinned by informal institutions. That is private coordination arrangement 
between lead entrepreneurs and their trading agents utilized in combination with elements 
such as trust and informal group dynamics in their attempt to mitigate transaction costs 
and gain access to market resources. Subcontracting as a production mode represents a 
decentralized system in which an entrepreneur contracts out production orders to an 
independent producer and takes responsibility for the final products.  In the 
subcontracting case investigated in this study, trade agreements are not comprehensively 
written and are sometimes based on oral agreements. The only written document may be 
an order sheet specifying the physical quality attributes of products that needs to be met 
but silent on safeguards for breaches of trade agreements and risks.      
 
1.3 Methodology 
The study adopts an in-depth case study approach with the aim of obtaining qualitative 
information on how informal arrangements and inter-firm relations enable the small-scale 
exporters to access resources; meet export market requirements; contribute to the 
reduction of opportunistic risks and resolve other constrains pertaining to the local 
microeconomic environment. This study is about the extent to which inter-firm 
subcontracting relationships and informal arrangements utilised by small-scale exporters 
enable them to overcome constraints to production and meet contractual obligations. 
These phenomena are better understood in their naturalistic state and thus require an 
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attempt to collect subjective and perceptual information from the selected small-scale 
exporters about their production processes and the relationships they establish with other 
firms and economic agents (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994). These issues do not easily lend 
themselves to rigid quantifiable measures. The case study approach with its focus on in-
depth investigations into real-life and contemporary events using multiple sources of 
evidence is therefore germane in helping to address the goal of this study (Yin, 2003). In 
using the case study approach, the stages procedure offered by Nadvi and Schmitz (1994) 
is adapted to this study (see chapter three for detailed presentation of the stages approach 
to network studies).        
 
1.4 Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the research problem, the research objectives and the main 
argument of the study. The chapter briefly looked at the debate on the significance of 
institutions to market exchange and the fact that the absence of effective state institutions 
partly contributes to the economic underdevelopment in most Third World countries. The 
paucity of empirical studies on institution and market development in developing 
countries, especially, in Sub-Saharan Africa highlights the rudimentary nature of market 
exchange, which is often governed by informal mechanism. In the absence of effective 
state-sponsored institutions, the argument goes that economic agents tend to rely on self-
enforcing and self-provisioning arrangements (private and informal) in their trade 
transactions. The main thrust of this study is that the availability of the devices of 
informal mechanisms and inter-firm subcontracting relations to small enterprises makes it 
possible for them to engage in export market transactions yet these arrangements can 
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prove inadequate in meeting contractual obligations under conditions of market 
imperfections and endemic risks. This theme is supported with case-study evidence from 
the Ghanaian craft export industry, which is characteristically informal but has succeeded 
in penetrating the international market where the exporters have to confront new 
challenges to production.       
 
The study is organized into eight chapters. Following the introduction is the chapter on 
the conceptual framework that provides the theoretical basis for the study. The discussion 
begins with the premise that market exchanges are neither risk-free nor costless and may 
entail a lot of failures. That institution is required to provide certainty to market 
exchanges and the incentives necessary to induce acceptable market behaviour. The 
relative strengths of (in)formal institutional arrangements, sub-contracting and inside-
contracting coordination mechanisms in mitigating market risks and resolving market 
imperfections are discussed. Also discussed in chapter two is the governance of global 
value chains, which is considered central to transnational organization of production 
activities, and the implications it has for African enterprises participating in transnational 
commodity chains. This is followed with a discussion of African informal market; 
discussed within the framework of institutional approach as a tool for analyzing the form 
and the dynamics inside the informal economy. The research method is presented in 
chapter three. The case-study approach to scientific inquiry and particularly, its relevance 
to not-easy-to-quantify informal network relations are discussed this chapter. Also 
considered in this chapter are the procedural steps that were followed through during the 
data collection process. A review of the historical development of the Ghanaian non-
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traditional export sector and the characterization of the craft export industry are 
undertaken in chapter four. Chapter five deals with the microeconomic environment 
(viewed from the perspective of the respondents) pertaining specifically to the sector of 
choice. Also considered in chapter five is the presentation of the evidence on the sub-
contractual relations between the small export vendors and their transaction partners and 
other informal trade arrangements. The empirical evidence on inside-contracting 
arrangement as probably ―new‖ institutional response to coordinating production 
activities among some of the exporters is undertaken in chapter six. This is followed with 
a discussion in chapter seven in which the empirical evidence is explicitly and directly 
related to the theoretical discourse in chapter two. Chapter eight concludes the study.        
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                                                      CHAPTER TWO 
                                          CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The focus of the study is the contractual relationships between principal entrepreneurs 
and their trading partners and how the relationships they establish enable them to 
successfully meet their contractual obligations and grow their firms given the context of 
the microeconomic and institutional environments. The study of inter-firm linkages to 
economic activities requires a framework with the power to help explore how economic 
agents interact with other partners and why they decide to interact with others the way 
they do (Knorringa, 1996). In an attempt to understand how and why the small Ghanaian 
enterprises interact with other trading agents the way they do in their export transactions, 
the study relies on the ideas from the industrial organization literature, network analysis 
and their incorporation into transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975; Knorringa, 1996; 
McCormick et al. 1997); all being part of the broader discipline of new institutional 
economics. Williamson (1975, 1980), explains that the choice of the type of institutional 
arrangement may depend on the effectiveness of the arrangement in enforcing contractual 
obligations and minimizing transaction costs surrounding exchange. This is an issue that 
is concerned with the choice of market and institutional arrangements that best addresses 
the risks and costs to market exchange. This thinking is premised on the principle that 
there are risks and costs to transacting in the market and therefore institutions (of 
different kinds with relative effectiveness) matter to minimize risks (North, 1990).   
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New institutional theorists unlike mainstream economists do not assume away the costs 
that are inherent in market exchanges. The market is not costless, for there are costs to 
negotiating, assembling information, concluding and enforcing contracts (Coase, 1937, 
Williamson, 1975, 1980). These costs come about because partners to a transaction may 
behave opportunistically but there are limits to the cognitive abilities of human beings to 
determine whether or not partners to a transaction would behave dishonestly after 
contract agreement is completed (Williamson, 1975). Lead entrepreneurs adopt a 
coordination strategy that enables them reduce transaction costs associated with 
opportunistic risks and market failures.   
 
This study in particular pays attention to informal trade arrangement, external 
subcontracting relation, inside-contracting coordination mechanism and their relative 
strengths in enabling entrepreneurs to minimize transaction costs and at the same time 
enhance enterprise growth. Also considered in this analysis is the idea that successful 
entrepreneurs may combine a mixture of coordination arrangements instead of a singular 
institutional arrangement in responding to agency problems and production challenges.  
 
The chapter is divided into six main sections. Following the introduction is Section 2.2, 
which delves into transaction cost theory and the concept of market failures. Section 2.3 
is about institutions and their economic importance and rehearses the debate in the new 
institutional economics with emphasize on the relative importance of formal and informal 
institutions in reducing uncertainties and market risks. Section 2.4 is devoted to 
subcontracting and inside-contracting coordination mechanisms, stressing the 
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preconditions for successful subcontracting arrangements and the motivations for inside-
contracting as well as their relative strengths in meeting contractual obligations and 
reducing market risks. An analysis of the global value chain concept and its implications 
for firms in developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, in international trade 
is presented in section 2.5. The literature that has attempted to interpret African informal 
markets within the new institutional economics framework is reviewed in section 2.6. 
Section 2.7 concludes the chapter with a summary of the main themes in the theoretical 
discussions. 
 
The core themes of the theoretical discussion regarding the choice of market and 
institutional arrangements by lead entrepreneurs under conditions of extreme 
uncertainties and risks considered in this chapter are that: 
 
 Informal institutional mechanisms and inter-firm subcontractual relations matter 
to the coordination of economic activities but remain inadequate in engendering 
greater enterprise success in an environment characterized by endemic market 
imperfections (North, 1991); 
 
 Under conditions of high transaction costs and endemic market imperfections 
rational firms would seek to internalize functions partially in-house to gain 
control over the production process in a bid to reduce market risks and meet 
market requirements (Williamson, 1975).      
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2.2 Transaction Costs and Market Failures 
2.2.1 Transaction Costs  
The neo-classical doctrine places a premium on individual rational choices in resource 
allocation and assumes zero transaction cost. In the neo-classical economic exchange 
institutions are considered unnecessary and the economy characterized by efficient 
market exchanges. If trading partners were to live in a business environment where they 
could assemble all possible information about their transactions and enforce contract 
compliance without cost, then they could use the market to insure themselves against risk. 
This, new institutionalists argue, is far from the real world of economic exchanges that is 
often characterized by incomplete information, uncertainty and market failures. There are 
costs to accurately determining the various dimensions of a trade transaction in detail 
and/or the performance of agents ex ant as well as enforcing agreements ex post. 
Transaction costs consist of the costs of measuring the attributes of the product or the 
service that is being exchanged and the cost of enforcing contract agreement (North, 1990, 
1991).  Williamson is credited with the conceptualization of transaction costs to include 
the combined human problems of opportunism and bounded rationality, without which 
there would be no need for economic institutions. These two concepts as put forward by 
Williamson are discussed below.  
 
Bounded rationality and Opportunism:  Human agents in the market place are limited in 
their cognitive abilities to receive, store and retrieve information. There are bounds to 
how much information can be gathered by trading partners during contract agreement and 
execution. This human limitation is compounded by the fact that there is the tendency by 
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some economic agents to behave opportunistically. Opportunism defined as ―self-interest 
seeking with guile‖ (Williamson, 1975, p26) together with the cognitive limitations of 
humans to identify hidden behaviour has implications on the choice of institutional 
arrangements. However, in the view of Williamson, opportunism poses no problem in a 
repeated trade interaction in a situation of transparent markets characterized by 
homogenous goods and many suppliers and where there is no capital or investment of 
human effort in the transaction process—opportunism is consequently checked through 
the loss of subsequent transaction. But there are occasions where trading partners may 
invest in human resource or invest capital specifically in customized goods or 
idiosyncratic tasks; a phenomenon Williamson refers to as asset specificity.  
 
Asset-Specificity:  More importantly, when the principal firm makes certain investments 
in the transaction that is specific to its needs and such investments are large, uncertain 
environment and any dishonest behaviour leading to hold-up may raise the cost of 
monitoring and enforcing contractual obligations. Mackenzie (2008, p869) sums up this 
transaction cost argument this way: 
 
In an environment of small number exchanges created by asset specificity 
or idiosyncratic tasks, coupled with uncertainty, complexity and, crucially, 
the assumed propensity of contract partners to act opportunistically, 
negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts is a complex and costly 
undertaking. 
 
High level of asset specificity makes threats of opportunism more costly to the investing 
party. According to Williamson the lead party would seek ways, under this circumstance, 
to control the other trading partner either by locking the partner into the relationship or 
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through hierarchical managerial control to minimize transaction risks (Williamson 1975, 
1981).  Williamson (1985) considers the degree of transaction-specific investment vis-à-
vis the level of opportunism (transaction costs) and uncertainty as cardinal factors that 
influence the choice of institutional arrangements. In addition to the degree of asset 
specificity, there are other factors such as length of relationship between the trading 
partners (Williamson, 1985, Kahkonen and Meagher, 1997) and the size or the volume of 
the transaction (Hong Hai, 2007) that may affect the choice of institutional mechanism in 
the midst of threats of shirking and dishonest behaviour.  
 
In a nutshell, transactions involving simple, standardized products, numerous suppliers 
and buyers where there are low asset specificity and dependency, trading actors can 
depend on competition as a mechanism to discipline dishonesty by switching or turning 
to alternative sources of supplies or buyers. In this case market exchange is likely to take 
the form of arm‘s length arrangement. On the other hand when the specific investment 
made in a transaction is high but the risk of opportunism or transaction cost is high the 
institutional arrangement is likely to take a hierarchical form, especially, where the 
enforcement of both formal and informal contracts is imperfect.  
 
2.2.2 Market Externalities 
According to Bates (1995) market failures arise when the conditions necessary for 
achieving the efficient workings of the market are absent. The choices of rational 
individuals may clash or be inconsistent with the ―public‖ good; this Bates calls the 
―social dilemma‖ (choices made by rational individuals may yield outcomes that are 
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socially irrational).  He looked at production externality as a type of market failure. It 
occurs when the activities of one agent impose cost or confer benefits on actors. Some 
firms may provide generalized services e.g. training of labour that go to promote the 
productivity of other firms in the industry. Though such externality may be in the general 
good of the industry, it may not be in the private interest of agents who seek to maximize 
their self interests to continue to provide such services.  In situations of such externalities, 
the economic actors would have to be induced to continue to provide such services 
through other forms of incentives. The non-provision of such services because of the lack 
of incentives to do so may be a cost to the general good of the industry, especially if it is 
essential for the effective workings of the industry. For example, product designers may 
be discouraged to come out with innovative designs if other members in the industry can 
copy their designs without respecting patent rights.  Institution provides the mechanisms 
that could help to overcome the tensions that may arise between private choices made by 
rational individuals and what are ―publicly‖ rational outcomes. The assignment of, for 
instance, property rights(institution), in the view of Bates (1995), limits the problem of 
free riding and provides incentives for maximizing private agents to make production 
decisions that are ―publicly‖ beneficial.      
 
2.3 Institutions and their importance to economic activities  
Transaction costs and market failures provide the sources of importance for institutions. 
Williamson (1981) places the combined existence of bounded rationality, asset specificity 
and opportunism at the centre of transaction costs theory and the analysis of economic 
institutions. Under the conditions of imperfect information and opportunistic risks, 
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institutions are required to provide the incentives and the certainty for trade interaction to 
take place (North, 1989, 1990). Institutions matter when it is costly to transact (North, 
1995) and when market failures are pervasive (Bates, 1995). The utility of institutions as 
human devices are designed: 
…to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange…and therefore 
determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and 
feasibility of engaging in economic activity (North, 1991, p97).  
  
The theoretical discourse in this section looks at the enabling role of institutions in 
economic exchange. In particular, attention is given to the elements such access to 
information about trading partners, effective enforcements and sanctions as critical in 
reducing transaction costs. In doing this, an attempt is made to analyze the relative 
importance of both formal and informal institutions in reducing transaction costs. The 
debate surrounding the role of informal institutional arrangements to transaction cost 
reduction and their inherent inadequacies in facilitating economic exchange is given 
weight in this discussion. Almost all the scholarly works on institutional analysis tend to 
reduce the function of informal institutions to enforcement, often neglecting the other 
functions of informal relations. Informal trade arrangements are self-enforcing as well as 
self-provisioning. Barr (1998), for example, showed that informal institutions in the form 
of interpersonal ties could play multiple functions of minimizing risks and at the same 
time be a conduit for the sharing resources. This study views informal institutions in both 
its enforcement and resource provision functions. The theoretical position that forms the 
basis of this analysis is that informal trade arrangements enable enterprises to minimize 
risks, enforce contractual obligations and facilitate access to resources for growth but 
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limitedly so under conditions of pervasive market failures and complexities that 
accompany expanding trade.    
  
2.3.1 What are Institutions? 
The new institutional economics literature is replete with different perspectives as to what 
the definition of institutions is. Following North (1990, p3), institutions are conceived as 
the ―rules of the game‖ or ―humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction‖. 
Human constraints expressed in rules, codes of conducts and the associated enforcement 
mechanisms, according to North, reduce transaction costs and facilitate division of labour 
and specialization. The thinking from the transaction cost school of thought is that we 
live in an uncertain world where there exist risks and complexities. Human beings 
therefore devise institutions in their attempts to control their economic environment so as 
to reduce transaction costs (de Soysa and Jutting, 2006). The understanding of institutions 
is not only conceived in terms of rules-setting or the accepted behaviour that should be 
followed through by transaction partners or groups of people but also extends to 
mechanisms for enforcing compliance and prescribes the consequences of violations. 
Institutions define what people are ―prohibited from doing and the conditions under 
which individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities‖ (de Soysa and Jutting, 
2006, p3). The consequences of dishonesty must be severe enough to deter future 
breaches in repeated interactions: ―the future costs should outweigh the immediate benefit 
in the individual‘s own calculation…whether for material things, social standing, internal 
guilt or whatever‖ (Dixit, 2004, p60). Through its effect on reducing transaction costs and 
safeguarding agreements, institutions can also generate the incentives for economic actors 
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to undertake productive activities. Strong institutions can discourage dishonesty and free 
riding and induce productive behaviour by positively affecting the incentive structure that 
agents face by safeguarding investment (Luiz, 2009).  Institutions as market constraining 
devices embody the elements of rules or norms, effective monitoring and enforcement of 
the rules or the norms to ensure that trading partners or a group of market participants 
them and breaches consequently sanctioned.   
 
Based on the degree of formality, institutions can either be classified as formal or 
informal. Though operating on different principles and mechanisms both formal and 
informal institutional arrangements can achieve the goal of reducing transaction cost and 
as a result create the condition for economic exchange to take place. While formal 
institutions such as contract law, property rights and public standards are created and 
enforced by the nation-state, informal institutions essentially remain undocumented, may 
emerge spontaneously and be self-enforcing (Williamson, 2009). There is no firm 
agreement in the literature regarding which of these types of institutions is more 
important or effective in supporting market exchange. One side of the debate supports the 
view that formal institutions (laws, property rights, legal contracts, and public quality 
standards) enforceable by state-sponsored third party are better able to support complex 
and impersonal trade arrangements. There are also those who hold the position that 
informal institutions provide good substitute for ineffective and inefficient state-
sponsored institutions in facilitating market exchange. The third way is the position that 
both formal and informal institutions are complementary institutional forms in facilitating 
market exchanges. These three strands of the debate are discussed below. This study in 
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particular shows that informal institutions and informal subcontracting relations are 
important to market transactions because they are predominantly utilized by the case-
study enterprises in their export transactions. The main caveat, however, is that informal 
ties and informal subcontracting relations are least robust in addressing agency problems 
and complexities associated with expanding trade under conditions of local capacity 
difficulties, socio-cultural problems, informational problems and enforcement challenges.   
 
2.3.2 Formal Institutions and Market Transactions 
Formal institutions are written rules that are devised to constrain human interaction and 
exchange. Formal enforcement mechanisms rely on third party agencies such as the court 
to enforce contract agreements or quality assurance bodies to provide standard 
formulation, certification and quality monitoring. In this case the rules of the game may 
be set or designed by the partners to the transaction (or a third party) and contract breach 
litigated for example by the court or quality assurance bodies (private or public) 
providing standard formulation and monitoring services to ensure compliance. The 
argument that is often put forward in support of formal institutions is that they are better 
able to support complex and impersonal transactions. According to Kahkonen and 
Meagher (1997), impersonal market exchange is made possible because effective state 
sponsored institutions can provide for predictable, transparent, impartial and low cost 
enforcement of contract. These, according to them, provide certainty for market 
transactions and also the threat of legal action can act as a check on opportunism. 
Contract law, for example that is administered by a third party, normally the state, 
specifies the terms of agreement, sets out the grounds and consequences of breach, and 
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backs up transaction with the third party‘s power to extract penalties (Hadfield, 2004).  
The understanding that strong formal institutions reduce uncertainty and risks induces 
economic agents to make credible commitments to strangers, thus making it possible for 
anonymous individuals and firms to transaction business across communities (Kahkonen 
and Meagher, 1997). This is because formal institutions protect and tie the hands of 
economic agents so that they do not behave opportunistically in entering trade relations 
by misrepresenting their performance or behave opportunistically afterwards by walking 
away from commitments(Hong Hai, 2007). The assumption is that by clearly setting out 
the parameters of a contract and specifying ex ante consequences of breach, opportunism 
is prevented ex post (after agreement is written) and as a result increase the confidence of 
actors to engage in anonymous market exchanges. But what if, for instance, formal 
enforcement mechanisms are ineffective and what is the implication for the choice of 
institutional responses by market participants (Fafchamps, 2001)? North (1990) sets out 
the conditions for effective formal enforcement to include the ability of the third party 
enforcer to measure the attributes of the contract and enforce agreement impartially at 
low costs such that the offending party always has to compensate the injured party to the 
degree that makes it costly to violate the contract. The costs to formal contracting and 
enforcement may relate to information gathering and dissemination, time and investment 
in human resources. Hadfield (2004) has observed that for third party enforcement to be 
effective, these costs must not outweigh the gains of resolving contract dispute. For ―in 
an environment with only high-cost enforcement mechanisms, only high-value contracts 
and those that are supported effectively by baseline institutions such as trust and family 
relationships are likely to go forward‖(Hadfield, 2004, p10).  Greif‘s (2006) analysis of 
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the Maghribi traders highlights how commitment problems by the traders were resolved 
outside the realm of the court system. Not only was the settlement of commercial dispute 
via the court system expensive and time consuming but also the courts lacked the 
capacity to collect information that was required to adjudicate trading dispute or simply 
some of the trade agents were above the law and could not be sued. They instead relied 
on ―coalitions‖ to surmount commitment problems (the concept of coalition is discussed 
further under informal institutions).        
 
The primary focus of this study has not been to explicitly investigate the effectiveness or 
otherwise of formal institutions in mitigating agency problems. This is not in any way to 
discount the importance of formal institutions to market transactions. The reason has 
more to do with the theoretical disposition of this study, which emphasizes the facilitating 
role of inter-firm linkages and personal ties in market transactions and the extent of their 
effectiveness. It is also informed by the fact that the environment within which this study 
(based on the reviewed literature) was conducted is generally characterized by imperfect 
and unresponsive formal institutional arrangements. It is true that where the legal system 
is weak, where dispute settlement through the court is cumbersome or where the size of 
the transaction between the partners is relatively small, trading partners may bypass 
formal enforcement mechanisms and resort to personalized enforcement mechanisms to 
circumvent the time consuming and expensive dispute resolution through the court 
process (Fafchamps 1996; 2001). The literature highlights the existence of weak formal 
mechanisms of enforcement in the areas of commercial dispute resolution, compliance 
with quality standards and unresponsiveness of formal institutions to small-scale 
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enterprises in many countries in Sub-Saharan African (Fafchamps, 2001; Lall and 
Pietrobelli, 2002). Under the conditions of weak formal institutional setting, certain 
agents resort to self-enforcing mechanisms to reduce commitment problems as well as a 
reliance on private provisioning to overcome internal capability constrains to trade, which 
is often the case in many Third World countries. The next section examines the extent of 
the role of informal institutions in market transactions as espoused in the literature.    
 
2.3.3 Informal (Private) Institutions and Market Transactions 
Opportunism and dishonesty could alternatively be mitigated by personal ties between 
transacting partners. The use of informal enforcement mechanism through group pressure 
and reputation effect could lower the cost of transacting and therefore the need for fewer 
formal safeguards to achieve contract compliance (Knorringa, 1996; Keefer and Shirley, 
2000). The idea of the role of interpersonal relationships in reducing deceit and shirking 
in economic transactions is firmly rooted in Granovetter‘s (1985) idea of embeddedness. 
This concept ―stresses…the role of concrete personal relations and…networks of such 
relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance‖ (p490). Granovetter argued 
that the widespread preferences for transacting with agents of known reputation imply 
that few are willing to rely on generalized (formal) institutional arrangements to guard 
against opportunisms. He identifies four grounds that make it is better to rely on personal 
relations for information in economic transaction; i) it is cheap ii) it is richer, more 
detailed and known to be accurate iii) individuals with whom one has a continuing 
relation have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage future 
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transactions and iv) continuing economic relations that are embedded in social relations 
carry strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism.        
 
Informal institutions, from a Northian perspective, are human constraints that emanate 
from shared norms of behaviour or code of conduct of social groups that govern human 
interaction. Viewed against formal institutions, informal institutions are private human 
constrains that stem from norms and customs (Williamson, 2009). Unlike a formal 
institutional arrangement in which contractual obligations are enforced by a third party 
mostly through the authoritative power of the state, informal institutional arrangements 
rely on self-enforcing mechanism to ensure that contract terms are adhered to. The 
members of a social group police themselves to enforce compliance to group‘s norms. 
Informal constraints are socially sanctioned norms of behaviour and internally 
enforceable standards of conduct (North, 1990).   Members belonging to informal trading 
associations or groups often share the common view that they are ―in it together‖ (Mead 
1984, p1101) and that, even though informal constraints are unconsciously designed, ―it 
is in everyone‘s interest to keep‖ (North 1990, p41). Therefore, aberrations of the norms 
of behaviour and the code of conduct by a member are viewed as negatively affecting the 
reputation and cohesion of the group and as such are met with sanctions that may see the 
member being ostracized. The fear of being ostracized from a social group or the 
expectation of future loss of trading relationship may check deceit and induce acceptable 
commercial behaviour between trading partners and among groups (Nadvi and Schmitz, 
1994; Bigsten et al. 1998). Sanctions in this context take the form of loss of reputation or 
valuable future relationship.  
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There is rich empirical evidence that highlight how informal institutional mechanisms 
have enabled trading partners to mitigate problems of contract commitment and trading 
risks. The Maghribi traders‘ coalition (Greif, 1993, 2006) and the Grameen financial 
arrangements (Morduch, 1999) are both cases in which informal institutions were utilized 
in their respective transaction regimes.  The Maghribi traders through the instrumentality 
of the ―coalition‖ were able to deal with overseas agents despite the commitment 
problems that were inherent in the relations. The ―coalition‖ was an institution in which 
implicit contractual relations and specific information-transmission mechanism supported 
the operation of a reputation mechanism that enabled the traders to overcome 
commitment problems. That a reputation mechanism governed agency relation such that 
traders conditioned future trade engagement on past conduct, practiced community 
punishment, and ostracized agents who were considered cheaters until they compensated 
the injured, and that agents were ready to forgo immediate gains to sustain their standing 
in the trader‘s group (Greif, 1993).  Greif noted that the coalition was closely knitted 
together such that members were committed to engage in transactions with other 
Maghribis in far places.     
 
The Grameen model is touted in the microfinance literature as offering institutional 
promise for mitigating information asymmetries between a formal lending institutions 
and small-scale borrowers by utilizing a peer monitoring system, which economizes on 
monitoring costs and maximizes the rate of repayment (Stieglitz, 1990; Ghatak, 2000). 
The Grameen banking model illustrates how formal banking institutions rely on informal 
mechanisms such as group solidarity pressure to administer loans to small scale 
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producers in many developing countries (Morduch, 1999). This informal financial 
arrangement, which originated from Bangladesh and has been replicated in a number of 
developing countries, enable small firms who may lack physical collateral to access 
formal credit (Morduch, 1999). The basic principle of this model is that by making a 
group jointly liable to loan repayment members are induced to monitor their peers to 
ensure that the loans are used productively for the intended purpose, which ultimately 
minimizes default rate. The group members only gain access to further credit if the group 
debt is discharged; a default by a member leads to denial of credits to any other member 
of the group. In this instance, the members have the incentive to monitor each other and 
to exclude risky borrowers from participation, thus promoting repayment (Morduch, 
1999). The peers possess rich information about each other regarding their conduct in 
utilizing the credit to execute the actual production activities. Through the peer 
monitoring mechanism, the bank is able to minimize information asymmetries and 
monitoring, which often present the main challenges of managing small credits to small 
producers.  Peer monitoring, in other words, acts in stead of conventional collateral in 
insuring against default but there are conditions under which this is sustainable. The 
success of this model according to Stiglitz (1990) depends on the size of the group. The 
model, according to him, thrives on small group size because that increases the risk from 
a default by a single member but increases the incentives for peer monitoring. He argues 
that large group increases the problem of free riding; each member in the group would 
prefer that others invest time and energy in monitoring. It is also not clear how effective 
these intangible assets such as peer monitoring in minimizing default are as both the size 
of the group and credit increase.       
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Ensminger (1996) similarly observed a situation where Orma traders in Kenya rely upon 
informal arrangements i.e. paternalistic relations to address pervasive agency problems.   
Keefer and Shirley (2000) made a similar claim in China, where informal institutions i.e. 
personal ties with local leaders, help insulate foreign investment against local deceit. 
They were, however, quick to point out that informal institutions incompletely explain 
the success of foreign investment in China and add that formal institutional checks 
embedded in the Chinese decentralized political system complement informal institutions 
in this regard.  
 
Related to the foregoing analysis of informal mechanisms is third-party private 
enforcements and provisioning (private intermediaries), which is argued to constitute an 
alternative path for filling institutional gaps that may arise as a result of weak state 
institutions, which provide trade support services. ―If the government does not provide 
contract enforcement using its general revenues, then a private person may be able to do 
so for a profit‖ (Dixit, 2004, p97). Gambetta‘s (1993) classic work; The Sicilian Mafia 
and the business of private protection is cited to support the claim of third party 
enforcement in the context of weak public provision of security by the state. Gambetta 
begins his book by recounting what a cattle breeder had told him to highlight the core 
thesis of his analysis of the business of mafia protection: 
When a butcher comes to me to buy an animal, he knows that I want to 
cheat him [by giving him a low quality animal]. But I know that he wants to 
cheat me [by reneging on payment]. Thus we need Peppe [that is a third 
party] to make us agree. And we both pay Peppe a percentage of the deal 
(Gambetta, 1993, p15; also cited in Dixit, 2004, p99). 
 
Gambetta (1993, p16) went further to explain that the intermediary function of:    
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Peppe was mainly selling information, thereby making the transactions 
possible, and that it was for this service that he received a 2 percent 
commission. When in addition he acted as a guarantor of quality and 
payment, the percentage increased.    
 
The services of Peppe were of two kinds, provision of information specific to the 
transaction and ex post enforcement to deter shirking and achieve compliance on 
commission basis (Dixit, 2004). The success of private third party intermediation as an 
alternative institutional path is contingent on the extent to which the intermediaries are 
able to discourage free-riding by making their services unavailable to non-clients. And 
for clients to continue to transact or use third party services, the intermediaries must 
credibly commit themselves not to use the trade information they possess for extortion or 
double crossing (Dixit, 2004). 
 
2.3.4 The limits of Informal Institutions 
Despite the significance of informal institutions to market exchange in the absence of 
strong formal institutions, there are those authors who question the efficacy of informal 
institutions in supporting complex, impersonal and expanding trade volume. Keefer and 
Shirley (2000), in their analysis of the relative weight of formal and informal institutions 
in safeguarding contractual obligations argued that informal institutions are insufficient 
when it comes to sustaining economic growth because informal institutions are weak in 
protecting specific investment from opportunistic hold-up and also do a poor job in 
guaranteeing quality of goods of manufacturers that exhibit important and hard-to-
measure quality attributes. Informal institutions are also regarded as restrictive in that 
they are often not available to most potential participants in the market since network 
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participants tend to trade with people they know. Greif (1994) makes a contrasting 
analysis of the efficacy of the institutional arrangements adopted by the Maghribi traders 
and the Genoese traders. The Maghribi traders as indicated earlier relied on informal 
group dynamics to assemble and transmit information and reduced agency problems but 
could not expand the scope of their trade outside the Maghreb‘s coalition (overseas 
trading was even done through agents who were themselves Maghribis). On the other 
hand, the Genoese traders who were culturally individualistic and used more bilateral 
arrangements backed up with formal enforcement systems benefitted from opportunities 
that emerged from trading with other traders outside the Genoese group. Another 
downside to the use of informal networks is that it may also minimize the gains of trade 
because the long-held trusted and few partners in the locality may face the same problems 
(Ensminger, 1996) and may impede exposure to new ideas. In a more recent study of 
contract enforcement in the Mexican footwear industry, Woodruff (1998) observed that 
informal associational mechanisms facilitated and sustained trade by reducing the cost of 
information (by creating a common data-base platforms easily available to members) 
about the reliability and behaviour of trading partners. Clients who reneged on payments 
were blacklisted and the agents of the trading association frequently used threats of listing 
defaulting clients in the ―defaulted clients‖ bulletin as a reputation mechanism to enforce 
repayment. He indicated further that this informal enforcement mechanism worked 
effectively within the context of the Mexican closed economy but trade liberalization in 
1987 weakened the sanctions that the manufacturers were able to apply to domestic 
retailers who behaved waywardly. This is because the latter were able to procure products 
from abroad and as such could not be held captive in the informal associational 
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mechanism. Likewise, since foreign buyers had never been captive to Mexican producers, 
the informal associational ―coalition‖ was ill-equipped to monitor them. In effect, 
informal institutions may be imperfect for enforcing contract obligations within the 
context of an expanding and complex trade. The difficulties of monitoring and 
enforcement make informal contracts as market constraining mechanisms less effective.     
 
According to North (1990, 1991), in the early stages of a country‘s development, its 
economy is characterized by informal institutions that seemingly work well for the 
largely traditional economic activities. Most transactions in this instance takes place 
within a dense social network of informal constraints and the reputation of the parties to 
the transaction are known. Contracts are enforced through these mechanisms to avoid 
deceit. The simplicity of trade makes the reliance on informal mechanisms possible.     
   
An expanding trade regime and increasing specialization consequently increases agency 
problems and the difficulty of contract enforcement becomes more complex and 
elaborated. In the view of North (1991), as trade expands and transcends geographical 
boundaries, the possibilities for conflict over exchange grow; difficulties over 
information gathering and enforcement of contract terms also increase. Formalized rules, 
contracts and third party enforcement bodies help to align the interest of agents to that of 
principals and resolves transaction disputes and thereby reduce monitoring cost. The 
expansion of trade:  
…need[s] effective, impersonal contract enforcement because personal 
ties, voluntaristic constraints, and ostracism are no longer effective as 
more complex and impersonal forms of exchange emerge. It is not that 
those personal and social alternatives are not important; they are still 
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significant …in today‘s interdependent world. But in the absence of 
effective impersonal contracting, the gains from ―defection‖ are great 
enough to forestall the development of complex exchange (North 1991, 
p100).    
 
Following North, Luiz (2009) makes a similar observation about the relative rigour of 
informal and formal institutions in supporting anonymous and complex trade regimes and 
indicates that in simple economies one can trust one‘s neighbour because one knows the 
family or the community and therefore reputation effects and community sanctions are 
possible. But as the economy becomes more sophisticated, a corresponding need arises 
for formal institutions because one is more likely to engage in anonymous exchange 
where the family is not known.  Investment of trust in formal institutions would be a 
better substitute for group sanctions.     
 
North (1991) and others in effect are arguing that as the market expands and trade 
increases, there is a parallel need for the evolution of institutions from informal to formal 
to deal with the complexity of trade. Legal enforcement and not personalized transactions 
enhances the economic reach and the range of partners they can transact with, without 
prior acquaintances (Fafchamps, 1996). In this case impersonal institutions replace 
personalized interaction and one is likely to engage in anonymous transaction without 
necessarily having to know the other partner.  The accessibility and the large reach that is 
obtainable from formal institutions encourage high volume trade and specialization 
(North, 1991; Keefer and Shirley, 2000).  Hence formal institutions can promote trade in 
ways that informal institutions cannot (Keefer and Shirley, 2000). Ensminger (1996) also 
notes that traders stand to gain from broader trade and specialization but this is 
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achievable when formal institutions are developed, which would enable the traders to 
deal with anonymous partners in good faith. But North (1991, p107) notes that the 
incentive to devise or the willingness to resort to formal enforcement mechanisms largely 
depends on the volume of trade. In other words, the evolution of formal institutions is 
causally related to the volume and complexity of trade:  
 
That is the increasing volume of distance trade raise[s] the rate of return to 
merchants of devising effective mechanisms for enforcing contract. In turn, 
the development of such mechanisms lower[s] the costs of contracting and 
[makes] trade more profitable.  
 
Similarly, Posner (1998) on his commentary of legal reforms in developing and transition 
economies alludes to the chicken and egg dilemma that characterizes the relationships 
between legal reforms and economic development. A poor country may not be able to 
pay for a good legal system, but without a good legal system that country may fail to 
grow its economy in order to be able to afford good legal system. Economic growth in his 
view is important on both the demand and supply sides of legal reform: i.e. to stimulate 
demand for legal services and to generate the resources necessary for the supply of legal 
services. He, however, indicated the need not to over-exaggerate the debate but instead 
for countries to proceed in building legal systems gradually and incrementally, 
commensurate with the modernization of their economies. 
 
The possibility is also there for economic agents to engage in trade transactions in a 
society that boasts effective formal institutions to apply legal contractual arrangements 
and simultaneously resort to informal institutional arrangements. Macaulay (1963) for 
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instance demonstrated that even in the US with developed formal systems, businessmen 
do resort to inter-personal relations in their business dealings.  He showed that in some 
instances trade agreements may take on the form of formal contracts but breach of 
contract terms may not be subjected to legal sanctions but instead ―good faith‖ dispute 
resolution may apply.  The motive here is that parties to a transaction may choose to rely 
on informal enforcement mechanisms instead of more coercive formal legal actions to 
extract contract compliance if they want to preserve their business relationship 
(Fafchamps, 1996). Formal enforcement mechanisms, especially the more coercive 
actions may undermine personal trust building (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005; Mackenzie, 
2008).  Even if formal contracts are considered effective institutional tools for reducing 
opportunistic risks, the imperative according to Williamson is that reaching a 
comprehensive contract entailing all unforeseen contingencies is an impossible exercise 
during and after contracting due to limits on rationality. This implies that to arrive at a 
complete contract with all the relevant information to a trade transaction in order to 
protect oneself from opportunism would be deficient without informal institutions or trust 
(Lorenz, 2000). Relational contracting as a complementary institutional tool has the 
advantage of enabling market participants to access hidden information about quality and 
standards as well as the behaviour of trading partners (Johnson et al. 2002). 
 
The foregoing discourse looked at the theoretical debate regarding the relative 
effectiveness of formal and informal institutions in reducing agency problems and high 
transaction costs. Strong formal institutions according to the literature are effective in 
sustaining impersonal economic transactions and high volume trade. In the absence of 
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effective public formal institutions market participants may either resort to informal 
institutions in their business transactions or rely on third parties to meet contractual 
obligations.  Both public formal institutions and informal self-enforcing/self-provisioning 
mechanisms could reduce the problems of agency and sustain specialization; however, of 
the two forms of institutions, self-enforcing institutions (inter-personal ties and informal 
networks) may prove less equal to the task of mitigating non-commitment to contractual 
obligations. Particularly, the lack of personal trust, a prerequisite for sustaining inter-firm 
relations, implies that informal institutional arrangement becomes less suitable 
mechanism for sustaining trade specialization. The distinction between the 
instrumentality of formal and informal institutions in facilitating market exchange may 
remain at the artificial level since both institutions may be used to complement each other 
in supporting market transactions. 
 
2.3.5 What if Informal Institutions are Insufficient and Opportunism Pervasive? 
It is obvious that the original theorists of new institutional economics undertook their 
analysis within the specific context of the industrialized countries where there exist, 
generally, strong formal institutions that support trade specialization. How do economic 
agents reduce transaction costs and market failures in an institutional environment 
characterized by informal institutional mechanisms that seem limited or inadequate as 
agents seek to engage in long-distance and expanding trade?  Clearly, these characterize 
the institutional setting of many developing countries; more so, in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(see a detail discussion on this subject in section 2.5).   More questions are raised as to 
how economic agents organize or coordinate economic activities in response to imperfect 
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institutional and economic environment in those societies. Bigsten et al. (1998), for 
example, makes an important observation about countries in Sub-Saharan Africa relying 
on market practices where delays, late payments and breach of other contract obligations 
are to some extent tolerated in order to surmount not just deceit but also other exogenous 
factors pertaining to the broader socioeconomic environment that may impede contract 
performance. The question of how such practices, for instance, fare as African 
entrepreneurs seek to trade with international clients, where there is the culture of stricter 
adherence to contract terms, largely remains open (Bigsten et al. 1998).  
 
What happens to market transactions in situations where informal mechanisms are 
infeasible, either because the scale of market participants is too high or the informational 
network and the system of group sanctions are too weak, formal institutions unavailable 
and transaction cost high (Dixit, 2004). The solution in terms of institutional arrangement 
offer by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) is that entrepreneurs who are faced with 
extreme market imperfections would seek to internalize transactions in-house to save on 
the cost of opportunism and other market risks. This study also takes the position that 
entrepreneurs facing uncertainties regarding their trade transactions would internalize 
production functions within the boundaries of their firms in an effort to minimize risks 
and market failures. However, in the particular case of entrepreneurs in the sector of 
choice for this study, the extent of the internalization they adopt assumes a form that is 
partial in nature to accommodate the flexibility that is required to adjust to changes in the 
volatile end market; an arrangement termed as inside-contracting. Inside contracting is a 
quasi-firm arrangement in which the production process is conducted partially in-house 
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under the indirect command of a principal entrepreneurs; affording the entrepreneur 
control over the production process. 
 
2.4 Sub-Contracting and Inside-Contracting Arrangements 
The obsession with the human problem of opportunism blinds Williamson to recognize 
other positive aspects of human behaviour such as personal trust in allowing production 
functions to be undertaken independently of a leading enterprise without having to 
internalize those functions in-house. The crafting of organizational hybrids between 
market and hierarchy offer the lead enterprise more flexibility than the rigid hierarchical 
structure, which enables the lead firm to reduce transaction costs and at the same time 
able to adjust easily to unstable markets situation (Mackenzie 2008). Production networks 
conceived to be intermediate arrangements, for instance, are described as ―lighter on their 
feet‖ than centralized firms (Powell, 1990) in responding to unanticipated changes in 
demand.   
 
Williamson‘s classical transaction cost theory is also criticized for its prime focus on the 
alternative organizational forms or contractual relationships between market and 
hierarchy, ignoring intermediate modes of organizing production such as production 
networks and subcontracting. Again, the transaction cost framework regards the flow of 
inputs, output and skills as given (Cooke and Morgan, 1998) and organizational forms as 
―comparative static‖ instead of treating them as a dynamic process (Foss 1993, in Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998). Between the extremes of spot-market transactions and highly 
centralized firms are intermediate forms of organization: 
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Moving from the market pole, where prices capture all the relevant 
information necessary for exchange, we find putting-out systems, various 
kinds of repeated trading, quasi-firm, and subcontracting arrangements 
towards the hierarchy pole… (Powell, 1990, p297).  
 
The evolution along the continuum is not unidirectional. The development of the 
production arrangements could begin from subcontracting arrangement towards either 
spot market arrangement or hierarchy. Intermediate production arrangements, whatever 
form they take, may be adopted for more than just the motive of reducing transaction 
costs but also could facilitate access to finance, the flow of market information and 
sharing of innovative ideas; necessary for firms‘ growth.  
 
Both sub-contracting and inside-contracting are conceptualized as intermediate market 
coordination arrangements between the ―buy or make‖ hypothesis. The basic idea that is 
expressed in this section of the analysis is that inside contracting systems and external 
subcontracting have relative strengths in addressing agency problems as the size and 
complexity of trade increases under conditions of market imperfections. The purely 
market-based putting-out production arrangement may enable entrepreneurs to gain 
access to some important resources and also overcome their own internal capacity 
difficulties, however, within the context of weak institutional and microeconomic 
environments, entrepreneurs relying on inside contracting arrangement are comparatively 
better able to deal with agency problems and address product/process complexities 
associated with modest trade expansion. Opportunistic tendencies and weak contract 
enforcement make the sustenance of informal subcontracting as a production arrangement 
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less appropriate for enterprise success. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the reality is also 
more complex than the simplistic alternative responses of either external contracting or 
inside contracting. Instead rational entrepreneurs may choose a complex mix of external 
and internal contracting arrangements in response to differing risks and production 
challenges.  This complexity pertaining to the case study industry on one hand reflects a 
drive towards internal integration as manifested in inside contracting. On the other hand, 
it shows the development of steady network of contracting relations based on inter-
personal trust building.     
 
2.4.1 Trust and Subcontracting Relations  
The burgeoning literature on network analysis stresses the role of inter-firm relations in 
enhancing the performance of small enterprises and enabling them to compete both in the 
domestic and international markets. Nadvi and Schmitz (1994) carried out an extensive 
review of empirical works on clusters in developing and developed countries and stressed 
the importance of inter-firm relations to the competitiveness of small firms. Generally, 
production networks facilitate sharing of information about product 
development/specifications, quality standards and also could help to lower transaction 
costs and uncertainty (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994; Barr 1998). Abigail Barr also looked at 
the linkages between the structure and functions of networks and how they may affect the 
performance of enterprises. She distinguished between what she called innovative 
networks and solidarity networks. Innovative networks are diverse, relatively large, 
allowing information about markets and skills to accrue to network members and utilized 
for the motive of enhancing enterprise performance. Solidarity networks on the other 
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hand, are small and homogenous and deployed for the purpose of reducing uncertainty 
and mostly patronized by small firms.  
 
Sharing important market information and technical skills, even involving specific 
investment, between independent trading partners is made possible when there is long-
term trust building relationship between the partners (Schmitz, 1999). Trust remains an 
important intangible ingredient that sustains production networks. Personal trust enables 
inter-firm relations to flourish, whereas opportunism or distrust can be counter-productive 
to the building of robust production networks (Fafchamps, 1996).  
 
Sako (1997, p3) defines trust as ―an expectation held by an agent that its trading partner 
will behave in a mutually acceptable manner (including the expectation that neither party 
will exploit the other‘s vulnerabilities)‖. Gambetta (2000) explains that when we say 
someone is trustworthy, it means the possibility that the individual will perform an action 
that is beneficial to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of 
cooperation. Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) observe that trust involves an accepted 
vulnerability to a partner‘s ill-will and go on to raise the question of how one can locate 
trustworthy partners for transactions if the world does contain opportunists. On what 
basis is trust formed and how does its basis change over time (Schmitz, 1999)?   
Zucker (1986) makes a distinction between characteristic-based and process-based trusts. 
According to Zucker, characteristic-based trust is tied to a person depending on features 
such as family background, ethnicity or a group membership. The ―trustworthiness of an 
individual is defined by membership of a group who the agent considers trustworthy… 
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and this identity establishes common meanings…about exchange‖ (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 1998, p 38). The Magribi traders‘ coalition discussed under informal institutions 
in section 2.3.3 bears resemblance to the formation of trust based on social-cultural 
identity. Characteristic-based trust is developed as a result of the inter-personal 
embeddedness of trading parties who share common cultural or social norms 
(Granovetter, 1985). Members belonging to a common social group (in addition to 
internal sanctions to sustain the reputation of the group) would be more confident in 
transacting business with each other. Schmitz (1999) terms this as ascribed trust; 
implying a belief in solidarity (in addition to sanctions) and not in the sense of blindly 
trusting anybody belonging to a particular family, ethnic group or a local community.  
 
Processed-based trust is formed as a result of direct experience of cooperation with 
trading partners (Zucker, 1986). It develops through recurring inter-firm transactions, 
where partners invest in the relationship over a period of time (Humphrey and Schmitz 
1998). According to Humphrey and Schmitz (ibid) repeated interactions allow the 
partners to learn and understand the motives of their partners. It is developed through the 
actual processes of doing business and the partners commit themselves to the transactions 
by consciously investing in the relationship for their mutual good.  Sako (1997, p3) refers 
to this as ―good will‖ trust, where the parties ―make an open-ended commitment to take 
initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from unfair advantage taking‖. This way 
trust is earned through conscious investments by the trading partners (Schmitz, 1999).  
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The basis of trust also changes with time. Humphrey and Schmitz (1998), Nadvi (1999) 
and Schmitz (1999) in their analyses of industrial clusters in Brazil and Pakistan have 
shown how the basis of trust can evolve from characteristic-based trust to earned-trust. 
The authors showed that early industrial activities in the clusters were facilitated by trust 
based on socio-cultural ties. However, the influence of socio-cultural ties diminished over 
time as outsiders with whom local producers share no social ties began to play a key role 
in the clusters‘ growth. Schmitz (1999, p144) summarized the changing ties in the 
Brazilian Sino Valley shoe cluster as follows:  
 
The resulting boom…weakened the socio-cultural ties which had 
facilitated exchange and cooperation. Export agents were beginning to 
play a major role, not only as traders, but also in product development, 
quality inspection and technical assistance. In order to succeed in 
external markets satisfying the foreign export agents took precedence 
over all other business relationships … by 1980s the local industry had 
become highly differentiated and the old socio-cultural ties had little 
influence on inter-firm relationships. 
  
As local producers begin to trade with external clients, who may serve as new sources of 
market information and technical know-how, it implies the need to build new bonds of 
relationships with the external agents in order to benefit from such resources (Nadvi, 
1999). Schmitz (1999, 145) observed that in the 1990s as the Sino Valley cluster 
experienced stiff competition from China and the export boom that began in the 1980s 
abated, the local producers had to return to ― a greater spirit of cooperation‖ based largely 
on conscious investments in inter-firm relationship. Schmitz‘s observation is consistent 
with Granovetter‘s (1983) analytical distinction between strong ties that are formed 
around non-economic identities and weak ties developed through frequent business 
interactions. The latter is regarded as important for achieving competitive advantage, 
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however, there may be barriers to building weak ties or business ties since building them 
requires investment. Meagher (2010) argues that the ability of economic agents to build 
and maintain stable business ties is a function of the social and economic characteristics 
of the agents. According to her, wealth, gender, education and the performance of 
individual firms are important requirements for shaping how producers navigate the shift 
to new business ties. Meagher (ibid) observed that producers in the informal shoe and 
garment clusters in Aba, Nigeria are increasingly developing weak ties based on 
considerations such as quality, reliability and price rather than communal solidarity. In 
other words, having the capacity to produce quality products in a reliable manner is an 
important condition for building weak ties. However, for the less well-endowed informal 
producers: 
 
weak ties are not always sources of strength. While they may widen 
access to resources, they involve more exacting conditions for the 
development of trust and economic collaboration. Those unable to meet 
these requirements are either thrown back on narrow and under resourced 
networks or abandoned to more unstable business contacts based more on 
opportunism and desperation than trust (Meagher, 2010, p88).      
  
It will be demonstrated in this study that the ability of the Ghanaian craft exporters to 
build processed-based trust with local artisan subcontractors and international buyers are 
important in enabling the exporters to gain access to skillful artisan labour, market 
information and sometimes finance. The exporters in the Ghanaian craft industry rely 
predominantly on subcontracting relations for their production activities but the 
effectiveness of the subcontracting relations in ensuring growth depends on the degree of 
built trust that pertains to the relationships. It will be shown in chapter six that the 
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exporters who are formally educated, possessing in-house production capacities and able 
to meet quality standards and delivery timelines have been able to build business ties with 
artisan subcontractors and international buyers, enabling them to gain access to skilful 
labour, market information and working capital. Conversely, the less well-endowed 
exporters tend to rely on arms length business ties often characterized by deceit and 
opportunistic tendencies and least suitable for securing resources and meeting market 
demands. 
 
How is Subcontracting related to Network? 
There is some confusion in the literature as to whether or not subcontracting 
arrangements and networks are related. Knorringa (1996) points out that both 
subcontracting and networks are collaborative arrangements constituting intermediate 
arrangements between markets and hierarchy. The differentiating factor is the amount of 
trust, derived either through inter-personal ties or formal institutional arrangements 
(generalized trust) that prevails in the particular production relations. Subcontracting 
arrangements may range from hostile bargaining based on distrust to more collaborative 
and intensive relations (Knorringa, 1996). In much the same way network relations can 
―degenerate‖ to fluid and distrustful relations. The Japanese example of relational 
contracting of ―moralized trading relationships of mutual goodwill‖ (Dore, 1983, p463) is 
often cited as typical example of subcontracting arrangements overlapping with network 
relations.  In the end: 
 
subcontracting and network relations may be rather similar in that they are 
hybrids between market and hierarchy, most network relations 
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significantly differ from the average subcontracting relation in that they 
contain a more significant degree of …trust…in some situations 
subcontracting relations may evolve into network relations (Knorringa, 
1996, p64). 
 
Subcontracting arrangements according to Knorringa (1996) occupy a substantial space 
between the market-hierarchy continuums and assume many faces. Mead (1984), for 
instance, identified three forms of subcontracting arrangements, which he claimed are 
prevalent in many developing countries and shed light on how small firms resolve 
contractual difficulties emanating, for instance, from opportunism and its varying 
implications on the growth of small firms. The first subcontracting arrangement identified 
by Mead is characterized by unequal market power relations between independent 
producers and few dominant leading enterprises. The buyer in this relationship can easily 
switch to a variety of suppliers and can undercut any potential market strength of the 
subcontractors, especially when the activities of the subcontractors seek to threaten their 
market position. Producers are restricted to simple activities based on the utilization of 
unskilled labour and the use of simple tools. This ―traditional‖ subcontracting 
arrangement, which is cost-reducing and based on lower input prices, can provide modest 
levels of incomes to large numbers of individual subcontractors or producers, but is least 
suitable in terms of the potential for enabling the subcontractors to achieve a long-term 
growth—there is limited flow of information and technical skills for developing new 
products and improving production process. The logic of such an arrangement though is 
often to help principal firms to reduce supervision costs and spread risks (Nadvi and 
Schmitz, 1994), yet supervision costs and risks may be high in deploying this 
subcontracting arrangement in an environment of pervasive opportunistic behaviour. It 
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will be shown later in the discussion how the ―putting-out‖ system which is synonymous 
to this first stage subcontracting arrangement (Lazerson, 1990), was rendered ineffectual 
by pervasive market imperfections and gave way to the development of a relatively 
robust production arrangement i.e. the  inside contracting system.   
 
Mead (1984) characterizes the second subcontracting arrangement as a competitive 
relationship comprising many buyers and suppliers in which the producers use machinery 
of some reasonable sophistication compared with the first arrangement. The multiple 
buyers and suppliers in this arrangement shift the subcontracting arrangement from 
unequal market power relations to a competitive situation, representing a much better 
pattern for growth.  
 
The third subcontracting arrangement involves a reliance on market arrangements as well 
as non-market links to resolve risks inherent in the transaction environment. In this 
arrangement, the leading firms may support the subcontractors or the producers by 
providing them with raw materials, finance and training to bolster the capacity of the 
producers. According to Mead, the principal entrepreneurs adopt this to overcome their 
own lack of supervision capability as well as technical skills. It is based on more 
collaborative inter-firm relations entailing substantial sharing of skills and information, 
and a lot of learning takes place—the potential for growth in this arrangement is 
relatively large. The actors in this arrangement utilize personalized networks to resolve 
the ―market-or-hierarchy‖ problem. This contracting type uses social sanctions to 
pressurize suppliers to eschew opportunistic behaviour. Dore (1983) observed that 
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transaction costs for Japanese firms are lower because opportunism is less a problem and 
there is the prevalence and explicit promotion of personalized trade arrangements. 
Subcontracting arrangements in this sense become relational arrangements when they 
are built on trust and entail qualitative flow of information and enforcement achieved 
through effective informal sanctions. To revisit the observation earlier about the 
complementarities between formal and informal institutions in facilitating market 
exchange it is important to recognize that relational contracting could be strengthened 
with formal institutional tools. The prevalence of relational contracting in Japan as 
indicated earlier has much to do with greater amount of goodwill that existed in the 
Japanese society. Dore, however, observed that even in this society where there is a high 
degree of interpersonal trust, there is no immunity to market abuse and therefore formal 
contracts are used to minimize market abuse. He cited the example of the official 
encouragement of the use of written in addition to oral contracts in business transactions, 
which aims at ―strengthening moral constraints on …the abuse of market power‖ (p465). 
He characterized this arrangement as the ―… formal institutionalization of the ethics of 
relational contracting‖ (p466).  In this instance formal contract is deployed in addition to 
relational contracting, instead of replacing it, in constraining market abuse.  
 
In other words, the elements of formal institutional mechanisms,  intangible assets such 
as trust and other social control mechanisms are instrumental in facilitating trade 
specialization between principal enterprises and their external partners (North, 1991). 
Excessive opportunism could be counter-productive to the building of personalized trust 
and transactions are more likely to be costly to monitor when formal enforcement 
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institutions are weak and the complexity of trade relatively high (North, 1990).  The 
typical arm‘s length subcontracting, in this circumstance may be untenable or insufficient 
as a source of innovation/ resources and transaction cost reducing strategy. Inter-personal 
trust, effective informal monitoring/enforcement and strong formal institutions are 
important requisites for enabling external subcontracting to thrive. On the other hand, 
weak institutional environments characterized by lack of trust and unresponsive third 
party service provision or enforcement bodies are inimical to successful external 
subcontracting arrangements. In line with this reasoning, Mead (1984, p1099) observed 
that:   
―…the more prevalent are imperfections in the market, the more difficult it 
would be to introduce subcontracting arrangements into a production 
chain…one might add to this list one characteristic of many developing 
countries: a complex and antiquated legal system, with cumbersome and 
time-consuming court procedures, making it particularly difficult to enforce 
contracts or to penalize those who break them. All of these characteristics 
suggest that ‗parent‘ firms might have substantial problems… enforcing 
contracts with independent producers whereby the latter would undertake 
certain activities on their behalf‖ 
 
A more robust production arrangement would therefore be required to address the 
complexities of production i.e. quality concerns and risks associated with pervasive deceit.  
 
Entrepreneurs seeking to overcome these challenges and grow their firms may employ a 
production path that emphasizes the advantage of balancing the flexibility advantages 
often associated with external subcontracting with the need to increase supervision to 
reduce opportunism and gain control over production in order to meet quality and 
timelines requirements (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994).  The choice of a typical vertical 
integration as prescribed by Williamson may also be less preferable for it has many 
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caveats. Typical in-house production is rigid and least responsive to meeting different 
types of production orders and idiosyncratic market needs because most often in-house 
production is limited to few or a single client (Lazerson, 1990). Tastes and preferences of 
consumers change rapidly and these place enormous challenges on vertically-integrated 
firms to adapt to such changes, unless such in-house producers have developed multi-
purpose capacity and versatile workforce to adapt to those changes, which in itself could 
be regarded as flexible. Traditionally, centralized factory production is associated with 
building buffer stocks of semi-finished products as a way of fully utilizing the labour 
force but this has its own cost implications because capital may be locked up in the stock 
(Lazerson, 1990). 
 
In the face of these concerns, lead entrepreneurs seeking to minimize agency problems, 
increase control over production process, meet domestic production challenges and 
simultaneously adapt flexibly to changes in demand may adopt the organizational path of 
inside contracting that seems to enable the entrepreneurs to address these concerns. 
Insights from the industrial history literature are relied on for our analysis of inside 
contracting. Its development is traced to the putting-out system.  
 
2.4.2 From Putting-Out to Inside-Contracting 
The origin of subcontracting, according to Lazerson (1990) is traced back to the putting-
out system that was a dominant mode of organizing production until the late eighteenth 
century in the industrialized countries. It shares a lot in common with today‘s 
subcontracting arrangement. The basic characteristic of the putting-out system is that it is 
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a home-based production system, which is coordinated by a principal entrepreneur or 
merchant-coordinator.  The principal entrepreneur provides raw materials and finance to 
the individual producer who performs one of the stages of the production process at his or 
her workshop using his/her own tools (Landes, 1966, Williamson, 1980, Dietrich, 1994).   
The principal merchants then collect the semi-finished or the finished product and market 
them as their own. The basic contribution to production by the entrepreneur apart from 
marketing was to establish design standards and technical requirements (Lazerson, 1990). 
Landes (1966, p 12) describes the putting-out system as follows:    
…the merchant-manufacturer ―put out‖ raw materials…to dispersed cottage 
labour, to be worked up into finished or semi-finished products. Sometimes 
the household was responsible for more than one step in the production 
process…but the system was also compatible with the most refined division 
of labour…the manufacturing process was broken down into as many as a 
dozen stages on the path to industrial capitalism. For one thing it brought 
industrial organization closer to modern division between employers who 
own the capital and workers who sell their labour. To be sure most domestic 
[workers owned their tools]. They were not, however, independent 
entrepreneurs selling their products in the open market; rather they were 
hirelings, generally tied to a particular employer, to whom they agreed to 
furnish a given amount of work at a price stipulated in advance. 
 
The putting-out system is considered as marking a significant transitional phase of 
industrial production for the reason that it pulls large numbers of rural folks into 
exchange relationships (Lazerson, 1990). Characteristically, the workers of the putting-
out system are left unsupervised, they set their hours of work and payment connected to 
output. According to Williamson (1980), each producer maintains a considerable 
contractual independence in their relationship with the central entrepreneur and makes 
distinct profit margins based on the agreed contract terms. This does not suggest that the 
decision-making process is on equal terms. Whether or not the relationship would be 
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hierarchical relates to the bargaining strength of the producer vis-à-vis the principal 
entrepreneur, which in turn is dependent on the extent to which the partners have 
acquired trade-specific skills and knowledge, and the ownership of particular assets 
(Williamson, 1980).   
 
The importance of the putting-out system is suggested to have been diminished by the 
late nineteenth century and succeeded by factory setting production arrangements. The 
explanation for this shift is partly given as the weakness in the traditional putting-out 
arrangement whereby central entrepreneurs could not directly control the individual 
producers. As indicated earlier on, the producers enjoyed enormous independence under 
the putting-out system. They controlled production in their dispersed workshops, 
determined how much and when to work; all proved as obstacles to production 
supervision (Lazerson, 1990).  It was not only the output that was difficult to control but 
also the behaviour of the home-based producers (Dietrich, 1994). Landes (1969, p59) 
captured the difficulty the central entrepreneurs encountered in controlling the home-
based producers this way: 
[The entrepreneur] had no way of compelling his workers to do a given 
number of hours of labour; the domestic weaver or craftsman was a master 
of his time, starting and stopping when he desired and while the employer 
could raise the piece rate with a view to encouraging diligence, he usually  
found that this actually reduced output.  
  
The difficulties of supervision consequently, first, led to poor and uneven quality 
production and delays. Second, the lack of supervision is also observed to have led to 
embezzlement of the resources provided by the merchants and from the perspectives of 
transaction costs theory, this undermined the putting out production arrangement. Third, 
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it is observed that the lack of work discipline on the part of the putting-out producers was 
linked to subsistence farming where planting and harvesting were given priority over 
industrial production (Sewell, 1967 in Lazerson, 1990).  
 
Theft, supervision difficulties, poor product quality, delayed deliveries and insufficient 
output made the loose putting out system less popular. These factors to a large extent 
rendered the putting out arrangements less suitable mode of production towards the late 
nineteenth century but the question is, has the putting-out system in the face of these 
deficiencies lost its relevance as a mode of organizing production in the contemporary era? 
Lazerson (1990), offers a contrary view, arguing that the putting-out system was 
incorporated into factory production, particularly for labour intensive activities. The 
putting-out system remains a significant form of production in both developed and 
developing countries often interpreted in the form of modern subcontracting arrangement. 
The underlying principles of both putting-out systems and modern day loose 
subcontracting are similar. Subcontractors and putting-out producers have no direct outlet 
to the market, produce on order for a leading entrepreneur and are formally independent 
(Lazerson, 1990). ―Putting-out‖ and ―subcontracting‖ are used interchangeably in this 
study. The difficulties of controlling independent subcontractors undermine the efficacy 
of subcontracting to reduce transaction costs and meet contractual obligations. The 
inside-contracting system was devised by the entrepreneur-coordinator to overcome the 
problems of poor product quality, labour supervision and avoid delays. 
  
 
55 
 
2.4.3 Inside-Contracting System: Controlling the Production Process to Mitigate 
Market Imperfections 
 
The putting-out system was succeeded by a factory system in the nineteenth century 
called the ―inside contracting system‖. Inside contracting is regarded as a ―refined 
version‖ or ―a natural development from the putting-out system as it existed in Great 
Britain‖ (Buttrick 1952, p206). Buttrick (ibid, pp205-206) described the inside 
contracting system as follows: 
Under the system of inside contracting, the [owner] of a firm provided 
floor space and machinery, supplied raw material and working capital, and 
arranged for the sale of the finished product. The gap between raw 
material and finished product, however, was filled not by paid employees 
arranged in [a] descending hierarchy…but by [inside] contractors, to 
whom the production job was delegated. They hired their own employees, 
supervised the work process, and received a [negotiated] piece rate from 
the company.   
 
The relationship between the inside contractors (master craftspeople) and the enterprise 
owners was contractual and the contractors worked as semi-independent producers 
(Englander, 1987). The enterprise owner negotiated a piece rate with the contractor for 
components that were produced. The contractor hired, fired and set the wages of their 
own workers but production took place inside the owners‘ factories instead of the 
contractors‘ workshops. The advantages of inside contracting were that, first, it freed the 
owners, even though they owned the plant, from some of the technical problems (i.e. 
craftsmanship skills) associated with production and labour supervision (Buttrick, 1952). 
The inside contracting system, from an evolutionary perspective, is a development that 
offered the entrepreneur a ―transitory‖ solution to the problem of how to organize 
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production in the emerging factory (Dietrich, 1994). The second is that the system 
afforded the owners the opportunity to exercise some level of control over production 
information and operations, which were outside their immediate control (Englander, 
1987). The supervision of the workforce, however, was indirectly exercised through the 
master craftsmen.  As the scale of production increased, the entrepreneurs who seemingly 
did not have the requisite supervisory skills or the ability necessary to organize 
production had to subcontract the responsibility of labour supervision to agents within the 
firm (Englander, 1987; Dietrich, 1994). Accordingly, the entrepreneurs of the inside 
contracting system had to:   
carve [their] work force up into units small enough so that the accustomed 
form of labour control could be maintained through the agency of 
contractors, craftsmen, and foremen…the unifying thread was the 
decentralization of labour supervision [inside] the enterprise. The conclusion 
to be drawn seems clear: whatever the imperatives in the direction 
of …production, on specific matter of managing workers, the nineteenth 
century manufacturer conceded the superiority of the close, personal 
supervision that characterized small-scale enterprise (Brody, 1980 cited in 
Englander, 1987, p433).  
  
The inside contracting system also presented some advantages to the master craftsmen 
and their workers. The system enabled the master craftsmen to maintain their autonomy 
within the changing market environment. They wielded the craft skills, hired and 
supervised the work force and yet spared the problem of finance and salesmanship 
(Buttrick, 1952; Englander, 1987). The incomes of the master contractors were the 
difference between the negotiated price with the factory owners and the piece rate they 
paid to the workforce under them. The inside contract system provided the new artisans 
with the opportunity to acquire skills under the tutelage of a master and the masters kept 
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those workers who demonstrated ability to perform. In turn, the workers were assured of 
reasonably steady job inside the factory building (Englander, 1987).   
 
The emergence of the inside contracting system was a rational response to market 
imperfections (high transaction costs), which the putting out system with its inherent 
laxity of control was least able to address (Englander, 1987). Besides, other 
circumstances played a part in the change process. Buttrick (1952) observed that as 
demand increased, the use of ―interchangeable principle‖ technology suitable for 
achieving production of standardized products in large volumes also emerged. There was 
also the existence of a body of a workforce that was used to the concept of producing on 
contract. These factors propelled the development of the inside contracting system: 
 
The increased demand for fabricated metal products accompanying…the 
Civil War made it increasingly difficult to fill orders without additional 
capital and labour. These the toolmaker [the early toolmaker and armorer of 
New England had small work shops where guns and implements were made 
on order for people in the neighbourhood] could not supply himself. If to 
this situation are added two other factors, we will have a picture of the 
setting from which the contract system developed. The first of these was the 
increasing use of the principle of interchangeable parts; the second was the 
existence throughout the nineteenth century of inside contractors within the 
government arsenals…given the increased in demand and the cost 
advantages of …making use of interchangeable principle, inside contracting 
developed into an important and widely used system (Buttrick, 1952, p206-
207)  
 
As the firm evolves from the home-based production situation as it is the case of the 
putting-out system to a factory environment, the entrepreneur will begin to be confronted 
with increasing overhead cost as he embarks on detailed supervision to minimize 
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cheating. However, transaction costs savings that are achieved through production inside 
the firm will be evident with quality control economies (Dietrich, 1994).  
 
The relevance of the inside contracting system began to diminish at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. As the owners adopted more formalized internal control and 
recruitment systems, the nature of the firm began to take on a hierarchical character 
moving towards what Williamson described as the vertically integrated firm. The basic 
principle of inside-contracting as a rational response to addressing quality control 
concerns, labour supervision difficulties/opportunism, and in dealing with the complex 
changes in the physical characteristics of the traded products makes it relevant to this 
study. The inside contracting as adopted in this study is viewed as an extension of the 
subcontracting arrangement, which is more hierarchical but less so than the vertically 
integrated firm. Though its development is a dynamic process in response to addressing 
some of the weaknesses of the rudimentary putting-out system, the putting-out 
subcontracting arrangement, however, serves as the bedrock for the development of the 
inside contracting system and is not a complete breakaway. Inside contracting 
economizes on transaction costs within the context of uncertain environment, through 
indirect supervision in-house. It effectively addresses complexity of production better 
than the largely market-oriented subcontracting arrangement under risky production 
environment, even though from the perspective of industrial organization it is a 
transitional arrangement and less stable compared with vertically integrated firms. 
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In one view, the external subcontracting relationship can evolve into inside-contracting 
and in another it could be considered as alternative production forms used by 
entrepreneur-coordinators. These production arrangements viewed as alternatives have 
relative robustness in dealing with transactions costs and risk as well as the extent to 
which they enable the availability of resources to the participating enterprises for success. 
In effect these alternative production strategies would have differing outcomes on the 
success of small enterprises in an uncertain and weak institutional environment. The basic 
idea that is being expressed here is that the success of small leading firms in the market 
may be linked to the relationships they establish with external trading partners (Lorenzoni 
and Ornati, 1988; Lazerson, 1988).  
 
The analysis in this section sought to conceptualize the different modes of organizing 
production within the context of the buy-and-make hypothesis. The production 
arrangement, depending on where it is located in the market and hierarchy continuum, 
could lean either towards market exchanges or hierarchical arrangements. Nevertheless, 
the organizational choices made by principal entrepreneurs, in reality, are far more 
complex than the simple dichotomy between market and hierarchy or between 
subcontracting and inside-contracting. Instead, lead entrepreneurs choose a complex mix 
of institutional arrangements to encompass buy, make and collaborate in their relations 
with other partners in responding to their environment (Knorringa, 1996). In agreement 
with this position, Lazerson (1988, p340) had this to say: 
 
Even more incongruous with the dichotomous vision of hierarchies and 
markets was the fact that, within a single firm, movements towards 
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hierarchy and away from markets in one area were often counter-balanced 
by a greater dependence on markets in other areas. 
 
Knorringa (1996) has stylized these arguments into what he calls transaction regimes. He 
defined transaction regimes (Fig.1) as a set of common characteristics of exchange of 
transactions that take place in a specific institutional context. At the extremes of the 
transaction cost framework are the ―buy‖ and ―make‖ regimes. The intervening 
transaction regimes between the ―buy and make‖ poles of the continuum included 
subcontracting regime, network regime, industrial district regime and clan regime. 
Knorringa used this framework to analyze the Agra footwear cluster in India. What is 
conspicuously missing in these transaction regimes is the system of inside contracting. 
The industrial cluster (spatial agglomeration) and clan regimes are not given 
consideration in this study because they do not provide direct theoretical explanation to 
the empirical evidence. Knorringa indicates that these labels are meant to invoke mental 
images for analytical clarity regarding the different production arrangements that may be 
employed by entrepreneurs in response to their environment. A major theme discernible 
from the above discourse is that given the context of the institutional environment, 
different organizational strategies may yield different outcomes in terms of their 
influence on enterprise success and growth. However, this should not prevent us from 
recognizing the complex reality whereby a production arrangement may evolve from one 
regime to another or a single firm may deploy more than a single transaction regime in 
response to peculiar circumstances. This theoretical framework guides our analysis of 
how Ghanaian craft exporters organize production activities given the existing 
institutional and socioeconomic contexts in which they operate.  
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 Figure 1 represents the various transaction regimes designed by Knorringa. The auction 
regime symbolizes spot transaction entailing intense price haggling among anonymous 
actors and assumed to be effective under conditions of perfect information and 
homogenous products whose quality can easily be verified. The subcontracting regime is 
a relationship in which a lead actor places an order with a subcontractor to produce all or 
part of the order to which the leading entrepreneur takes and markets as his own. It may 
involve a written or oral contract in which the lead firm sets out the precise specifications 
of the order in advance. The subcontracting regime could overlap with the auction regime 
and takes on the form of market-based relation. Similarly it could intersect with the 
―direct control‖ regime leading to hierarchical or ―locked-in‖ subcontracting relations. 
The direct control regime on the other extreme on the transaction costs framework is a 
hierarchical arrangement within the firm in which the lead entrepreneur enforces 
compliance through direct controls and operational routines. The network regime carries 
the notion of close collaboration and trust building relationships between the trading 
partners. Like, the subcontracting regime the network regime is conceptualized as 
occupying the space between buy (market) and hierarchy (direct control) regimes. 
Subcontracting relations may develop from a hostile bargaining based on distrust to a 
more durable trust based relations thus overlapping with network regime.    
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  Buy                                                                                                                             Make 
Fig. 1(Adapted from Knorringa, 1996) 
 
 
2.5 The Global Value Chain Concept and International Trade 
This study is also about how international market forces shape the production activities of 
the small-scale Ghanaian craft exporters locally. It is therefore important to seek a 
framework that enables us to understand the organization of production activities across 
both firm and transnational boundaries and in particular how the organization of 
industrial activities is driven by international market demands and pressures. Gereffi et al. 
(2005) have attempted to capture the organization of industrial activities across firm and 
geographical boundaries using the global value chain concept. The contemporary global 
economy, according to Gereffi et al. (ibid), is marked by two main processes. First, 
Western corporations have been restructuring their operations in order to concentrate on 
their core competencies such as marketing, product strategy, and high value-added 
segments of manufacturing and in the process farm out non-core activities to suppliers in 
 
 
Auction 
 
 
 Direct Control 
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developing countries. This has extended the organization of industrial production across 
national boundaries. Second, this process is believed to lead to the upgrading of supply 
capabilities of firms in developing countries participating in global production chains.  
 
The global value chain concept is concerned with how global production and distribution 
systems are organized, involving recurrent transactions between various firms, across 
geographical boundaries (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Organizing industrial 
production on a global scale involves independent economic agents such as traders, 
export agents and global lead buyers who link supply to final consumption. To ensure that 
that the discrete roles of these agents are smoothly linked together as a unit presents 
enormous coordination challenges; agency problems may be high. This requires an 
institutional mechanism for aligning the interests of the different trading agents and 
actors for smooth flow of goods and services along the chain. 
 
Governance of global production networks is used to express the control that is exercised 
by some economic agents along the chain to ensure that all the discrete activities in the 
production network are neatly meshed together (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). Gereffi 
(1994) made reference to ―a governance structure‖ (i.e. authority and power relationships 
that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow along 
the chain) as central to the coordination of transnational production arrangements. Gereffi 
(ibid.) in his original conceptualization of transnational industrial organization made a 
distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven chains. The bases of the distinction 
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between the buyer and producer driven chains are located in their key barriers to entry 
(Gereffi et al. 1994). The producer driven chains are largely controlled by multinational 
corporations and they are typical of capital and technology intensive industries such as 
the automobile and aircraft industries. Barriers to entry in such chains are located in the 
heavy investments that are required to build large-scale, high-technology production 
facilities (Gereffi et al. 1994, Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).   
 
Buyer-driven chains refer to those industries in which global retailers, brand-named 
merchandisers and trading companies play a central role in coordinating the activities in 
the production networks. The buyer-driven chains are common in labour-intensive 
industries such as garments, footwear, toys, house wares and hand-crafted items (Gereffi, 
1994). The lead actors exercise control along the chain through the specification of what 
type of product needs to be supplied, in what quantity, when, and at what price 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). Global buyers who are usually the lead actors in the 
global value chains attain their powerful positions by specializing in high-value added 
functions such as marketing, branding and product development; activities in which entry 
barriers are high (Kaplinsky, 2000). Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) note that chain 
governance is important for market access, the acquisition of production capabilities by 
suppliers and the distribution of gains along the chain. They maintain that even if trade 
quota and tariff barriers are removed, access to Western markets would not be automatic 
because the chains into which developing countries‘ producers feed are often controlled 
by a limited number of buyers. Gaining access to the lead firms or buyers in the chain is 
an important precondition for exporting into Western markets. The decisions of the lead 
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global firms regarding quality, price and delivery timelines may lead to particular 
producers and traders losing out in global trade, especially, small producers who lack the 
capacity to meet buyers‘ demands.  Producers that gain access to the lead buyers tend to 
face new pressures as well as new opportunities for improving their production activities. 
The lead firms make exacting demands for cost reduction, higher quality and speed. They 
may at the same time transmit information about best practices to their suppliers and 
provide hands-on support and pressure on how to improve production processes. 
Humphrey and Schmitz (ibid.) also note the centrality of chain governance to the 
distribution of gains along the chain. Actors who govern the chain by virtue of 
specializing in functions that are characterized by high entry barriers command high 
returns whereas producers undertaking activities with low entry barriers often reap low 
returns. The exercise of control along the global chain is considered to be the source of 
the appropriation of the chain‘s value, marginalization and the sharing of risk burden 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). This raises the development question of how the gains that 
accrue to global value chains can be distributed fairly along the chain, since the powerful 
actors tend to appropriate a greater share of the gains (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001) or 
how such gains can be captured by weaker producers. This question is largely beyond the 
scope of this study.  
 
Sturgeon (2008) added to the value chain governance debate by drawing attention to the 
loci of power at different levels of the global value chains instead of the prime focus on 
the singular dominance of global lead buyers in driving global value chains. He indicated 
that suppliers could wield competence power when their products and services are seen as 
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nearly indispensable for the lead firm. He, however, added that by virtue of the enormous 
market power that they possess, lead firms can undercut supplier power by switching 
suppliers. This study is particularly concerned with the exercise of power or the lack of it 
by the chain actors (both local and international) in ensuring the smooth flow of inputs 
and outputs and the integrity of the production chains. Again, instead of international 
buyers who are the prime focus of most global value chain studies, this study focuses on 
the domestic actors (i.e. exporters/producers) who coordinate and control production 
activities at the supply end of the export commodity chains. The study is, however, not 
oblivious to the influence and pressures international buyers exert on local production for 
export as well as the economic risks the local exporters have to bear for participating in 
the buyers‘ value chains.     
Gereffi et al. (2005) have constructed five governance structures of global value chains 
based on: 
 The complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a 
particular transaction, particularly, with respect to product and process 
specifications; 
 The extent to which information and knowledge can be codified and, therefore, 
transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specific investment between the 
parties to the transaction; 
 The capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of 
the transaction. 
The patterns of value chain governance described by Gereffi et al. (ibid.) include the 
following: 
Markets: buyers respond to specifications and prices set by sellers and because the 
complexity of information is relatively low, transactions can be governed with little 
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explicit coordination. The products types involve in these transactions are relatively 
simple and asset specificity may fail to accumulate. 
 
Modular value chains: the ability to codify complex product specifications may give rise 
to modular chains. This chain, which is based on codified knowledge, has many of the 
benefits of arms-length market linkages i.e. speed, flexibility, and access to low cost 
inputs. It differs from market linkages in that there is information flow, albeit in a 
codified form; across inter-firm links. Because of codification, complex information can 
be exchanged with little explicit coordination. 
 
Relational value chain: According to Gereffi et al. (ibid.), relational value chains emerge 
when product specifications cannot be codified, transactions are complex and supplier 
capabilities are high. In this case, information about product specification (i.e. tacit 
information) is exchanged through frequent face-to-face interactions and governed by 
high level of explicit coordination. The mutual dependence that emerges from the trade 
interaction may be regulated through reputation, social and spatial proximity, family and 
ethnic ties (see also the discussion of the role of informal institutions in facilitating 
mutual market exchanges in section 2.3.3). The relational value chain is particularly 
important for this study because of its emphasizes on the importance of the capability of 
the supply-base as a precondition for gaining access to transnational trade networks, the 
regulatory and resource provisioning roles of ethnic-based and process-based trusts. The 
dynamic dimension of trust in facilitating inter-firm trade relations to enhance 
competitiveness of small firms in transnational trade is discussed in section 2.4.1.   
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Captive value chains: when the ability to codify and the complexity of product 
specifications are both high but supplier capabilities are low, then value chain governance 
assumes the captive type. This may occur because of low supplier competence in the face 
of complex products and specifications, which requires a great deal of intervention and 
control on the part of the lead firms. The lead firms seek to lock-in their suppliers to 
prevent others from reaping the benefit of their effort. Opportunism is controlled in a 
captive chain through the dominance of lead firms, while at the same time resources are 
made available to subordinate firms to make exit an unattractive option. 
 
Hierarchy: when product specifications cannot be codified, products are complex and 
competent suppliers cannot be found, lead firms will then seek to develop and 
manufacture products in-house. This governance type is motivated by the need to 
effectively manage inputs and output flows and to control resources, especially 
intellectual property rights. 
 
Gereffi et al. (2005) view modular, relational and captive value chains governance as 
extensions of a network approach to industrial organization across national boundaries, 
forming intermediate arrangements between market governance and hierarchy.    
 
As small African firms seek to enter the export market, they do not only have to contend 
with local factors, but they also have to confront export market forces and buyer demands 
that call for organizational adjustments. There are barriers to participation in global value 
chains. The export markets to which African labour-intensive enterprises desire access 
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are the very markets that are highly controlled by buyers and access to these markets is 
contingent on buyer-specific standards, product specifications, speed, and volume. The 
extent to which African exporters are able to meet or adapt to these requirements may 
either lead to participation or exclusion from the export market. These issues present 
unique challenges to many small African enterprises, which very often do not have access 
to the relevant market information needed or just do not have the capacity to meet these 
requirements. Gibbon and Ponte (2005) characterize Africa‘s participation in 
international trade as trading down, which they regard as the shorthand for the processes 
underpinning Africa‘s experience of trade disintegration into the Western economies. The 
process of exclusion is in part attributed to the failure of:  
African Firms to meet new expectations concerning quality, lead times, 
volumes, and prices, and their failure in actively shaping new standards to 
their advantage—including ones related social and environmental 
concerns raised by Northern NGOs. In some cases, exclusion … [has] 
even occurred as a result of the failure of Africa‘s farms and firms to 
continue meeting traditional expectations in relation to these dimensions, 
as the provision of public goods like quality control has collapsed (p202).    
 
These challenges, however, are not unique to small firms in Africa. Developing 
economies are regarded as latecomers in the global economy and are ―dislocated from the 
mainstream international markets [they] wish…to supply (Hobday, 1995, p34 in 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). Keesing and Lall (1992) aptly recognized this problem 
and argued that new suppliers from developing countries are expected to meet 
requirements that frequently do not (yet) apply to their domestic markets. This creates a 
gap between the capabilities required for the domestic market and those required for the 
export market. The role of international buyers, as exemplified in the global value chain 
discourse, has been central in helping some developing countries to bridge the gap 
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between their local capacity and export market requirements. This process is very evident 
in many Asian as well as Southern American countries, where buyers have been 
instrumental in enabling small enterprises to overcome some of their capability 
challenges, upgrade their production process and products, and integrate into the Western 
market. Except in some few cases, and mostly in the area of agricultural products (Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2002; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005), African firms have not been able to 
established strong and performance enhancing collaborative relationships with foreign 
buyers in manufactured products. In a study of three African countries, including Ghana, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, Biggs et al. (1995) observed that the interaction between 
indigenous African firms and foreign buyers is generally weak, though there is limited 
evidence of instances whereby foreign buyers have assisted local enterprises to upgrade 
their product quality, become more cost competitive and reduced production turnaround 
times. The risky African business environment and imperfect enforcement systems are 
argued to discourage the building of strong relationships with foreign buyers. Thus small 
firms on the continent miss out on the advantage of the transfer of skills, technical know-
how and market information that could be derived from establishing strong business ties 
with international buyers (Fafchamps, 1996, 2004; Pedersen and McCormick, 1999).  
 
Buyers are usually concerned with whether or not their trading partners possess some 
minimal technical, organizational capacity and export experience required to meet 
contractual obligations. Levy et al. (1999) observed in a study of Jeparan carved furniture 
in Indonesia that foreign buyers were more willing to establish a strong and sustainable 
relationship with firms with a proven record of success in the export market than new 
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entrants into the export markets. The implicit understanding here is that the length of 
experience in the export market and demonstration of a reasonable capacity level to 
deliver on contract terms are important requisitions for building strong and direct 
producer-foreign buyer linkages. This is what Sako (1997) refers to as competence trust, 
which touches on the issue of whether or not parties to a transaction are capable of doing 
what they say they would do. The lack of competence trust may in part explain the non-
existent or the lack of depth of the relations small African firms establish with foreign 
buyers in export manufacturers.  
 
Traders have been identified as important economic agents who could help fill an 
important link between local producers and foreign buyers (Knorringa, 1999; Nadvi and 
Schmitz, 1994). Traders and trade intermediaries are often conscious of information 
regarding market intelligence whereas producers may possess production knowledge, and 
so bridging this functional divide between these agents and producers could be an 
important source of market information for growth (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994).  
 
The story is told especially in the Asian countries about the difficulty of nascent exporters 
and foreign buyers working together in the early years who were able to overcome this 
institutional gap through the mediating role played by export agencies and other trading 
agents (Levy et al. 1999; Weijland, 1992). Despite the claim of the instrumental role 
played by export agents and traders in other developing countries in helping small firms 
to succeed in the export market, our knowledge of the role of traders in industrial 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa is underdeveloped (Akoten and Otsuka, 2007). 
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Recent studies report the emergence of a myriad private trade intermediaries on the 
African business landscape—though the evidence still remains sketchy—whose functions 
enable local firms to transcend barriers to exchange and build trade links with distant 
buyers (Fafchamps 1996, 2004). In the same vein Jackson (2002) reported that the market 
facilitation and trade promotion functions performed by public and quasi-government 
agencies in Ghana and Zimbabwe enabled small and medium firms to overcome 
information and capacity difficulties. One theme that emerged from Jackson‘s study was 
that these agencies face many administrative, organizational and financial constraints 
internally, which restrict their ability to meet the end of providing trade facilitation and 
promotion services. This present study in particular reports on the role of private 
intermediary agents that feed into the production chains of small-scale exporters that are 
being studied.  
  
The export agents and trade intermediaries are like any other private economic agents 
operating within the same domestic economic and institutional environments. The 
effectiveness of the role of trade intermediaries, whether in the area of contract 
enforcement or in the provision of market information and other trade services, may also 
be constrained by market failures. They are agents who seek to maximize their self-
interest and so would be reluctant to invest and continue to provide trade intermediation 
services for greater success if there were very few economic incentives to do so.  
2.6 African Informal Economy and Institutional Analysis      
Can we talk of African markets and how do African institutions shape markets? Can we 
apply the tenets of new institutionalism to the analysis of African markets that are largely 
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informal in nature? Pro-African institutionalists and economists have attempted to chart 
the uncharted waters by way of situating the analysis of African markets in the new 
institutional economics thinking. The current understanding in the literature emphasizes 
the point that African markets are like any other markets everywhere. However, the 
institutions that support various markets may differ according to different surroundings 
and the ways in which they are embedded. The coordination of market activities by 
African firms is embedded in local institutional and environmental settings, which to a 
greater extent influence their success as market participants. Fafchamps (2001) identifies 
three modes of allocating resources in Sub-Saharan Africa: gift exchanges, markets and 
hierarchies. Among the three, he claims, gift exchange is more prevalent, but hierarchies 
in the form of large vertically integrated corporations are less prevalent than markets in 
Africa. Arguably, he indicated that markets are important in Africa than in the West 
because there are few hierarchies in Africa (except few large multinational corporations) 
and the few that exist are in themselves weak. He draws attention to the small scale 
transactions and large numbers of small intermediary firms that dominate market 
transactions in Africa compared with the West where market transactions are coordinated 
within large corporations, the size of transactions is large and the production chain 
dominated by few intermediaries. Despite the fact that markets are a commonplace in 
Africa, they are imperfect—―the truth is that market activity in Africa is not without form: 
it is only without economic formalization‖ (Fafchamps, 1997, p733).   
Most economic activities in SSA are argued to take place in the informal realm and 
beyond state‘s regulation. It is suggested that the informal economy employs more people 
(outside the agricultural sector) than the official economy in Africa (Meagher, 2010). It is 
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also estimated that about seventy per cent of the non-agricultural labour force earn their 
livelihoods informally and that this accounts for about forty percent of Gross National 
Product in Africa (Meagher, ibid). An informal economy and informalization are not 
uniquely African phenomena: they are global in nature. The African version of informal 
enterprises and informalization, however, represent ―an extreme in a wider global 
trajectory of rapid informalization‖ (ibid, p 14).  In view of this, a discussion of markets 
in SSA would be inadequate without a consideration of the concept of informality. 
 
Keith Hart (1973) is credited with inventing the term ―informal sector‖ as distinguished 
from the formal economy. Hart (ibid.) demonstrated in his study the ingenuity and the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the urban poor who had no access to formal work in a suburban 
area of Accra. Hart‘s study departed from the earlier maginalistic view (famous between 
the 1950s and 1960s) which considered the informal economy as residual, backward, 
traditional, unproductive and populated by a marginal mass of ―excess reserve army‖(see 
discussion in Portes and Shauffler, 1993). Hart‘s version of informality celebrates the 
potential of the informal economy for independent employment creation and growth 
(Meagher, 1995). Like Hart (2006), De Soto (1989) subscribes to the entrepreneurial 
dynamism of the informal economy but urges the deregulation of the state to allow the 
spirit of entrepreneurship among the working people to flourish. De Soto (2000) has, 
however, modified his position and advocated for another form of regulation through the 
legalization (formalization) of informally-held assets of the poor and informal workers in 
order to improve their livelihoods.  
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Informality is widely defined as ―income generating activities that take place outside the 
regulatory framework of the state‖ (Castells and Portes 1989, p12). Maintaining the 
notion that the unofficial and official sectors of the economy are dichotomous pair is 
considered problematic because it tends to obscure the complex relationships, and the 
blurred boundaries, between the two. Instead of the notion of economic dualism, the 
Marxist structuralists such as Portes and Schauffler (1993) place emphasis on a unified 
systems encompassing a dense network of relationships between formal and informal 
enterprises and allowing for a role for the state in the expansion of the informal sector 
(Meagher, 1995). According Meagher (2010), it is difficult, if not impossible, and 
perhaps a fruitless classificatory exercise, to try to decipher the boundaries between the 
official and unofficial spheres of economic activities whether one is observing global 
commodity chains or trade in conflict diamonds since ―goods originating in 
unregulated … contexts are integrated into formal sector production and distribution 
systems (ibid, p14). Chen (2006) equally emphasized the complexity and sheer numbers 
of formal-informal linkages and stressed the importance of the allocation of authority and 
economic risks embedded in these linkages. Informal enterprises may produce goods and 
services existing within value chains where the terms and conditions in the chains are 
determined by a lead firm, either a lead national firm in domestic chains or international 
lead firms in global value chains (see the earlier discussion on the role of global buyers in 
the governance of global value in section 2.5). The major suppliers who receive orders 
from lead firms in the value chain can also determine the terms and conditions of orders 
for products they subcontract to informal workers down the chain. ―These commercial 
relationships are not likely to be regulated [formally]‖ (ibid, p85).              
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The current discourse on the concept of informality shifts the debate from the dualistic 
perspectives to a focus on regulatory and organizational roles of social networks to 
economic exchanges within the informal economy. Meagher (2010) argues that what 
matters most to the analysis of African informal economies are the unique organizational 
mechanisms and authority relations that characterize informal forms of economic order 
instead of the primary focus on the dichotomy between formal and informal economic 
activities. Hart (2006, p33) also recognizes the inadequacy of the analytical value of the 
dual informality concept and suggests the need to explore the…―social forms [that] have 
emerged to organize the informal economy and to examine the institutional particulars 
sustaining whatever takes place beyond the law‖. According to Meagher (2010, p16), 
―social networks have moved centre stage in the analysis of unofficial forms of economic 
organization, emerging as a means of investigating the informal economy‖. Framed by 
the rubric of  new institutional economics, a case is made for the ability of social 
networks to provide effective and cheaper bases for economic development outside the 
framework of the state. The regulatory and organizational roles of social networks are 
seen in the areas of reducing opportunism through identity ties, reputation and group 
sanctions (see section 2.3.3 detailed discussion of this) and by enabling access to new 
sources of information and resources (see also the discussion of the role of earned trust in 
facilitating access to resources in section 2.4.1). According to Meagher (2010, p26) ―an 
institutional approach to network analysis offers new tools for interpreting the dynamics 
of informal organization in contemporary Africa‖. The focus on institutional analysis 
helps better to explain the dynamics and the processes of informality by dwelling on such 
issues as enforceability and credibility of contracts (Sindzinger, 2006).           
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The challenges pertaining specifically to African informal markets are commitment 
failures and breaches of contracts, information asymmetries, and lack of capacity of 
African firms to meet quality requirements. It is always difficult to discern genuine 
agents from ―hit-and-run‖ or ―fly-by-night‖ agents (Fafchamps, 2004). While breaches 
and contract non-conformity may be purely due to opportunism, it may also be as a result 
of exogenous economic factors, for example, bad roads and power outages may unduly 
delay the conveyance of supplies and the production process (Fafchamps, 2001). 
Fafchamps likens African markets to the rudimentary flea market arrangements and 
garage sales of the developed countries; systems that are inherently fraught with 
opportunism, spot market exchanges in which transactions take place predominantly on a 
―cash and carry‖ basis. 
 
Coupled with these challenges are the issues relating to weak formal institutional 
enforcement mechanisms. Third party quality assurance agencies (state and private) are 
often non-existent or where they do exist they lack the capacity to design and enforce 
quality standards or they are just unresponsive to the needs of small enterprises (Lall et al. 
1994; Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002).  Lall et al. (1994, pp44-45) made this observation 
regarding third party public provision of standard and quality enforcement services in 
Ghana:  
 
Along with the absence of quality control systems, there is a widespread 
lack of appreciation of standards in Ghanaian industry. The GSB [Ghana 
Standard Board] lacks the resources (financial and human) to prepare 
engineering standards, to encourage industry to use them, and to enforce 
standards in a meaningful way…The absence of a range of approved and 
published …standards means that there is a danger of substandard 
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specification being used to define product performance, with consequent 
effects on sales and export.      
 
Recourse to legal institutions to resolve trade disputes is not a common practice. 
Fafchamps advances a number of reasons to explain this situation. The small enterprises 
and producers rarely possess valuable assets that could be used to service judgments and 
in that case threat of court action is not credible since recovery is very often problematic. 
If defaulters could be forced to pay, the size of transaction is often too small to warrant 
court action and if agents were free they:  
 
…would still not take small contractual disputes to court because 
irrespective of court and attorney fees, valuable time is lost in court. This 
implies that it would be difficult…to significantly broaden the reach of 
courts by reducing their cost‖ (Fafchamps, 2001, p116).  
 
This observation is consistent with the Northian perspective that it becomes increasingly 
uneconomical for agents to resort to formal systems of enforcement the smaller the size 
of trade transaction (North, 1991).            
 
How do small producers and agents seek to reduce the high transaction costs inherent in 
the African markets? According to Fafchamps (2001), two main institutional responses 
are adopted by small African enterprises in order to minimize transaction costs and also 
enforce contract obligations. Fafchamps‘(ibid) main thesis is that in an environment of 
high uncertainty and risks and when formal contracts are imperfectly enforced, relational 
contracting based on trust and contractual flexibility are adopted by small African firms 
to minimize opportunism and delays that may arise from uncertain production 
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environments. In this sense trust becomes a substitute for formal enforcement 
mechanisms. Relational contracting economizes on transaction costs and at the same time 
serves as the source of innovative ideas for enterprise performance (Barr, 1998). Though 
Africa lacks effective formal institutions, thanks to informal institutions based on 
personal ties and social sanctions, small African firms are able to reduce high transaction 
costs and also gain access to resources for their production activities (Fafchamps, 1996, 
2001, 2004, Barr, 1998; Brautigam, 1997). Meagher (2010) highlights two main 
perspectives on African social networks ―optimists‖ and the ―pessimists‖. The pessimists 
see the African social networks as representing social liabilities that are inimical to 
economic development. The optimists regard Africa‘s social networks as a solution to the 
problems of state and market failures, which emphasize the role of trust, communal 
solidarity, indigenous institutions of reciprocity and social sanctions. From the latter 
perspective, Africa‘s informal systems are crafted as ―weapons of the weak to emphasize 
the triumph of local organizational solutions in impossible situations‖ (ibid, p20). The 
extensive use of informal systems and informal institutions by small-scale African 
entrepreneurs to reduce uncertainty and agency problems had led some to argue that they 
could be perfect substitutes for weak formal institutions in supporting market exchange 
(Brautigam, 1997). This study takes issue with this claim and maintains that informal 
institutions and informal networks may enable small African firms to reduce agency 
problems and ensure the flow of resources for productive activities locally, but they are 
not rigorous enough to enable small firms to meet contractual obligations as they seek to 
participate in expanding and complex trade arrangements under uncertain microeconomic 
  
 
80 
environments. The incentives to provide certain services through informal trade networks 
may be stifled by opportunistic tendencies, mistrust and competitive pressures.   
 
Meagher (2010) argues that in the contexts of extreme economic stress and global 
competition, the economic performance of African social networks can be enhanced by 
the   nation-state. She argues that successful networks cannot be defined as independent 
of the state but are rather shaped by their relationships with the state. She states: 
―dynamic networks are as much a product of, as a substitute for, effective state 
intervention‖ (ibid, p174). The nation-state is relevant because: 
 
In a globalizing economy, a viable small enterprise sector requires a wide 
range of services that cannot be provided through social networks…these 
include facilitative trade policy, decent roads …technical up-grading, and 
assistance in meeting the administrative and quality requirements of access 
to global markets. Even sustaining the social cohesion that underpins 
collaborative enterprise networks is as much a product of state policy as of 
cultural affinities‖ (ibid, p174) 
 
In addition to considering the roles of state policy and trade networks is also the issue of 
whether or not governments‘ policies can foster the creation of business networks for 
enterprise competitiveness (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996, 1998; Schmitz, 1999). 
According to Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) cooperation and trust can be produced in 
situations where there exist no prior social ties. They support this position with the 
examples of networking programmes in Denmark and Chile where cooperation and 
networking among small-scale producers was brought about by external intervention, 
though, they admitted the approach is new and requires further testing.   
 
  
 
81 
Situating African (informal) markets within the framework of institutional analysis 
breaks new grounds in helping us to understand the workings of market institutions, 
especially, the role of relational contracting or social networks in enabling economic 
exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa to take place in the context of weak states. To what 
extent do relational contracting and informal market practices enable small enterprises to 
succeed in terms of meeting the more exacting market obligations in distant markets 
given the uncertain environments within which African enterprises operate?   
 
The major caveat of seeing relational contracting as a response to the environment of 
high risks is that it leads to the fragmentation of the markets into small networks as 
partners are only comfortable dealing with people they know and can trust (Pedersen and 
McCormick, 1999, Fafchamps 2004). In other words, the consequences of the 
pervasiveness of weak formal institutions and the adoption of informal institutions in 
their stead lead to the fragmentation of African markets. This is consistent with the view 
expressed by North (1991) regarding the limitation of informal institutions in enabling 
local producers to engage in distant trade. Fafchamps (2004, p71) in particular reference 
to African markets elaborates this position as follows:  
 
…although effective in enabling business to develop and firms to gain 
access to trade credit, [it] leads to the fragmentation of the economy into 
networks. It limits the range of commercial partners a firm may possibly 
deal with in a businesslike fashion. Because the economic reach of firm is 
reduced, one expects specialization and firm growth to be restricted.    
 
Although flexible contracting (for example by allowing renegotiation of late deliveries, 
risks are shared) and relational contracting are beneficial to enabling enterprises to deal 
  
 
82 
with contractual non-performance and risks locally, they become problematic as local 
manufacturers seek to trade with international clients. Flexible contracting practices are 
often (mis)interpreted by foreign clients as bordering on opportunism and unreliability, 
and inconsistent with the strict adherence to contractual obligations that is required by 
international trade; this together with other obstacles may explain why African 
entrepreneurs trade very little with the rest of the world (Bigsten et al. 1998).   
 
The workings of African markets are still far from the neoclassical prescriptions 
pertaining to an ideal free market system. Market exchanges based on inter-personal 
relationships may be prevalent in African contexts but this study will show that pervasive 
opportunism, which is counter to trust building, may erode the effectiveness of trust-
based market exchanges. It may therefore ultimately not be cheaper to transact business 
in such an environment, economic agents may have to expend resources and efforts 
policing and safeguarding transactions to avert deceit. Monitoring costs are raised, 
especially, when some investments have been made in the relationship. These may 
provide some explanations for the differences in the success of Asian and African 
informal networks in trade transactions. Informal institutions will be ineffective as a 
market constraining device if information about the conduct of market participants are 
hard to come by and breaches of informal contract are weakly enforced. The Chinese 
Guanxi informal trade network is often cited as an effective informal market institution 
and its effectiveness is attributed to the internal sanctions of losing trade relationships 
with all network members which, serves as incentive for cooperative behaviour 
(Standifird and Marshall, 2000). The success of informal networks critically lies on the 
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availability of information about partners, effective monitoring and enforcement (i.e. 
biting sanctions taking the form of loss of valuable future relations).     
 
Unlike advanced economies, Sub-Saharan Africa lacks indigenous large vertically 
integrated firms capable of addressing some of the institutional challenges inherent in 
their environments. Hierarchies tend to protect the ownership of know-how; better enable 
the enforcement of contractual obligations and also internalize important talents of 
particular individuals (Fafchamps, 2001). Why small African enterprises rarely graduate 
to become large firms still remains an open question. The general observation in the 
literature of small enterprise development suggests that the majority of micro-enterprises 
hardly graduate to become large-scale enterprises. Those that succeed to be become 
medium or large-scale firms are in the minority. Commenting on the growth of micro- 
enterprises in five Sub-Saharan countries, Mead and Liedholm (1998, p67), observed that 
―about only 1% ‗graduated‘ from micro-enterprise seedbed and ended up with more than 
10 workers‖. The explanation for this trend is often attributed to differences in location of 
enterprises, educational background of enterprise owners, availability of financial 
resources, technology and market orientation. The very few that manage to graduate from 
their survival stage and grow are the very ones that have relative good access to 1) stable 
markets, 2) finance for working capital and capital investment, 3) adaptable technology, 
labour and raw materials, 4) urban locations and 5) entrepreneurs with good educational 
background willing to take risks and able to innovate, and solve the various transaction 
issues that influence their firms growth (Fafchamps, 1994; Grosh and Somolekae, 1996; 
Mead and Liedholm, 1998; McCormick et al. 1997; Rogerson, 2001). Fafchamps (1994), 
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particularly, highlights the significance of market size and technology adaptability to 
firm‘s size. He argues that the small size of markets in Sub-Saharan Africa is a hindrance 
to firms‘ growth. The small firms generally, tend to serve localized rural and urban 
markets, dominated by poor consumers. These enterprises offer products that are low in 
quality and least amenable to the use of mass production techniques. In the words of 
Fafchamps (1994, p5), ―…mass production techniques have not yet been developed or 
adapted to local tastes; small-scale technology is the state of the art technology‖ for many 
small enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa. He pointed out that even if the technology is 
available, the incentive for its acquisition or adaptation would come from an increasing 
market size resulting from the emergence of new market sources. Murphy et al. (1989) 
makes similar claims about the linkage between the size and composition of the market 
and the question of whether or not an enterprise would adopt handmade artisan 
production or mass production techniques. A market composed of quality-conscious rich 
upper class consumers is bound to favour the demand for high quality handmade products 
(high end niche markets). Conversely, the market that is dominated by large and 
relatively rich middle-class is more likely to sustain mass production profitably. Small-
scale African firms may potentially adopt mechanized mass-production strategy for 
growth if they are able to access larger markets.  
 
2.7 Conclusion   
The discussion in the chapter delved into the debate of the relative importance of formal 
and informal institutions in minimizing transaction costs and facilitating market exchange.  
Formal institutions are state-sponsored rules-setting and enforcement whereas informal 
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institutions are spontaneous, self-enforcing and self-provisioning market mechanisms. 
The consensus is that both institutions could reduce market risks and uncertainties and 
provide stability to the market on condition of effective monitoring and enforcement. 
There are those who maintain that effective formal institutions and its associated 
enforcement mechanism are better able to sustain expanding and anonymous trade than 
informal institutions that relies on personal ties. The theoretical and empirical evidence, 
however, points to the persistence of informal institutions in both developing and 
developed economies and they may be used in complement with, or as substitute to 
formal institutions. Informal institutions as complete substitute for formal institutional 
arrangements is questioned on the basis that in an expanding trade regime and under the 
circumstances of endemic opportunism, informal mechanisms are weak in protecting 
specific investments from opportunistic hold-up, poor in guaranteeing quality of goods 
and arrest other forms of market failures like free-riding. In the context of weak 
enforcement, informal trade institutions make imperfect substitute for formal institutions. 
Credible formal institutions and generalized trust are important prerequisite for trade 
specialization; otherwise coordination of economic activities would take on the form of 
restricted and simple market exchanges. 
 
The fourth section of the chapter embodied the discussions on other market coordinating 
mechanisms that are the subcontracting and inside-contracting relations and the extent to 
which both arrangements could reduce market risks and also enable firms to grow. The 
various dimensions of subcontracting were discussed and how they interlock with 
production networks. The understanding is that strong subcontracting relations built on 
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trust are important for minimizing risks and sharing of resources. The discussion also 
dealt with the various dimensions of trust and their relative strengths in enabling firms to 
access critical resources in order to remain competitive. The absence of trust or pervasive 
opportunism and weak enforcement renders subcontracting an ineffective tool for 
coordinating market activities. Though subcontracting is considered a modern 
phenomenon, its origin is traced to the putting-out system that existed in the 19
th
 century, 
which later evolved to become inside-contracting arrangement. The inside-contracting 
system differs from subcontracting in that the contracted producers operate inside the 
production premises of the lead entrepreneur. Inside-contracting from the historical 
accounts was a coordination response to address the market imperfections to which the 
rudimentary subcontracting was not robust enough to deal with because of its inherent 
weakness of laxity of control over the production processes.  The purported demise of the 
putting-out system and the rise of inside contracting was attributed to the following 
factors: 1) the independence of the subcontractors made it difficult to supervise 
production 2) the behviour of the independent subcontractors was difficult to keep in 
check 3) lack of supervision led to embezzlement of resources provided by lead 
entrepreneurs 4) absence of supervision also led to poor and uneven quality products and 
delays 5) lack of work discipline on the part of subcontractors resulting preferences given 
to farming and other cultural activities over industrial production.  The view was that the 
inside-contracting that emerged was more effective compared with the loose putting-out 
system to deal with these sources of imperfections.  The increased in demand and volume 
of trade coupled with the availability of workforce willing to work on contract and the 
emergence of technology for standardized production contributed to the natural 
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development of inside-contracting. The advantage of the inside-contracting system is that 
it affords the entrepreneur indirect control over the labour process and direct control over 
product quality.  
 
The fifth section was devoted to the concept of global value chains and how the 
governance structures of the chain may either constrain or enable small-scale enterprises 
from developing countries to participate in global trade. The section also highlighted the 
challenges African firms face in their attempts to build performance-enhancing linkages 
with global buyers in order to benefit from market information, product innovation and 
technical upgrading.   
 
The reviewed literature showed that the new institutional economics offers an important 
framework for gauging institutional arrangements that support market transactions in 
Africa. The converging theme regarding markets and market institutions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa generally is that they are imperfect. Market exchanges are generally rudimentary 
and bedeviled with deceit and opportunism and thus raise the cost of transacting business 
in this environment. The small and microenterprises dotted on the continent rely mostly 
on informal mechanisms or relational contracting arrangements to minimize transaction 
risks and again access to critical resources. This enables trade to take place but on a 
limited scale where enterprises trade with individuals they know personally. Endemic 
mistrust and monitoring difficulties may weaken the strength of relational contracting as 
a market coordinating tool. These, it is argued limit the ability of microenterprises and 
small firms relying on trust-based relations to participate in trade on a wider scale for the 
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purpose of growing their enterprises. Those firms that attempt to engage in wider trade 
with individuals they don‘t know tend to face larger threats of opportunism and are also 
confronted with the huge challenge of addressing the mismatch between their domestic 
coordination constraints and the conditions pertaining to the distant markets. Very often 
these small exporters lack the relevant export market information and the local capacities 
to meet market demands. The small firms are somehow able to overcome the problem of 
market information asymmetric by relying on trade intermediaries. This, however, may 
leave them vulnerable to intermediaries acting as agents who may be in a position to 
exploit their contacts with foreign buyers to make excessive profits e.g. Lebanese traders 
in West Africa and US agents buying for US retail chains. 
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                                               CHAPTER THREE   
                                        THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The study has been designed to help understand the forms of market and institutional 
arrangements adopted by Ghanaian craft producers in meeting export market demands 
and to overcome uncertainties and high transaction costs locally. By institutional 
arrangements, the study looks at arrangements that stress inter-firm linkages and informal 
mechanisms of exchange. The discussion in the previous chapter looked at the 
significance of institutions in minimizing transactions costs. In particular, the importance 
and the limitations of informal institutions in facilitating market transactions in the 
absence of effective formal institutions were highlighted. Also discussed were 
subcontracting arrangements and inside-contracting and their relative effectiveness under 
extreme market imperfections. How do the exporters respond in terms of organization of 
production to challenges pertaining to their local production environments as well as to 
the demands of the export market? The study attempts to address this question using an 
in-depth case study approach. The chapter is divided into four main sub-sections. Section 
3.2 follows the introduction and entails the theoretical discussions of the case study 
approach and the justification for doing network analysis using this approach. It is 
followed by the rationale for the sector of choice of this study in section 3.3. A detailed 
description of the actual data collection process, which took place between July and 
September 2007, using in-depth interview techniques is found in section 3.4. Section 3.5 
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concludes the chapter with a summary of the theoretical understanding of case-study 
research and the main lessons learnt during the data collection process. 
 
3.2 Case Study Approach to Network Analysis 
A qualitative case-study approach is adopted for our investigations into the coordination 
responses that Ghanaian craft exporters adopt in their attempt to overcome the constraints 
placed on them by their environment and access critical resources in order to meet market 
requirements and obligations. The case study approach is considered suitable for 
exploratory research where understanding of the research issues is the prime objective, 
the phenomena being explored are difficult to quantify, particularly if they are not easily 
identifiable, and there is the need to study the phenomena in their natural settings (Yin, 
2003; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Anderson et al. (1994) have suggested a case study 
approach to network analysis. In their view, to be able to deepen our knowledge of the 
processes within different types of networks requires a detailed case study approach  that 
seeks to cover substantial time periods and attempts to seek information from several of 
the firms in the industry as well as from different functions within the firm.  
 
Nadvi and Schmitz (1994) similarly suggest an in-depth case study approach that relies 
on multiple sources of evidence for network analysis. They argue that network analysis is 
not just about describing the characteristics of inter-firm relations but it is also concerned 
with dynamic processes underlying interactions between various economic agents in the 
network. To be able to deal with the dynamic processes, which depend on the subjective 
accounts of events by the actors in the subsector, requires a research tool that is capable 
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of capturing these perceptual views from the actors considered in the study (Leonard-
Barton, 1990). Thus, the case study approach with its emphasis on in-depth investigation 
into contemporary and historical processes through the use of multiple sources of 
evidence (Yin, 2003) is therefore an appropriate research approach for undertaking 
network analysis (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994). 
 
3.2.1 Validity and Reliability of Case Studies 
In-depth case-study research is often criticized on the grounds that it is overly subjective 
and the research findings tend to be coloured by the researcher‘s and the researched‘s 
biases and opinions. The critics argue that qualitative case study approach is less suitable 
for generating theory because of its context-specific nature and the fact that the findings 
are based on the subjective views of selected few. The response to this critique is that the 
rigour of qualitative case study like any other scientific inquiry is assessed based on 
whether the investigations follow transparent research trajectory and employs the use of 
appropriate tools and techniques for gathering data and reporting findings so that the 
conclusion would be judged as credible and dependable. Adopting a case study approach   
is not so much an issue of the size of sample that one interviews but whether the research 
process has been undertaken in a systematic fashion: ―No matter how small our sample or 
what our interest, we have always tried to go into organizations with a well-defined 
focus—to collect specific kind of data systematically‖ (Mintzberg 1979 cited in 
Eisenhardt, 1989, p532).  In the language of qualitative research, validity conveys the 
notion of the steps taken by researchers to achieve accurate and credible results (Creswell, 
2003). Yin (2003) in particular, offers certain criteria for judging the quality and rigour of 
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qualitative case study approach which includes construct validity, external validity and 
reliability. These concepts are explained in turns below.  
 
Construct validity:  is concerned with the explicit specification of the concepts or objects 
that are being studied in relation to the study objectives and asks whether correct 
operational procedures have been established for delving into what one says he/she is 
studying. Am I measuring or investigating exactly what I said I was going to study? Once 
this is done, Yin suggests among other tactics the following to increase the quality of 
construct validity during the data collection stage. The first is the use of multiple sources 
of evidence in a manner that encourages convergent lines of inquiry, a process referred to 
as data triangulation. He argues that case-study findings are likely to be much more 
convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, 
allowing for data corroboration.  Real triangulation is achieved when the facts of a case 
study are supported by more than a single source of evidence. It is also possible for the 
facts to diverge using multiple sources of evidence. In this case, the data is said not to 
have been triangulated and thus analyzed as separate facts to the case study.  The second 
tactic is to establish a chain of evidence. This is about maintaining clear linkages between 
the various stages of the study so that the conclusions can, for instance, be traced to the 
research questions, the data collection tools employed and the evidence. In this instance, 
a third party observer should be able to convince himself of the basis by which a 
researcher arrived at a certain conclusion by tracing the evidentiary process from the 
conclusion backwards to the study objectives.  
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External Validity: as indicated earlier, in-depth single cases are criticized for being 
narrowly focused on selected few actors who may not be representative of the ―universe‖ 
and therefore forms a poor basis for generalizing. Yin draws our attention to the major 
flaw of confusing qualitative case study research with quantitative surveys: 
Critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to survey research, in which a 
sample (if selected correctly) readily generalizes to a larger universe. This 
analogy to samples and universe is incorrect when dealing with case studies 
(p37).  
 
He argues that qualitative case studies are distinct from quantitative surveys in the sense 
that they rely on analytical generalization in which the researcher strives to generalize a 
particular set of results to some broader theory. In the particular case of this study, an 
attempt is made to relate the findings to the theoretical framework derived generally from 
the new institutional economics and its sub-disciplines of transaction costs framework 
and network analysis. The use of theories is important both during the pre-data collection 
processes as well as providing the framework for interpreting the case study findings.  
The theoretical ideas that are developed tend to influence the research questions, the 
propositions, units of analysis and provide the logic for linking the data to the research 
propositions: ―the complete research design embodies a ‗theory‘ of what is being studied‖ 
(Yin, 2003, p29).  
 
Reliability: is about whether a later researcher conducting the same case study can 
achieve the same results by following the same procedures as described by an earlier 
researcher (it is about doing the same case over again and not replicating the results of 
one case by doing another case study). The precondition for allowing a repetition of the 
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same case study is through the documentation of the procedures and the operational steps 
that were followed through in the earlier study. Yin likens the process to accounting in 
which the accountant has to be aware that an external auditor performing a reliability 
checks on his balance sheets must be able to produce the same results if the same 
procedures are followed. Cautious documentation of the various stages of the research 
process makes the case-study research a reliable inquiry.   
 
Though this set of criteria if followed through could increase the quality of the case-study 
research, they are not straightjacket prescriptions; they would have to be adapted to suit 
specific circumstances. The whole process is an iterative one; allowing the researcher to 
adjust the research design ranging from research objectives, fieldwork techniques and 
theoretical dispositions to the existing circumstances. The flexibility that is in-built in the 
case-study data collection methods enables the researcher to take advantage of emergent 
themes and unique case features (Eisenhardt, 1989). The research questions change, in 
much the same way that the theoretical propositions would have to be re-shaped in line 
with the evidence. The open-endedness, however, does not suggest that the qualitative 
case-study researcher can do whatever that he/she likes; ―the need to balance 
adaptiveness with rigour—but not rigidity—cannot be overemphasized‖ (Yin, 2003, p61).   
 
Nadvi and Schmitz (1994) have proposed that network case studies begin with the 
gathering of secondary data with the view to obtain information on: the general 
performance trends in the sector; the number of active firms (focal enterprises) in the 
sector, and the range of other trading actors these firms collaborate with in their business 
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transactions. This is then followed with a more in-depth data gathering on selected active 
firms in the industry. This phase focuses on the firm’s histories and relationships. It 
covers issues such as how the firm was established, how it has developed over time and 
critical turning points in the firm‘s history. The focus on relationships entails seeking 
qualitative data on the linkages between the focal enterprises and its various link units 
and the resulting resources derived from the interactions. Collecting detailed information 
about the focal enterprises and their production link units, according to them, is done with 
the ultimate aim to disaggregate the processes underlying the linkages between the 
various economic agents in the network. They suggested that if possible data should be 
sought from all the link units within the network since this could have the advantage of 
enabling the researcher to triangulate evidence from multiple sources thereby enhancing 
the validity of the study. It also ensures that certain actors who perform important 
functions within the network are not excluded (Murty, 1999). However, not all the agents 
in the firm‘s trade transaction network can be identified and interviewed in all 
practicalities, especially, when these trade interactions takes place in the informal realm.  
 
3.2.2 Setting of network boundary and inclusion criteria  
The practical difficulty of engaging in detailed dialogue with all the possible link units in 
the network is what is referred to as the boundary problem. This is an issue that requires a 
judgment to be made about which firms or organizations are to be included in the firm‘s 
network of trading partners if all the actors or the agents in the network, in practical terms 
cannot be identified and interviewed. But this cannot be done arbitrarily; it ought to be 
carried out in a well thought manner. To overcome this requires setting the network 
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boundary by selecting the actors, which are of strategic importance to the objectives of 
the study (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994; Murty, 1999). Setting the network boundary also 
demands an effort to establish a set of rules about the actors that will be included in the 
study (Spreen and Zwaagstra 1994; Murty, 1999). The more convenient approach, 
generally, is to delimit the network actors through the use of spatial boundaries—
however; some important actors outside the defined geographical vicinity may be 
excluded (Murty, 1999). To ensure that certain actors with strategic influence on the 
network are not excluded, priority is given to sectoral connections over geographical 
proximity (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994). Beyond geographical boundaries, Murty (1999) 
proposes that the decision on the inclusion criteria be made either on the attributes of the 
actors in the network or the relations they establish with other actors. The attributional 
criteria could be based on specific features or the functions of the actors, whilst the use of 
relational criteria is about the inclusion of those agents that are cited by other agents as 
important to their trading relationships. The relational criterion is noted to be appropriate 
when a complete list of actors to which a selection could be made for interviews is non-
existent. Using members of the network to cite others in the network i.e. snowballing, 
even though time consuming, is considered an ideal method to avoid excluding actors 
who may have important influence on the network. Whilst the use of inclusion criteria 
seeks to limit the numerous actors that could potentially be considered and to ensure that 
important actors with strategic importance in line with the study objectives are considered, 
it in the end excludes other actors in the network. The point that is of paramount 
importance is that the decision to use inclusion criteria must be based on the study 
objective (Murty, 1999). Confusion could arise as to the exact object of study when one 
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attempts to study abstract and intangible phenomena such as inter-firm trade relations and 
informal trade networks. 
 
3.2.3 Unit of Analysis 
The units of analysis in this study are the ―focal enterprises‖ (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994) 
and the production relationships/networks. The focal enterprises in the context of this 
study are the exporters. In network studies, the ultimate unit of analysis is the 
relationships that are established among trading partners. In this instance, it is argued 
researchers interested in studying trade networks can no longer focus solely on individual 
firms since attention  shifts to a focus on the ―whole‖ (Vandenberg, 2006, p19-10); for 
efficiency is derived from the ―whole‖ instead of the parts.  Feasibly and as indicated 
earlier on, not all enterprise units within a particular trade network can be identified and 
interviewed during the course of the fieldwork. Hence the focal enterprises become the 
starting point for studying the production network; recognizing the influences of the other 
enterprises within the network. The craft exporters have been selected as the focal 
enterprises in the craft export industry because of their strategic role in organising and 
coordinating production activities for export and the reason of being the principal risks 
takers in coordinating craft export activities. The characterization of the various 
categories of focal craft enterprises is presented in chapter four.   
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3.2.4 The Researcher’s Position in the Research 
The sector chosen for this study is not the researcher‘s ―backyard‖. Backyard research 
according to Creswell (2003) often entails studying the researchers‘ own working setting. 
Despite the fact that this may facilitate easy access to information and deeper 
understanding of the issues under investigation, the danger of the researcher overly 
introducing his own biases into the data collecting and reporting process could be high. 
This researcher has been a ―professional student‖ and had no historical background in the 
sector of choice and so the initial motivation for undertaking this study had more to do 
with the theoretical fascination with network approach to industrial development than 
with the experience of practicing in trade and industrial development. In 2004, when this 
researcher was exploring how informal (casual) port workers in Tema, Ghana organize 
themselves the importance of the functionality of informal groups and collective alliances 
with other agents in enabling the informal port workers to survive their fragile and 
difficult economic circumstances and also seek improvements in their working conditions 
became apparent (Boampong, 2005, 2010). The role of informal groups in enabling the 
informal workers to minimize difficulties related to their working environment and also 
survive their economic exigencies, albeit, in a fluid manner, inspired this researcher to 
further test the idea of how informal networks and ties enable small firms that 
predominate in the Ghanaian economy to survive their own economic realities and 
possibly grow. There are some studies that have specifically looked at this theme in the 
Ghanaian context, notably Barr (1998), Fafchamps (1996), and Lyon (2000). However, 
the empirical evidence is scant, particularly, on the question of the robustness of informal 
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networks in fuelling success as small scale firms operate beyond the territorial boundaries 
of Ghana.      
 
This researcher had very little understanding of the sector of choice at the start of the 
study. So part of the initial efforts during the pre-data collection stage was directed 
towards the search for secondary background information on a number of industries to 
see how they fit into the network perspective and also to seek information on 
performance trends as well as the major actors operating in the case study industry. The 
literature search yielded four studies that either focus solely or partially on the sector of 
choice. They included the works by Biggs et al.‘s (1994) ―Africa can compete!‖, the 
World Bank study (2001) on the international competitiveness of the Ghanaian non-
traditional export, Action for Enterprise (2004) study; sponsored by DFID on embedded 
business services for craft exporters in Ghana and Pageau‘s (2004); GTZ sponsored 
survey into the Ghanaian craft industry. These studies provided the researcher with useful 
empirical background information on the craft industry prior to the actual data collection 
process.  
 
3.3 The choice of sector 
This study is confined to the enterprises of Ghanaian craft producers who export their 
products abroad, especially, to the West. The sector is dominated by mainly small-scale 
enterprises and traders whose activities remain largely informal and yet have succeeded 
in gaining access to the much difficult international market. The birth of the craft industry 
as a source of foreign exchange earning coincided with the implementation of SAPs and 
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since then the sector has achieved some modest success in the midst of uphill challenges 
in the export market. It holds the potential for poverty reduction, if coordination 
dysfunctions and problems to exchange are resolved. The industry is a labour intensive 
activity based on renewable natural resources with strong backward linkages to a number 
of craft villages with enormous potential for employment generation and poverty 
reduction (World Bank, 2001). Given the level of informality in the industry, it would be 
appropriate to infer that the actors in the industry are more likely to rely on inter-firm 
relations and informal ties in their business transactions instead of formal institutional 
mechanisms. Indeed, Sørensen and Nyanteng (2000) in a study of Ghanaian non-
traditional export to the regional West African market hinted that small-scale traders who 
dominate this market rely predominantly on traditional trading systems and highlighted 
the environmental constraints that confront the traders. These constraints, they indicated 
include dishonest behaviour on the part of fellow traders and the difficulties they face in 
monitoring their goods against theft. According to these authors, the traders have 
naturally responded to opportunistic risks by ―doing things in-house… rather than relying 
on the market‖ (p58). What this means is that each trader carries out many activities 
herself or himself. Traders monitor and control their goods to avoid risks. Monitoring 
costs are thus relatively high in the regional West African trade given the small scale of 
operations. Notwithstanding the high level of risks and monitoring costs, the traders are 
able to check opportunism by building long-term relations and by organizing policing 
trade associations. The authors also made an important distinction between the traditional 
traders who take advantage of small market opportunities compatible with their 
operational capabilities for the motive of survival as against growth-oriented producers 
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who seek to expand their firms by exporting via network relations and by developing 
operational routines to enable them minimize opportunistic inclinations. This distinction 
and other observations by the authors regarding monitoring difficulties and trade risks are 
of particular significance to this current research. These provide snapshots of the 
circumstances in which the enterprises of the chosen sector operate in as well as the 
institutional responses to the coordination difficulties they face. The problematic aspect 
of these authors‘ study is that it failed to recognize the dynamic aspect of the firm‘s 
development i.e. how inter-personal ties and networks may enable a surviving small 
export trader to evolve and become an expanding producer. Such a gap is not surprising, 
because it is consistent with the general view held in the literature that micro-enterprises 
or small traders rarely ―graduate‖ to become medium or large firms, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa (see discussion in section 2.5). The strength of this study, however, is that 
it points to the relevance of transaction cost framework and network analysis to the study 
of the Ghanaian non-traditional export sector whether it is to be understood in terms of 
the rudimentary regional trade dominated by small traders relying on informal ties in their 
trading transactions or producers with routinized operational arrangements in-house. 
Large parts of the African markets are generally regarded as rudimentary, uncertain and 
risky compared with Western markets but these markets do not lack institutions (though 
of different kinds) that support their operations. Thus an attempt to understand these 
markets and institutions cannot escape being interpreted within the framework of the new 
institutional economics (Fafchamps, 2004; see section 2.5).  
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The choice of this sector is not only appropriate to enable us to broaden our 
understanding of the ways and extent to which the institutional responses by the small-
scale exporters enable them to address local constraints to production and high 
transaction costs but also help us to gain an insight into how the coordination 
mechanisms adopted by these small firms fare in terms of meeting end market 
requirements and the specifications of international buyers in the absence of formal 
institutional mechanisms that are responsive to small-scale firms. The integration of the 
craft industry into the export market is observed to have been made possible through 
various forms of inter-personal subcontracting relations (AFE/DFID, 2004). The sector of 
choice thus provides us with the microcosmic platform for examining the extent to which 
small-scale exporters are able to overcome transaction uncertainties and address trade 
complexities e.g. quality standard requirements by relying on inter-firm contractual 
relations and informal mechanisms. 
 
3.4 The Actual Field Data Collection Process 
3.4.1 Geographical Location of the Study 
 Interviews were conducted in Accra and Kumasi the capital and the second largest city in 
Ghana respectively. The initial fieldwork plan was designed to concentrate the interviews 
in Accra. However, it became apparent during the course of the interviews that Kumasi 
and two surrounding villages, namely Foase Atwima (about 10km from Kumasi) and 
Ahiwaa could not be excluded because of the strong backward linkages the craft industry 
has with producers in these areas. These villages are endowed with master-craftsmen and 
raw materials and almost all the handicraft exporters in Accra interviewed either 
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subcontract orders to the craftsmen or source inputs (labour and raw materials) from these 
two craft villages. While the majority of the artisan subcontractors are in the villages, the 
exporters, traders and the intermediaries are mostly found in Accra. Out of the 38 active 
exporters of wood-based craft products listed under the Government of Ghana Craft 
Initiative Programme (CIP), 30 are in Accra, 6 in Kumasi and 2 in Takoradi and Central 
regions. The major export agents under CIP who also represent international buyers 
locally are all in Accra. This is a reflection of the closeness of Accra to the craft market 
and the availability of relatively better trade facilities.   
 
3.4.2 The Search and Selection of Interviewees 
Forty-seven interviewees and informants were selected for one-one-one interviews. This 
included interviews with exporters/producers, export agents and other informants. The 
distribution (see appendix 1) of the interviews was as follows: Export agents 6, 
Subcontractors/Producers from Foase Atwima and Ahwiaa 4, mainstream machine 
furniture exporter/producers 4, Informants 6 (all from the craft industry). Twenty-seven 
focal exporters were interviewed and their distribution was as follows: large-scale 
producers (8); craft workshops/designers (4); export vendors (10); and traders (5). The 
list of the exporters was obtained from Aid to Artisans Ghana (ATAG) and was 
corroborated with exporters on the books of Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC). 
The initial fieldwork plan envisaged the use of firm size i.e. the number of employees to 
ensure the inclusiveness of the different types of the exporting firms operating in the 
industry in the study. The use of this criterion was found to be problematic in that the 
artisans and craftsmen are employed on piece-rate basis and their engagement by the 
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exporters vary depending on the quantity of the orders to be executed, which makes it 
difficult to determine with certainty the numbers of workers engaged by the exporters. 
The employment relationships between the exporters and the workers are fluid and the 
exporters do not claim responsibility over the crafts people they hire as their workers. The 
categorization used by the Government of Ghana Craft Initiative Programme (CIP) was 
instead adopted for the selection of the interviewees in an attempt to ensure that the main 
stakeholders are not excluded. The enterprises were classified as large scale craft 
producers, niche market producers and firms working with agents (export vendors) (the 
list of exporters obtained from ATAG was also categorized in a similar fashion). Whilst 
these seemingly reflect some kind of the different firms operating vertically along the 
craft industry chain, the criteria for the categorization were not explicitly explained. The 
criteria used could have been based on the specialties and internal production capacities 
of the enterprises. 
 
The list obtained from ATAG contained only the active exporters in the craft industry. 
The hundreds of upstream subcontractors who supply finished or unfinished products to 
the exporters and many artisans were not captured in the list neither could it be obtained 
from other sources. The exporters who in this case are the focal enterprises of the study 
were asked to identify these other actors in their production. They were asked to identify 
their suppliers or subcontractors upstream, who either execute orders or source raw 
materials for them. From this, four main artisan subcontractors in the two craft villages 
visited were identified and selected for one-on-one interviews. They were selected for 
interviews because they represent the cream of artisan subcontractors who possess good 
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knowledge about craft production in the villages. Prior to the visit to the villages, it 
became apparent after a series of interviews with the respondents in Accra that these 
subcontractors who maintain a large pool of craftsmen in the craft villages frequently 
execute orders for the exporters in Accra. The responses from many of the exporters 
converged on these selected artisans as their main subcontractors. 
 
Even though, the key export agents/intermediaries were on the list obtained from ATAG, 
to confirm the trade relations between the exporters and the agents, however, the 
exporters were asked to identify the trade agents and buyers they usually transact 
business with.   
 
Personal interaction with key actors in the craft export industry by this researcher 
received a boost with an opportunity to attend a trade seminar organised by the Trade 
Facilitation Office of Canada (TFOC) in collaboration with the Ghana Export Promotion 
Council on 20
th
 July 2007 at M‘Plaza Hotel. TFOC‘s Design Africa initiative sought to 
create market linkages in Canada for African producers of home décor items and also to 
help the participants of the initiative to develop their capacity to move into the high-end 
of the home décor export market. Interactions with some of the exporters at the seminar 
revealed that most of them were disinterested in the high-end Canadian market for a 
number of reasons. They were interested in producing items for the mass market as they 
are easy to produce and required little effort, consisting of relatively regular high volume 
orders from buyers as against irregular, low volume orders and difficult to produce 
premium items for the high end of the market to which they do not have the production 
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capacity to undertake. The exporters who have the capacity to produce the middle-ranked 
quality products prefer to remain loyal
1
 to their buyers and would not want to sell their 
designs, at least in the short-term, to their buyers‘ competitors.  It was therefore not 
surprising that only one Ghanaian craft exporter was selected in 2006 to participate in 
Design Africa trade show in Canada. 
 
3.4.3 Interviews with Key Private Actors in the Industry 
The interviews were unstructured and open-ended. They took the form of a one-on-one 
conversation with the respondents. The type of interview technique adopted to seek 
qualitative information from the firms is described by Yin (2003) as guided conversation 
entailing the pursuance of a consistent line of inquiry (using the case study guide) but the 
stream of questions under consideration were fluid rather than rigid. The interviews were 
less structured than conventional interviews but more guided than the word conversation 
might also suggest (IDD and Planafric, 1998). The underlying reason is to satisfy ―the 
needs of [one‘s] line of inquiry while simultaneously putting forth ‗friendly‘ and 
‗nonthreatening‘ questions in [an] open-ended [manner]‖ (Yin, 2003, p90).     
 
The owners/managers of the exporting enterprises and the export agents were the 
individuals who were interviewed. The informants were mainly officials from public and 
private organizations knowledgeable about the activities of the craft and furniture 
industry. The subcontractors from the carving village interviewed were master-craftsmen 
                                                 
1
 This does not mean the exporters maintain single and exclusive buyer relationships. It would be 
demonstrated later in the empirical chapters that indeed the exporters maintain multiple buyer relationships. 
The lack of capacity on the part of the majority of the exporters to produce high quality products seems to 
account for their disinterest and not the fact that they don‘t want to betray their loyalty with their buyers.  
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with many years of experience as carvers. The interviews were carried out at the 
production sites or places where the exporters and the production subcontractors 
undertake their activities. It was a difficult task physically locating some of the 
production sites of the exporters. These exporters are scattered all over Accra with some 
of them operating in unmarked and difficult to locate premises. Visiting the exporters‘ 
premises for interviews was time-consuming and entailed a lot of travelling to some very 
remote areas and the periphery of Accra. This researcher, in the early stage of the data 
collection, was fortunate to be taken around to few production sites in Accra by one key 
informant; employed as quality inspection officer by the American buyer; AMC.  
 
Most of the interview sections lasted between 45minutes and 2hrs using a conversation 
guide (see appendix 3). The interviews were carried out at the premises of the exporters 
or the offices of the informants. The specific items in the guide included the profile and 
histories of the exporting or the producing enterprises, business linkages between the 
exporters and subcontractors, buyers, export agents, horizontal linkages between the 
producing firms and issues bordering on quality standards and monitoring. The various 
items in the guide were not mechanically followed through to the letter in all the 
interview sections. It had to be adapted in certain instances to suit the specific 
circumstances of the industry, which could not be anticipated during the design stage. For 
instance the distinction of different buyers and that of arm‘s-length subcontractual 
production arrangements and in-house production systems were realized in the early stage 
of the interviews to be significant features in the industry and so were prioritized in the 
subsequent interviews. Again, the initial research question was concerned with the 
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architecture of inter-firm relations utilized by the exporters in accessing critical resources 
for their production activities. It also became evident in the course of the data collection 
that the form and the extent to which inter-firm subcontractual relations enable the 
exporters to coordinate their production activities could not be disentangled from soft 
issues such as trust or mistrust and the context of the socio-economic environment. It 
became apparent that issues of enforcing contractual obligations and the uncertain local 
socio-economic environment do have implications for how the small-scale firms organize 
their production activities for export. These issues where given attention in the course of 
the data collection, which in the end influenced the reframing of the conceptual 
framework and ultimately the research objectives.  
 
Again, the fieldwork plan did not envisage a separate interview guide for the export 
agents and the other informants from the private and public organisations. What was done, 
instead, was to engage this category of respondents in much more unstructured 
conversations in an attempt to gain an insight into their role in the craft industry and more 
importantly to corroborate some of the issues raised by the exporters. The export agents 
were used as proxies for buyers since this researcher lacked the capacity and resources to 
contact the buyers directly for interviews. The export agents who represent international 
buyers locally were in a better position to know the minds of the buyers and market 
trends. The buyers were not the prime focus of the study though their perspectives would 
have helped to understand how their activities influence the commodity chains of 
Ghanaian crafts. 
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The data collection was undertaken at a time when most of the exporters were executing 
orders for AMC group of buyers from the USA. This afforded the researcher the 
opportunity to observe the production activities at the various links in the domestic chain 
from carving at the production sites to packaging and final shipment at the port. The 
timing, in other words, was right for an investigation into such an industry that is market-
driven. Some of the interviews were audio-taped with the consent of the respondents.   
 
The study encountered two main difficulties. The first centred on data on the performance 
of the individual exporters in the craft industry. The common indicators often used to 
measure the performance or growth of small firms are the number of employees 
employed overtime, profit margins, output, sales and assets (Mead and Liedholm, 1998). 
What is lost in this set is the measurement of the influence of the industry on poverty 
reduction. As should be expected, there was the general apprehension by the craft 
exporters to give figures on their profit margins, neither were they able to supply 
information on production output since they hardly keep good records of these a except 
few who were able to give an indication of their annual production capacity. They 
sometimes chose to give impressionistic statements such as ―business is good or bad‖; 
―margins are good or falling‖. The study, however, relies on secondary data (export sales) 
to give some indication of the performance of the different exporters vis-à-vis the 
production strategies adopted by the exporters. The study relies on narratives instead of 
hard figures to describe the influence of the industry on poverty reduction.   
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The second was that the mainstream furniture producers who were contacted for 
interviews were ―too busy‖ to grant interviews. It also came to the realization of the 
researcher that a majority of the mainstream furniture producers were indeed not into 
active export. The office of Furniture and Wood Products Association of Ghana 
(FAWAG) was visited three times with the view to construct a list of producers or 
exporters of machined furniture. In all three occasions the office was found closed. It was 
later gathered that FAWAG had been operationally inactive for several months; casting a 
shadow on what was to be expected. The Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) was 
instead contacted for a list of manufacturers or exporters of machined wood furniture. 
Seven producers were contacted but four granted the request for interviews and out of 
this only one manufacturer produce high quality furniture for export. The other three 
firms produce furniture for the high end of the domestic market. These companies are 
large and vertically integrated firms that produce furniture for the local Ghanaian market. 
The implication of this to the study is that the traditional mainstream furniture producers 
are largely under-represented in this study. However, the few that were interviewed had 
had occasional or one-off encounters with clients beyond the borders of the Ghanaian 
market and gave hints about some of the difficulties they face and the barriers that 
prevent them from becoming active players in the export market. The problems 
encompass the lack of technical and managerial capacity to meeting quality and delivery 
requirements of mainstream furniture at competitive prices. European buyers, for instance, 
require suppliers to prove that the wood products they buy come from a sustainably 
managed and independently certified sources. Ghanaian forests have not been 
independently certified, except in a few cases of sawmilling firms whose forest 
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consignments have been certified by an independent body (e.g. Samartex has it 
consignment certified by SGS South Africa). In response to the question of why they 
have not been able to export to the international market one respondent identified their 
inability to procure raw materials from certified and sustainably managed sources as a 
major impediment to their access to the export market. A respondent had this to say in 
connection with this issue: 
 
The problem that we face is getting the market. I think the reason why we 
are not getting it is partly due to our inability to get certified forest 
consignment. Because any buyer who would want to do business with you 
would ask: ―can you get the raw materials from sustainable source?‖ They 
want to be sure that the moment they start business with you, you can 
produce and meet their volume requirement every time. I have had 
encounters with a lot of buyers over there and most of the time the 
requirements we can‘t meet them (Irokko company).     
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter dealt with theoretical foundations of case-study research as a scientific 
inquiry and its appropriateness for studying informal trade networks and relationships. 
The chapter was also devoted to the recounting of the techniques and procedures applied 
to the data collection process. In-depth case study approach was adopted to help explore 
the extent to which inter-firm subcontractual relations and other informal mechanisms 
enable the case study firms to overcome resource constraints and production uncertainties 
and risks. Suitable for investigations into hard to quantify historical and contemporary 
phenomena, qualitative case-study research with its inherent emphasis on in-depth 
naturalistic understanding, is often branded too open-ended, subjective and entailing the 
biases of the researcher and the researched, which are far cry from objective scientific 
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inquiry. But the proponents of case study methodology argues that the rigour and the 
quality of case studies can be assured when investigators set out to address their research 
problem by following a clearly defined and transparent research trajectory. The correct 
specification of units of analysis and the operational measures that seek information from 
multiple sources helps to increase the construct validity of case-study research, whilst 
generalization is made possible by relating the case study findings to the relevant 
theoretical ideas. These theoretical understanding of case-study approach influenced the 
actual data collection process. The in-depth interviews that were conducted using 
conversational guide to gather information about the structural and instrumental aspects 
of inter-firm relations did not only target the focal enterprises but also other key actors 
who are linked to the production chains of  the focal firms as well as key stakeholders 
operating outside the production chains. The underlying aim was to seek information 
from different possible sources for the purpose of data triangulation as well as seeking 
divergent views. By relying largely on official list of exporters, the study seemingly 
focused on the relatively successful exporters to the exclusion of other least visible 
exporters. The intention during the data collection process was to interview sizeable 
number of the different actors on the craft production chain. However, the use of few 
proxies (identifiable and key master artisans in two craft villages) meant that the actual 
views and insights of the numerous artisan and artisan subcontractors operating upstream 
either individually or in groups are under-represented in this study. There was the 
practical difficulty of physically locating some of these iterant artisans and subcontractors.  
One interviewee recognized the danger of under-representing the views of some of the 
exporters by constructing selection frame based solely on official list:  
  
 
113 
when anybody comes for these feasibility studies, they give you some 
specific people, isn‘t it? We are about fifty people. Did they give you all the 
fifty names? They give you people who have a set-up, a showroom and an 
office. Most of the exporters don‘t have these. They do their work in the 
bush. They don‘t have warehouse, they don‘t have any premises. I think you 
should have the opinion of those who even don‘t have offices. You should 
interview them also.  
 
The message here is simple; one should always seek multiple opinions from multiple 
sources to help broaden the findings of the research. The inability to contact and 
interview the mass of the artisans and artisan subcontractors who in a sense are 
considered the main workers in the industry is one main limitation of this study. What 
this also means is that there is a lack of sufficient evidence to properly gauge the 
implications of the craft export industry on employment levels, environment and poverty 
as perceived by the mass of the artisans operating in the craft villages. The anecdotal 
evidence (perceptual) gathered from the few artisan subcontractors interviewed showed a 
positive impact of the industry on the material conditions of the artisans (see section 6.6 
for the narrative of the poverty impact of the subcontracting relations on the artisan 
subcontractors).    
  
Another downside of this study is the failure to determine how the trade regulatory 
regime, in this case the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) impacts on the 
relative success of the industry in integrating into the US market. 
 
Timing of the data collection is of great significance especially when the phenomena 
under study are time sensitive. Most of the exporters at the time of the fieldwork were in 
the season of executing orders for export. Another experience during the course of the 
  
 
114 
data collection is the need to be flexible and adjust the process accordingly to take 
advantage of emerging trends and issues as was the case with this study. Again, rushing 
to the field for data collection is not a perfect substitute for good pre-data collection 
preparation, particularly, if the researcher is not familiar with the chosen case study sector. 
No matter how well one gets prepared, there are bound to be some ―reality checks‖ and 
disappointments as not all intended issues are likely to be resolved in the course of the 
data collection.                               
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                                                      CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BACKGROUND TO THE GHANAIAN NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORT 
SECTOR 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the background information on the Ghanaian non-traditional export 
(NTE) sector in general, narrowing down to the chosen case study sector i.e. the craft 
industry, which is a subsector of the NTE. This introductory section is followed by the 
presentation of policy initiatives and government support towards the non-traditional 
export sector; demonstrating the activist role of the government of Ghana in promoting 
the NTE sector, especially, during the SAP-era. Section 4.3 follows with descriptive 
background information on the craft export industry; in its historical and contemporary 
contexts. The character of the various actors involved in the vertical production chain of 
the craft export industry is presented in Section 4.4; showing the myriad of different 
private actors in the industry. Section 4.5 entails background information on the exporters 
who are considered the focal actors for this analysis. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter 
with a summary of the main themes.  The government of Ghana played a very active role 
in promoting the craft export industry in the early years of the industry‘s development but 
current evidence demonstrates the assumption of the dominant role by a myriad of private 
actors who drive the industry.  
 
4.2 Non-traditional Export Sector 
For almost a century, the Ghanaian export sector was dominated by the traditional 
primary products of cocoa, timber, gold and other minerals until the 1980s when the 
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government of Ghana intensified its effort to diversify the export sector to include non-
traditional export products as part of the economic recovery programme.  Non-traditional 
exports are defined by the government of Ghana as any export products other than the 
traditional export products of cocoa beans, logs and timber, and gold (Buatsi, 2002).  
They include horticultural products, fish and seafood, processed and semi-processed 
products including furniture and furniture parts, aluminum products, prepared foods and 
beverages, and craft products. 
 
Teal‘s (2003) analysis of the Ghanaian export sector growth revealed a picture of erratic 
performance throughout the twentieth century. For instance, he observed that the export 
per capita in 1907-1910 was US$100 and after decades of steep decline, the effort to 
diversify and improve the performance of the export sector in the ‘80s and the ‗90s could 
only return export growth at the end of the twentieth century to the levels recorded at the 
beginning of the century.  The export sector during this period was also dominated by 
cocoa exports with the attendant problems of volume and price fluctuations, which 
affected export earnings; ―the history of Ghana‘s trade performance in the twentieth 
century is the history of its cocoa exports‖ (p125).  The contribution of non-cocoa export 
to total export during this period was negligible.  
 
The diversification of the export base through the addition of non-traditional products to 
the export basket was thus an agenda designed by the government of Ghana in an attempt 
to reverse this trend. The goal of promoting non-traditional exports was to boost and 
diversify export earnings, generate employment and reduce poverty (World Bank, 2001). 
  
 
117 
The government of Ghana set itself the target of ensuring the non-traditional export sector 
contributes about US$ 16 billion to the total export revenue as part of a broader agenda to 
ensure that Ghana achieves a middle income status by the year 2020 (Buatsi, 2002).  The 
production of the main primary exports is concentrated in the relatively rich southern 
regions leaving other deprived parts of the country virtually out of the export trade. The 
promotion of non-traditional products for export was viewed as a way of enabling poor 
regions in Ghana to participate and to share in the gains of the export trade (Konadu-
Agyemang and Adanu, 2003).   
 
Notwithstanding the insignificant increases in export growth over the decades, the 
contribution of the non-traditional export to total export revenue is very visible. The 
earnings of non-traditional export grew from a modest value of US$119.3 million in 1994 
to US$705.4 million in 2004 and as at 2003 about 3000 individual exporters participated 
in the industry (see table 1). What is still not clear is the total number of workers engaged 
in this sector. 
 
The identification of the need to diversify the export sector was given effect in 1969 by 
the government of Ghana through the establishment of the Ghana Export Promotion 
Council (GEPC) and the introduction of import surcharges and export promotion 
packages to support non-traditional exports. But as Addo and Marshall (2000) observed 
firms established in the ‗70s to start large-scale production for export of non-traditional 
products did not receive any government support. The 1980s, however, marked a 
renewed interest on the part of the government of Ghana to revive the non-traditional 
  
 
118 
export sector by introducing new policies and programmes with the intent to remove 
some of the constraints in the sector. These constraints were identified to include weak 
production base, high domestic production costs, inadequate export incentives, difficult 
bureaucratic procedures associated with export transactions and the lack of knowledge 
about export procedures. The government‘s effort manifested itself in the areas of fiscal 
policy incentives and restructuring of the existing formal trade support agencies. The 
major fiscal incentives introduced by the government to boost the export sector included 
a retention by the exporters of 35 per cent of export earnings in foreign exchange, 
corporate tax rebate allowing the exporters of non-traditional products to claim 30-75 per 
cent of their tax liability, customs duty draw back allowing exporters to draw back up to 
100 per cent of duties paid on materials imported to produce goods for export.  There 
were also attempts to modernize the existing trade support institutions such as the Ghana 
Export Promotion Council (GEPC) and the Ministry of Trade and Tourism (now Ministry 
of Trade and Industry). This was done through retraining of personnel and staff in 
international trade practices and provision of modern office equipments to these agencies. 
Regional offices were also established to expand the reach of trade promotion services to 
rural producers and exporters (Addo and Marshall, 2000).  To improve the production 
capacity base of rural communities for export, the government initiated the development 
of export production villages (EPV) with the objectives to; develop effective institutional 
mechanisms for the coordination of rural export production, to ensure availability of 
supplies for sustainable export markets, to improve production efficiency and quality 
consciousness among rural producers. According to Addo and Marshall (2000), UNDP 
and government of Ghana jointly financed the EPV projects and by early 1990s, five of 
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them had been established. The International Trade Centre (ITC) in 2001 reported on the 
success of an EPV in the Ghanaian village of Aburi as follows:  
 
Started with 35 woodcarvers in 1990, this EPV has grown to over 300 
woodcarvers. It now employs nearly 700 persons…its annual export turnover 
has risen from US$160,000 to US$3,250,000 in 1997. It has become a 
reliable supplier to Getrade [a local export agent] and Pier One (cited in 
Wolff, 2004, p124).  
 
The policy initiatives and the renewed interest by the government of Ghana (GOG) to 
strengthen trade support institutions since the ‘80 could be described as appropriate to the 
development of NTE, yet a lot of constraints continue to persist both at the institutional 
and the microeconomic levels. The GEPC faces the problem of inadequate funding, 
which limits its ability to fully address the constraints facing the exporters fully. A major 
critique of the government of Ghana‘s intervention in the development of the non-
traditional sector is that it has overly been concentrated on the macroeconomic 
environment to the detriment of tackling the microeconomic constraints (Addo and 
Marshall, 2000; World Bank, 2001). As it will be shown later in chapter five, the 
difficulties at the microeconomic level presents major challenges for the case study sector 
and the extent to which the craft exporters respond in terms of institutional arrangements 
to overcome these constraints is important for their success in the export market.    
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                                 TABLE 1: TRENDS OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS (1994-2004) 
ITEM                               1994  1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000      2001   2002   2003    2004 
Agricultural Products 
Value(US$m)                  39.2    24.4    50.3    57.4     77.8    84.5    74.5     82.5    85.7    138.1    159.9 
Number of Exporters  1206    1280  1714   1654    1344    1232   1520    1570   1442     1546         NA 
(Semi) processed Prod 
Value(US$m)                  77.8  130.2  223     267     317.5   313.3  321.1   362.7  407.2    446.6    540.4 
Number of Exporters  1154    1333  1424   1430    1256    1228   1518    1401   1491     1492         NA 
Handicraft 
Value(US$m)                    2.3      2.1      2.9      4.72    6.4       6.7       5.0    14.9     11.3       4.2         5.2 
Number of Exporters    169      192     201     194     160      137      165     146      150      143          NA   
Total  
Value(US$m)                119.3  15 9.7  276.2  329     401.7  404.4    400.7   459.6  504.3   588.9     705.4 
Number of Exporters  2529   2802   3339   3278   2760    2597    3203    3117   3083    3181           NA 
 
  
Source: Konadu- Agyemang and Adanu (2003) and ―The State of the Ghanaian Economy 2004‖  
 
 4.3 The Organization of Ghanaian Craft: The Case Studies Sector  
This section looks at the organization of Ghanaian crafts prior to the implementation of 
SAPs and during the SAP-era. The craft industry during the pre-SAP era was driven by 
domestic consumption (e.g. specialist crafts) and the tourists market. The SAP regimes 
encouraged a direct integration of the Ghanaian craft industries into the international 
market where the industries‘ growth is linked to, the ability on the part of the exporters to 
adapt to, international demand and pressures (World Bank, 2001).  
 
The Craft Industry during the Pre-SAP regime 
Earlier studies on the Ghanaian craft industry associated the genesis of some craft 
production with the development of the Ashanti court system in the eighteenth century 
(Johnson, 1979, Browne, 1981b): 
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…in the early eighteenth century, the strong and wealthy centralized 
government of Ashanti established certain settlements as craft villages to 
supply the pots, stools, drums, cloth, goldwork, state swords and other 
paraphernalia of the Ashanti court‖(Browne, 1981, p313). 
 
Johnson‘s (1979) rich account of the organization of Ashanti craft talked of an elaborate 
product specialization among the craft villages
2
 that surrounded Kumasi, the Ashanti 
capital, and the dynamism of the sector in adapting to changing internal market 
circumstances. Craftsmen made stools, staffs of office, umbrellas, drums and wooden 
utensils for the royal kitchens. Though this craft production was originally tied to the 
traditional court system, the artisans had the freedom to make and sell some of their 
wares to outsiders but not the designs reserved for the palace. Beyond making crafts for 
the chief‘s court, Johnson observed that, some of the craftsmen earned a living through 
craft production: ―…they [the craftsmen] could…earn enough by craft production to buy 
such things as salt, which they could not themselves produce…‖ (ibid, p78). Some of the 
craft villages, according to Johnson (ibid), specialized in producing for the tourist market 
(the exact period when this emerged is not known but it was in existence in 1975 when 
Johnson undertook her fieldwork)
3
 and adapted their product forms to the taste of the 
tourists:  
 
                                                 
2
 Johnson (1979) named the product specialties of the villages as follows: Kente (Bonwire, Wono; now 
Sakrawono,  Adangmoase and Besease), Beads (Daaba),  State shields (Wawasi), Basketry (Wawasi), 
Umbrella making (Banko, near Mampong Akrofonso, Nsuta and Wawasi), Adinkra Cloth (Asokwa and 
Ntonso),  Pottery (Pankronu and Old Tafo), Gold weights and Brassware (Kurofofrom), Blacksmithing 
(Adwumakase  Kese and Wawasi). It is important to note that most of these villages, which Johnson 
described as ―more than three hours‘ easy walk from Kumasi‖(p78)  are now suburbs of Kumasi 
demonstrating that ―the map of the craft villages is certainly not static today, nor was it evidently static in 
the past (ibid, p78). A map of the craft villages surrounding Kumasi can be found in Browne (1981b, figure 
1, p314).     
3
 According to Wolff (2004) the Ashanti fertility dolls were popular as tourist and export art forms in the 
late 1960s. 
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At Ntonso, it has become something of a tourist industry, developing 
interesting new forms in combination with tie-dye techniques, and non-
traditional colours…Bonwire has lost much of its traditional character by 
catering to tourists, though the town is still one large workshop (p78).       
 
The tourist market served as important source of demand for the Ghanaian decorative 
craft products when court crafts declined in importance. Johnson (ibid) described the 
emergence of a tourist market as follows: ―The court crafts [were] in a more precarious 
situation…In many cases the tourists…stepped in…Meanwhile the craftsmen [were] 
ready enough to oblige‖(p82). She described the booming tourist demand for Ashanti 
craft in this manner:  
 
The crafts of Ashanti are flourishing as never before. Every year, 
busloads of tourists arrive in the better-known villages, eager to return 
home with ‗authentic‘ African works (ibid, p81).  
 
 The craftsmen catered to the new sources of tourist demand by introducing new product 
designs, copied from other West African countries, into their product mix: 
 
Masks are not part of Ashanti tradition, but since many tourists think that all 
African art ought to include masks, Ashanti carvers cheerfully make copies of 
Ivory Coast masks with ‗legs‘ or the Chi Wara antelope masks…of…Mali 
(ibid, p82). 
 
Besides the tourist market, domestic consumption of decorative craft products also grew 
in importance. Curio shops emerged on the streets of major cities in Ghana and the stocks 
of small traders grew. Johnson (ibid) reported the growth of the domestic market for the 
works of craftsmen for ―…items not aimed solely at the foreigner, and of course the 
demand for domestic necessities always exists‖ (p 82). The sophistication of decorative 
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craft production became elaborated through the production systems that evolved in line 
with the existing market segments. These production systems could be described as 
―mass production‖ for the tourist market and niche production for a small number of 
individual clients locally. Some specialist villages, according to Johnson, produced items 
for the tourist market using entirely so-called traditional techniques, but in fact containing 
elements of mass production but lacked ―the subtlety of the best traditional work and at 
worst produce[d] rather crude results‖ (p80). However, other craftsmen who produced to 
the orders of clients ―were able to maintain a higher standard of workmanship than [was] 
possible by mass-production for the tourist market‖ (p80).  
 
Browne‘s study (1981a), which dealt with the internal dynamics of kente weaving among 
the Ashanti, looked at the ways kente cloths were marketed locally, the nature of 
employment in the industry, and the question of whether or not the attempt made by 
external agents to ―modernize‖ traditional technology of craft production in the 1970s 
was an appropriate intervention. In her study of kente weavers in Sakorawono, a village 
near Kumasi, Browne (ibid) observed three ways in which finished products from the 
village were marketed. Women traders from the village who taking cloths to other parts 
of Ghana; the artisans themselves taking cloths to the markets in Kumasi and elsewhere; 
and by selling direct to customers, from whom the kente had been ordered. Because the 
craftsmen in this village did not produce for the tourist market, they lost out on the 
advantage of increased sales and revenue from the tourist market. However, they gained 
from having a year-round demand and a more consistent price structure for their output 
(Browne, ibid). Browne also categorized the workers in the craft village into self-
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employed and those she regarded as ―employees‖. The employees were hired by people 
such as master artisans, women traders and individuals who had capital with which to buy 
raw materials. The employees were given the raw materials to make the products and 
they were paid on a piece-work basis according to the value (quality) of the product. The 
self-employed bought their own raw materials, made their designs and marketed the 
finished products for profit. According to Browne, most of the artisans and the employees 
aspired to the status of self-employment but there were cost barriers to achieving this 
status. To achieve this status required the artisans to work long years in order to 
accumulate enough capital. The employee status was a ―temporary status…albeit, a 
prolonged period for some‖ (ibid, p35). 
 
There were attempts as far back as the seventies to ―modernize‖ or ―improve‖ Ashanti 
crafts. Notable intervention, for instance, was initiated by the Technology Consultancy 
Centre of the University of Science and Technology (UST, now Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology), and the National Cultural Centre in Kumasi to 
improve the efficiency of craft production through technology improvements (Johnson, 
1979, Browne, 1981a). According to Johnson (1979
4
, p82), some technical problems 
were resolved through this effort but ―in some cases the idea of increased efficiency [was] 
applied…in a somewhat insensitive way, often by people who have not taken the trouble 
to find out the consequences of the technical changes they advocate‖. The supposed 
improvement that was achieved (e.g. the hybrid mock-kente loom) was ―neither efficient 
nor traditional…they [gave] the poorest impression of Ashanti technology‖ (ibid, p82). In 
                                                 
4
 Johnson‘s fieldwork was conducted in August 1975 with a research grant from the Centre of West African 
Studies, The University of Birmingham. 
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particular, the effort by UST to improve the technical efficiency of kente weaving in 1973 
yielded little success (Browne, 1981a). The craftsmen who participated in the project 
were neither interested in using the ―new‖ technology nor willing to introduce it in the 
village—the cost of acquiring it was a major obstacle. She further observed:   
 
It is difficult to see what relevance such a project would have had…even 
had the [technology] been cheaper. The amount of capital available to 
artisans and the likely demand for new products are critical considerations 
when considering technological change, particularly in a rural setting 
(Brown, 1981a, p36).  
 
The size of market is emphasized by Fafchamps (1994) and Murphy et al. (1989) as an 
important element for technological adaptation (see section 2.6). Whilst simple and 
handmade products suit small niche markets, mass production technology is sustained by 
large market size. Johnson (1979) was not particularly against the modernization of 
Ashanti craft: she argued that the ―…worst enemies of Ashanti crafts may well be those 
who are most anxious to preserve them‖ (ibid, p82). She summed up her stance on the 
mechanization of, for example, kente weaving as follows:  
Neither traditional narrow looms nor any other form of handloom can 
provide the quantities of cheap cloth demanded in Ghana, and the answer 
must ultimately lie in mechanized manufacture…similar considerations 
apply to any goods in mass demand (ibid, p82). 
 
She, however, maintained that traditional Ashanti crafts could survive in sophisticated 
societies by exploiting local and export niche markets that cannot be cheaply and 
efficiently be exploited by mechanized production systems. Basu (1995) draws our 
attention to the fact that technical change driven by external demand may not necessarily 
have a benign effect on original craft production—for it may lead to the ―destruction of 
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the very authenticity that formed the basis for its genuine appreciation in external 
cultures‖(p259).    
 
The debate in the seventies and subsequently was not so much against technical change in 
the organization of Ashanti craft production rather it was about the idea that effective 
technological improvements are achieved with the support and participation of the 
artisans themselves (Brown, 1981a).  
 
The Craft Export Industry since SAP 
The contemporary craft export industry is described as a success story in Ghana. As the 
above analysis illustrates, craft production has been part of Ghanaians culture for many 
years, and its birth as direct earner of export revenue coincided with government policy to 
promote non-traditional export during the implementation of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s (Pageau 2004; World Bank, 2001). Export 
earnings from the craft sector (as evident in table 1) rose from the modest figure of 
US$2.3million in 1994 and peaked at US$14.9million in 2001 but this has been achieved 
within a volatile competitive environment. This success according to Pageau (2004) is 
partly due to the fact that Ghana is a new source of authentic ethnic craft products. Export 
earnings from the sector, however, declined from US$14.9million in 2001 to 
US$5.2million in 2004. The uniqueness and authenticity of Ghanaian crafts are obviously 
regarded as insufficient to sustain the growth trend in the craft industry if the producers 
fail to match the quality and price of their global competitors (Pageau, 2004). 
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The Ghanaian craft export sector is a market-led industry and its original integration into 
the international market was spear-headed by international buyers, especially those from 
the USA. The role of government has been concentrated in the areas of trade promotion 
and facilitation activities, which are done through the agency of Ghana Export Promotion 
Council (GEPC). This government agency sometimes with financial support from 
international development agencies has been instrumental in linking the local exporters to 
international buyers. Initially, most craft export went to Europe, albeit, in small quantities 
mainly as a result of participation in European trade fairs. The entry into the US market 
of Ghanaian craft products in relatively large quantities started in 1993 when Pier 1 began 
sourcing products from Ghana. The maiden contact between Pier 1 Import and the craft 
exporters, for instance, was initially facilitated by the GEPC.  
 
In 1992, the GEPC with financial support from the Commonwealth Secretariat organized 
a trade mission to the North America in search of buyers.  Following this mission, Pier 1 
entered the Ghanaian market as the first key international buyer. Because of the 
instrumental role played by GEPC in bringing Pier 1 to Ghana, the expectation was that 
the Pier 1 buyers would rely on GEPC to coordinate export orders on their behalf. But 
because of their general apprehension in doing business with government officials, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, they chose instead to rely on a non-state channel by 
appointing a private agent on a commission basis, Kraft Export Consult, to be their local 
agent to coordinate export orders locally on their behalf. Incidentally, the owner of this 
agency was also on the staff of GEPC and was part of the team that helped to bring Pier 1 
to Ghana but later resigned to establish Kraft Export Consult. The owner of this export 
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agency had this to say in connection with the reluctance of Pier 1 buyers to deal with the 
public agency: 
They [buyers] selected a number of items. They ordered from about 23 
different producers to the tune of US$900,000…they gave us the 
orders …the vice president of Pier 1 then asked me if I can recommend 
somebody for them to coordinate their export orders for them. But I 
reminded him that they were brought into the country by GEPC and that the 
council would coordinate for them successfully. They replied that US 
companies do not want to work with government institutions and that they 
prefer working with privately-owned companies. I indicated to them that I 
have already registered a private company and if they wanted I could use 
my company to do for them. The man said OK, at least we are familiar with 
you; we have known you for sometime if only your office would give you 
the blessing to do it, if it wouldn‘t have any conflict of interest.       
 
The initial moderate success chalked up by Pier 1 in doing business in unfamiliar 
business territories such as Ghana in the early 1990s caught the attention of other US 
buyers under the umbrella of the Associated Merchandise Corporation (AMC) to enter 
the Ghanaian market. This development stimulated the emergence of myriad local traders, 
local export agents and other intermediaries to fill an institutional vacuum between the 
small artisan producers and the international buyers (World Bank, 2001). The theoretical 
explanation for the emergence of the plethora of commercial intermediaries and traders in 
trade mediation is often seen as a coordination response to information problems, high 
transaction risks and imperfect contract enforcement (Fafchamps, 2004).  
 
The policy initiative designed by the Government of Ghana under its Presidential Special 
Initiative (PSI) of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has sought to implement 
programmes with the aim of transforming the industry from its cottage-like, unorganized 
and subsistence–focused activities into a modern production platform capable of meeting 
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large orders and expectations in terms of standards of the international craft trade. A 
number of exporters were selected to benefit from specific initiatives under this 
government programme. The programme aptly recognizes the organizational difficulties 
facing the craft export industry and therefore sought to;  
 re-orient the minds of the selected companies to adopt best practices in production 
organization and marketing and also undertake re-conditioning exercises to 
develop positive production attitudes towards exports;  
 expose the selected enterprises to global best practices by organizing study tours 
to other craft exporting countries that have succeeded in ―mass-production‖ 
techniques of craft products with the ultimate goal of learning how such 
enterprises in those countries  handle large export orders and enforce standards 
and quality (six key actors were actually sponsored to visit Morocco, Philippines 
and Honduras);  
 engage in product development initiative by fielding external and local 
consultants in addition to individual efforts in developing new products for export 
and also relying on the existing institutions of innovations.   
 
Much as the government‘s policy initiative offered appropriate response to the challenges 
bedevilling the industry, some of the exporters interviewed expressed very little 
confidence in the policy, regarding it as one of those bureaucratic processes that would 
only remain on paper and would not see the light of implementation. 
 
4.3.1 Ghanaian Craft Export Products  
The craft products that are imported from Ghana include baskets, traditional musical 
instruments, drums, wooden masks and figures, Ashanti stools, furniture and home 
accessories, beads and jewelleries, ceramic wares, textiles i.e. Kente products and other 
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cloth products. This study looked in particular at wood-based Ghanaian crafts. The export 
of wood-based crafts constitutes about 80 per cent of all craft exports earnings according 
to export figures from GEPC, thus considered fairly representative of the craft export 
industry (Pageau, 2004). Basket exports, which were next to wooden craft exports in 
terms of revenue, fell drastically from about US$4.7million in 2001 to US$550,000 in 
2002 (GEPC) as a result of stiff competition from Vietnam—with better organised 
production systems to produce high quality baskets at cheaper prices for the international 
market. In view of the wide assortment of Ghanaian craft products, it is still possible to 
categorise them into the traditional/simple decorative pieces and middle-ranked utilitarian 
home accessories; products that have use in Western homes but designed with Ghanaian 
decorative designs.   
 
4.3.2 Destination of Ghanaian Craft Export 
Most of the Ghanaian craft exports are destined for the USA, Holland, Italy, Germany 
and Japan. The US with a huge African-focus market provides major demand for 
Ghanaian craft export and most of the products christened as ―mass products‖ are for this 
market. There are smaller American niche market buyers who buy functional and the 
relatively high quality home decor from the few exporters capable of producing these 
types of products. It became evident in the course of the interviews that the craft products 
that are exported to the European market are of low volume; high quality functional 
products that the majority of Ghanaian exporters interviewed did not yet have the 
capability to undertake.     
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4.3.3 Raw material supplies 
The main raw material for the craft industry is wood. Wood once regarded as in 
abundance in Ghana is increasingly becoming scarce due to forest depletion. The craft 
industry relies mostly on informal sources for wood supply, mainly through chain saw 
operators and ―lumber dealers‖ who supply it with wood off-cuts from sawmills. The ban 
on chainsaw operators by the Government of Ghana since 1998 to curtail forest 
degradation has made it difficult for the exporters to obtain wood from informal sources. 
This, however, has not reduced the reliance of the craft exporters and the small producers 
on clandestine sources of wood supplies from distant villages though they often face 
harassment from forestry officials and the police and end up paying bribes in their bid to 
transport the logs. Most of the small producers cannot afford the high cost of sawn 
lumber that the millers are only prepared to sell at export price. Again fiscal incentives, 
such as tax rebates on volumes exported and the export earnings retention fund instituted 
by the government of Ghana encourages the millers to export instead of supplying the 
domestic market (Owusu, 2001). In the face of these difficulties, the exporters are 
resorting to lesser-utilised wood species instead of the fast depleting traditional 
hardwoods. Again some of the craft firms and producers have secured lands and 
embarked on tree plantation projects to ensure sustained supply of raw materials. A case 
in point is the Foase craft village where the artisans have come together, secured land and 
begun a tree plantation. 
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4.4 Background to the Key Private Actors in the Craft Production Chain  
There are a number of actors in the production chain of the craft industry in Ghana and a 
brief description of the actors along the chain follows here, beginning with the actors 
involved in upstream activities and moving to those in downstream activities. The 
classification is derived from researcher‘s fieldwork data and other studies by Action for 
Enterprise (2004) and Pageau (2004). The actors in the vertical chains of the craft 
industry include the individual artisans and craftspeople, exporters, traders, export agents 
and international buyers. These are the actors along the commodity chains that link the 
Ghanaian craft products to the ultimate clients in the West and the roles they play are 
important in determining the success or failure of the art industries (Wolff, 2004). They 
are regarded as ―gatekeepers‖ in the sense that they ―play a role in controlling the 
commodity flow…and are essential actors in the feedback process that guides future 
production behaviours of artisan[s] …who strive to remain active in a highly competitive 
market (ibid, p132). Wolff (ibid) identified the domestic gatekeepers at the supply end of 
the craft commodity chains in Ghana to include master craftsmen, entrepreneurial 
individuals (the exporters who form the central focus of this study), and export agents. At 
the demand end of the transnational craft production chain are the US and European 
buyers for small and large retail outlets. According to Wolff (ibid) an exploration of the 
activities of the different actors along the commodity chains that link African artisans to 
the Western market can be useful for understanding the nature of commodity flow, 
product change in cross-cultural context, and explaining success or failure of artisan 
industries in tapping the resources of global market. In addition to the various activities 
and influences of the various gatekeepers in the Ghanaian craft commodity chains, this 
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study also looks at how the nature of the relationships and institutional mechanisms 
utilized by the ―exporters‖ in transnational craft commodity chains enable them to 
effectively coordinate their activities.       
 
4.4.1 The Craftspeople and Artisan Subcontractors 
These are the craftspeople with the indigenous skills who are directly involved in 
manually producing craft products for mainly the lead exporters and export agents on a 
subcontractual basis. They also sell directly, though on a limited scale, to regional buyers 
and small international buyers. Typically, the artisans and the craftsmen produce in 
groups independently in the craft villages
5
 and peri-urban areas in southern Ghana. The 
artisans and the craftspeople may also be contracted to produce at the workshops or the 
premises of the exporters. The master craftspeople, acting as lead subcontractors, hire 
other artisans and craftspeople to execute orders on a piece rate basis either in the 
workshops of their hirers or in groups in the craft villages. They are highly mobile 
occupationally and can easily switch from one lead exporter to another depending on who 
offers the highest bid. However, some of the artisans and craftspeople have established 
special relationships with some of the exporters and thus work regularly for them. They 
perform specialized and discrete activities such as designing and carving, sanding, 
polishing, finishing and sometimes packaging. There are gender and age divisions of 
labour in the craft production. The men undertake the designing and the carving functions 
while the women and children do the sanding and polishing of the products. Wolff (2004, 
p127) succinctly captured the nature of these divisions of labour in this way: 
                                                 
5
 Foase Atwima and Ahiawaa in Ashanti region, Aburi in Eastern and other villages in Volta and Central 
Regions. 
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The [male carvers] make the raw piece and incised decorations and contract 
their wives, sisters, friends and kids for polishing. So mainly women 
sandpaper the pieces, put on finishing touches with the sharp knife and then 
apply the polish…The pieces however belong to the man, she is just a 
contractor and is paid her fee, if not she keeps the pieces and gives it only 
back after …being paid. She also trains younger ones and her children to 
help her with the work after school. There are already 12 year old boys who 
hide, when the school teacher goes round the town to ring and bell and call 
them for afternoon classes, they prefer the polishing work.  
 
The lead exporters may buy the raw materials and pay the artisan subcontractors for their 
labour or may subcontract the whole order to the artisan subcontractors and leave them 
with the charge to procure raw materials. In this instance, the artisans negotiate the price 
of each item to be produced with the lead exporters and receive advance payment to 
execute the order. Most of the exporters prefer the latter arrangement and give price 
incentives to artisans who procure their own raw materials to execute export orders. In 
this way, the exporters push the responsibility of procuring raw materials to the artisans. 
Since the exporters carry the financial burden and the risks associated with production 
pre-financing, they only subcontract to artisan producers they can trust not to abscond 
with their monies. Cheating by artisans and craftspeople is endemic in the industry; this is 
dealt with in more detail later in our discussion. The artisans and craftspeople also engage 
in transactions with multiple lead exporters to maximize their chances of getting export 
orders.   
 
4.4.2 The Export Agents 
They are the domestic representatives of international buyers in Ghana. They perform 
different functions and some of their activities overlap with the activities of the exporters. 
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There are seven of them playing significant intermediary roles between the exporters and 
the buyers. They include Getrade, Kraft Export Consult, Fritete, Afripeche, Delata, SPB 
Unicommerz and Sankofa. The intermediation functions of these export agents and their 
subcontracting relationship with some of the lead exporters are dealt with in detail later in 
chapter 5, section 5.4.  
 
4.4.3 The Buyers/Market 
There are different kinds of buyers who patronise craft products in Ghana. They can be 
segmented along the lines of volume of export orders, the product type, quality and the 
nature of the end market. They are the big and the small international buyers. The big 
international buyers with long standing trade relationship with Ghanaian craft exporters 
are from the USA. They include Pier 1 import and AMC group of buyers.  
 
There are also international small buyers who deal directly with the producers or the 
exporters, let‘s call them the middle-ranked quality product buyers. They order small 
product quantities consisting of relatively complex products i.e. functional craft products. 
Unlike the big buyers, the interaction between the small buyers and the exporters is 
qualitative in nature. It entails exchange of market information and support for product 
development. Buyer demands regarding product quality and standards are high requiring 
more intensive interaction between the buyers and exporters. Some of the small buyers 
sometimes send their consultants to develop new products together with the exporters. 
The empirical evidence suggests though order volumes from individual small buyers are 
  
 
136 
low and infrequent, profit margins are relatively high (see quotations in sections 6.2.3 and 
6.2.4).  
 
There is also the category of small buyers who order small quantities of products similar 
to those patronised by the big buyers directly from the producers and the exporters. From 
historical accounts, these small buyers dominated the Ghanaian market until the early 
1990s when the big buyers entered the market and almost forced them out of the trade, 
though some of them occasionally give orders to the artisan producers. Two of the 
producers interviewed at the export villages were executing orders for small Ghanaian 
buyers resident in the US at the time of the visit. The common defining factors for the 
international small buyers are that they offer better prices, make upfront payments to the 
producers to pre-finance production, and sometimes are more involved in developing new 
products with the exporters.  
 
There are also other traders who travel from neighbouring countries to buy craft products 
from Ghana and re-export them. Tourists and one-time international buyers occasionally 
buy craft products from street-side shops and designated craft shops such as the Art 
Centre in Accra. Here the transaction is spot-like, one-off and entails a lot of price 
jostling and haggling between the vendors and the buyer. 
 
The growth of the Ghanaian crafts products since the early 1990s has largely been driven 
by international demand. However there is an emerging domestic market— the expatriate 
workers, Ghanaian returnees from Europe and USA, hotels and restaurants— that offers a 
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great market potential for the high quality hand-made home products. One exporter 
interviewed had actually retreated from exporting and is now producing for this market 
and other exporters also indicated their willingness to diversify their market base to 
include the high-end domestic market. This segment of the Ghanaian market is quite 
demanding and also has tastes and preferences similar to the international market and can 
serve as a source of pressure for innovation and improvements. 
 
This study though takes the local exporters as its focal actors in the Ghanaian craft 
commodity chain; it also recognizes the role of international buyers in controlling the 
chain. By specializing in marketing activities, the Western retailers and wholesalers are 
able to exert considerable influence on transnational trade in African craft products. The 
literature on global production network teaches us that international buyers tend to 
control the commodity chain they feed into by virtue of possessing market knowledge 
and marketing infrastructure. By occupying strategic positions in the chains they are able 
to exert pressure on their suppliers to ensure timely delivery of orders at specified quality 
without having to own the production infrastructure of the suppliers. The American 
retailers and wholesalers through their marketing strategies manipulate the meanings of 
African craft products based on their deep understanding of the tastes and preferences of 
American consumers to boost demand (Wolff, 2004). The success of Ghanaian akua ba 
(fertility) dolls in the American market, according to Wolff (ibid), has been achieved 
through the Americanization of the traditional meanings of the dolls by the US retailers:  
 
The retailer, driven by economic concerns, modifies and inserts information 
based on their knowledge of the American audience. A good example is the 
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firm that expands the meaning of ―fertility‖ to include success in 
business…the retailers convey an aura of authenticity and functionality 
around their goods to encourage consumers to ―use‖ the dolls as home 
décor‖(ibid, p136) 
By specializing in marketing at the end of the commodity chains, the retailers are able 
control the economic value of the African craft products (Wolff, 2004). It will also be 
demonstrated in chapter five that by occupying special position in the commodity chains, 
the buyers are able to achieve compliance with quality and timely delivery through 
financial penalties for non-compliance with product specifications and delivery timelines.  
 
 
4.5 The Focal Craft Export Enterprises 
Defining who the exporter is in the Ghanaian craft industry is a bit problematic. There are 
a plethora of firms and individuals who consider themselves as exporters. The common 
variable that seems to hold true for all the individuals and firms calling themselves 
exporters is that they are ―business people‖ or entrepreneurs who are motivated by profits 
to take business risks. They secure production orders from the buyers, take responsibility 
of the final products and ultimately bear all the risks associated with the execution of the 
export orders. One key role of the lead exporters is to seek resources e.g. trade credit and 
make advance payments to the craftspeople for the execution of export orders. Thus 
delays, non-execution of orders and cheating by artisans and subcontractors increase the 
risk burden on the lead exporters. These exporters are the focal actors in the network of 
private actors operating in the craft industry. 
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On the classification of industrial activities, McCormick et al. (1997) argued that the 
organization of production is not only a function of technology but also should be seen as 
entrepreneurial strategy that matches available resources to market relations. Following 
from this, they developed a typology for Nairobi‘s garment firms based on their differing 
interaction with the input market, capital and the product markets. Action for Enterprise 
also used similar criteria to classify Haitian craft industry (USAID, 2006). This study 
adopts similar criteria to categorize the focal enterprises according to their differing 
interaction with export agents/buyers, product type, the input market and production 
strategies. The focal enterprises fall into four main categories: traders, export vendors, 
craft workshops/designers, and craft factories. The characterization of these enterprises is 
preceded with brief historical background of some the enterprises.   
 
4.5.1 Characteristics and Types of the lead Export Enterprises 
Most of the craft exporting enterprises were established in the early 1990s to meet 
growing demand from US retailers and wholesalers. The ownership structure of the 
majority of the firms is either sole proprietorship or ―husband-wife‖ family business and 
almost all are wholly Ghanaian-owned. The educational background of the owners varies 
with enterprise. Generally, those firms that are described as traders and possess no or 
minimal production capacity are run by individuals with very little formal education. The 
relatively successful exporting companies are owned by entrepreneurs with formal 
education up to the tertiary level and in certain instances have been associated with the 
craft industry in some other ways before deciding to establish their own firms. The formal 
training of the entrepreneurs and their past experiences are regarded by most of them as 
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useful to the craft export industry. Also worth noting is the significant role played by the 
NGO, Aid to Artisans Ghana in grooming (wittingly or unwittingly) some of the 
entrepreneurs who later established their own exporting firms. The table below highlights 
the training background and date of some establishment of some the exporters 
interviewed.   
 
Background of some Selected Craft Exporters 
Afrikan-Dream Studios Ltd started as a sole proprietorship in 1993 by Ralph Ashong and 
grew to become a limited liability enterprise in 1996. Ralph Ashong is a professional sculptor 
and African Art graduate of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology and 
his association with Aid to Artisans (USA and Ghana) greatly contributed to his 
understanding of the export market.  
 
Mr. Ofoli is the proprietor of Kottage Originals, which was established in 1999. Mr. Ofoli is 
very talented and has the flair for innovative African designs. He is a product of Kwame 
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) where he studied rural art and 
industry. Upon completion of his university education, he worked with Aid to Artisans Ghana 
until he resigned to establish his own export firms, though he continues to deal with ATAG. 
Likewise, the owner of Delhouse enterprise, Mr. Del Boampong, studied Art for his 
undergraduate and recently completed his MBA studies at KNUST.  
 
Wild Gecko was established in 1993 by the company‘s partners Poem van Landewijk and 
Kingsley Sarfo. Poem has always been interested in beads and had practiced bead making as a 
hobby until she teamed up with Kingsley who was then exporting beads to Germany. Her 
Father, a geologist and a lecturer with scientific interest in bead materials inspired her to take 
up a career in that direction and she is always motivated to be creative and always thinking of 
doing something different. Wild Gecko recently produces a wide range of high quality 
furniture and other home accessories for both the export and the domestic markets.  
 
Ms. Grace Mensah, the owner of Hide-Out enterprise, has been in the craft trade since the late 
1970s. She started by selling craft products at Accra Art centre to tourists. She was introduced 
into this trade by her late husband who was an artist and sign writer.  Unlike other exporters, 
she has very limited formal education. Ms Grace was introduced to the export market by the 
boss of ATAG. She started exporting decorative craft products as a vendor in 1999 and 
specializes mainly in traditional crafts with very little functionality.  
Source: Field Interviews 2007  
4.5.2 Traders and Export Vendors 
The export vendors are ―businesspeople‖ who liaise between domestic export agents and 
local artisans/craftspeople. They may not have the artisanal skills themselves but instead 
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rely on skills of the craftspeople and artisans. In certain instances they operate as traders 
who possess no production capacity and wholly subcontract their orders to artisan 
subcontractors. The export vendors possess some minimal production capacity and may 
subcontract whole or the early stage of production i.e. sourcing of raw materials and 
carving to artisan subcontractors but undertake later stage activities such as drying, 
product finishing, packaging and labeling in their small workshops.  
 
The export vendors usually take product samples designed by the artisans and 
craftspeople and present them at buyers‘ exhibitions organized by the export agents. 
When they are fortunate enough to secure orders, they subcontract the orders to the 
artisan designers after the price of each piece is negotiated. When an agreement is 
reached, the vendor then makes an advance payment to the artisan contractor or the 
craftspeople to execute the orders. The contractual relationship between the vendors and 
the craftspeople lasts as long as the orders last but the relationship is reciprocal. The 
artisans give their product samples to vendors for buyers‘ exhibitions and the vendors 
must reciprocate by subcontracting the orders to the artisans and trust remains a key 
ingredient in this relationship. The vendors specialize in typical craft products such as 
masks, figurines, drums, dolls, trays; products that could be describe as lacking greater 
functionality and are mostly produced for the lower end of the mass market. Apparently, 
the order volumes that are executed through these individual vendors are small but when 
the individual orders are consolidated by the export agents or put together they constitute 
large volumes, which enable them to economize on shipping costs.  
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The vendors lack the capacity to undertake their own export processing arrangements 
neither are they able to attract buyers directly. They mostly rely on local export agents to 
perform logistical and other shipping arrangements for them as well as depending on 
export agents for orders.  
 
The craft workshops and the large-scale producers began as vendors with very minimal or 
no production capacity in the formative years of the industry. When the US buyers first 
entered the Ghanaian market in the early 1990s, the organizational response of the craft 
exporters were reported as follows: 
 ―...the suppliers have responded with speed and have demonstrated 
flexibility. This rapid supply response has been possible, in large part, 
because the traditional nature of most of the products ordered has not 
called for new skill development. Many suppliers are themselves 
middlemen and have enjoyed the flexibility of sourcing from a large pool 
of smaller, often rurally based, production groups. Some suppliers have 
also had to set up production units to complement these sources, if only 
for finishing products to specification‖ (Biggs et al. 1994, p35). 
 
 
4.5.3 Craft Workshops/Designer Producers 
The craft workshops or the designer producers have integrated greater part of the 
production process in their workshops. They have been described by Biggs et al. (1994) 
as ―boutique‖ producers who produce smaller volumes for quality conscious consumers 
who are less price-sensitive. This category of exporters produce a relatively high quality 
range of products including garden furniture, cabinets, chest of drawers, bedside and floor 
lamps, mirrors, magazine and  CD racks, coasters, jewellery/treasure boxes and picture 
frames; mostly functional products, which are of middle-ranked status.  
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They contract a few experienced and skilful artisans with whom they have built a long-
term relationship to work in-house. They maintain a skeleton administrative staff that 
performs the normal secretarial as well as sales functions.  
 
The craft workshops also produce the typical traditional figures, wall hangings and masks 
mostly patronized by volume buyers. They subcontract the early stage of these products 
meant for the low-end mass market to independent contractors and artisans and undertake 
finishing and packaging in their workshops. Like the vendors, the craft workshops make 
advance payments to the independent contractors and artisans to execute their orders 
whether or not they produce outside or inside their workshops. When the artisans work 
within the premises of the exporter, not only are they provided with the space and the 
equipment to work but they are also provided with raw materials.       
 
The craft workshops or the designer producers maintain two main market channels i.e. 
the domestic and the international market. The domestic market comprises mainly 
expatriate workers and Ghanaian returnees from the West. The export market 
encompasses boutique shops and small quantity niche buyers as well as the mass market 
controlled by high volume buyers. The craft workshops have not weaned themselves 
completely off the services of domestic export agents. They continue to rely on the 
domestic export agents for markets services such as securing export orders, especially 
from big buyers, and shipping arrangements. They construct differing relations with the 
buyers. Characteristically this group of exporters maintains two streams of interaction 
with buyers. While the interaction with the large international buyers is impersonal, that 
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with small quantity international buyers is more personal and entails qualitative flow of 
information and other hands-on support.  
 
Kottage Originals Enterprise 
Kottage originals is a case that typifies what has been described above as craft workshops or 
designer producers. Currently the owner employs three carpenters, two finishers at his workshop 
and he doubles as the designer of the company. Kottage Originals also has a showroom situated 
within the Premises of Artist Alliance Gallery on La Beach road in Accra.  Whilst the firm 
centralizes the production of its furniture orders in its workshop, it subcontracts the early stage of 
production of its products meant for the US mass market to subcontractors in the craft villages 
(such as Foase, Asamang and Aburi) and the finishing is done in the firm‘s workshop in Accra. It 
is difficult to estimate the precise size of the mobile subcontractors that the firm works with, this 
is because when the firm contracts out the orders to its main production contractors (master 
craftspeople), they in turn subcontract to other artisans and craftspeople, the number of which is 
difficult for the firm to estimate. The firm claimed that other companies use the same strategy to 
execute export orders for big American buyers such as Marmaxx, Cost-Plus and Pier 1 Import.  
 
According to Mr. Ofoli, the owner of Kottage Originals, the main area of specialization of his 
company is the production of unique African furniture and other home décor accessories, the 
production of which is done in his company workshop in Accra where his contractors are 
assembled to undertake production activities. He claims his furniture is too expensive for the big 
American buyers. The company exports the furniture to a host of buyers in Italy through a buyer, 
Mysha, who consolidates the orders and ships to Italy. The company also supplies to other 
European buyers such as Art Works of Africa, UK; Made-in-Africa Collection in Germany; and 
Swahili Import in USA. The company equally values its local customers who are mainly 
expatriate workers in Ghana. The price tags on some of his products displayed at the company‘s 
showroom ranged from $400 to $900. Regarding the furniture, the company has few local 
competitors and Mr. Ofoli could count five companies that are into quality furniture production as 
his competitors.  
 
Kottage Originals considers its creative African product designs as its strength and something that 
distinguishes the company from its competitors. When asked what the buyers like about his 
products, Mr. Ofoli replied: ―I think it is the uniqueness. They are unique. You can go round the 
whole country you will see only one of this products (pointing to a particular product in the 
course of the interview). I don‘t produce too many pieces. You see this table console, that is about 
the third one and I can do this for this year and stop it. I couldn‘t replicate the original design. 
You hardly find two of this in my shop‖. Mr. Ofoli strictly protects his designs from being copied 
and the centralization of the furniture production within his company‘s workshop is actually 
meant to achieve this purpose.  
Source: Field interviews 2007 
4.5.4 Large-scale Exporters/Factories 
The craft factories in one sense are similar to the craft workshops in that they have 
integrated most of the production processes in-house. In another sense, they are different 
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because they are able to execute high volume export orders using intermediate equipment 
or modern machines. In addition to production in-house, these exporters occasionally 
subcontract early stages of the production processes of relatively simple products to 
independent artisan subcontractors. They produce to meet rigid cost, quality and volume 
requirements. The large-scale enterprises produce a broad mix of products in large 
volumes including gift items, home accessories, traditional African figures and statuettes, 
traditional stools, drums and furniture. The products with less functionality dominate the 
products content of these in-house exporters but are of higher quality and finishing 
compare with the vendors with minimal production capabilities. Their functional products 
in terms of design and aesthetic beauty are less appealing compared with the craft 
workshops or the boutique producers. They have significantly weaned themselves off the 
services of the domestic export agents and have developed internal capacity to undertake 
their export and shipping arrangements. The exporters in this category have the capacity 
to execute orders from US$100,000 to US$500,000 per annum (e.g. Fritete and Tekura). 
 
Figure 2 is an attempted pictorial representation of the Ghanaian craft export industry, 
which is conceptualized within the transaction cost framework presented in chapter two 
(fig.1). The bold boxes represent the various categories of the focal exporters in the craft 
industry; showing their internal production capacities and production functions. The 
vertical and diagonal double-arrowed lines represent the forward and backward linkages. 
The thickness of the lines represents the intensity of the business interactions between the 
actors. The broken arrows signify occasional interactions. The long horizontal double-
arrowed line represents the continuum on the transaction costs axis. The traders are 
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engaged in trade transactions that are synonymous with the auction regime characterized 
by one-off interaction and price jostling. This is followed by the export vendors who 
possess minimal internal production capacity and predominantly rely on subcontracting 
relations to execute export orders. At the extreme right of the diagram are the exporters in 
the category of craft workshop and large-scale producers whose transaction regimes 
correspond to ―in-house‖ subcontracting, which is not specifically represented in the 
transaction cost framework conceptualized by Knorringa (fig.1). The inside contracting 
regime as practiced by the Ghanaian exporters is more rigid than the traditional 
subcontracting relations but less rigid than the vertically integrated firm. It occupies a 
space that is the intersection of the subcontracting, network and direct control regimes 
depicted in fig 1. 
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                                                 MAPPING THE GHANAIAN CRAFT EXPORT CHAIN  
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                              4.6 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter centred around general background information on the 
Ghanaian non-traditional export sector as well as specific information on the craft export 
subsector. For a century, Ghana did not register any significant change in export revenue 
as well as the components of the export sector. The government of Ghana realizing this 
unacceptable trend intensified its activist role as part of SAP to diversify the export sector 
through the promotion of non-traditional exports. Fiscal incentives and initiatives to 
strengthen meso-level trade support institution were designed to boost the export of non-
traditional products. The reality is that the good intentions of the government of Ghana 
have not sufficiently been translated into removing constraints facing the NTE sector at 
the meso and micro levels. The craft exporters benefitted from government buyer 
linkages programmes in the early years of the industry.  
 
The craft villages with historical links to Ashanti culture remain important ―workshops‖ 
for the production of crafts for the domestic, tourist and export markets but the geography 
of the production sites has change; new centres of production have emerged in peri-urban 
areas that had no historical links with craft production. The craftsmen from the craft 
villages operate as production subcontractors either from their village workshops or may 
be contracted to produce from the production workshops of their hirers in the urban 
centres. Different agents such as traders, export agents and exporters based in the cities 
i.e. Kumasi and Accra assumed dominant roles in the organization of craft production for 
export. The roles of these actors occupying specific links in the craft commodity chains 
influence the flow of craft products from the artisans operating in the craft villages to the 
final consumers in the West. The majority of these agents have no social or historical 
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relationships with the craft villages, unlike the craftspeople who are bonded together by a 
common cultural identities and family ties in the craft villages. This has implications for 
the nature of the relationships existing between, for instance, the artisan subcontractors 
and the export agents/exporters, which take the form of commercial relationships often 
characterized by opportunism (see empirical analysis in the next chapter).  
 
The development of the industry in the post-SAP era is driven largely by foreign buyers, 
which has led to the spontaneous emergence of local private actors to fill coordination 
gaps in the industry. The exporters who are singled out as focal enterprises for the 
purpose of this study are the entrepreneurs who are motivated by profit to take risks and 
also play pivotal role in coordinating craft production for export. These exporters are not 
uniform; they are segmented according to their capacity base, the market segment or 
buyer and the product type. The next chapter looks at the contractual relations between 
these focal enterprises and the other private actors in the craft industry. The analysis 
looks at the relationships between the exporters and their trading partners to include 
subcontracting and inside-contracting and their differing strengths in enabling the 
exporters to overcome their production constrains and export market requirements. This 
is preceded with a discussion on the local market risks, uncertain production environment 
and export market forces that affect the activities of the exporters. 
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                                                   CHAPTER FIVE                           
COMPETITIVE AND IMPERFECT PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENTS OF THE 
CRAFT EXPORT SECTOR AND SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS                         
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the extent to which reliance on subcontracting relations enable the 
craft exporters to overcome microeconomic and environmental constraints to production 
for export. The chapter is structured around two main themes. The first is concerned with 
the presentation of local microeconomic and socio-cultural factors, international 
competition and end market forces impinging on the activities of the exporters. Biggs et 
al. (1994) summed up the coordination challenges that the Ghanaian craft export industry 
faced during the embryonic stage of the industry‘s development to include: 
 the difficulty of accurately estimating the production capabilities of far-flung 
artisans in order to avoid over committing on quantities and timing; for cultural 
and other indigenous practices could interrupt production schedules; 
 managing the quality standards applied to each item produced by workers who are 
unaccustomed to such rigid specifications on colour, measurement and 
consistency of design.       
The second looks at market coordination via subcontracting relations and informal 
institutional arrangements, which are adopted by the exporters in response to addressing 
some of the constraints placed on them by the uncertain local economic environment and 
external market forces. On one hand, the organizational paths adopted by the exporters 
are a response to their attempt to overcome external market requirements and local 
specific supply-side constraints. On the other hand, the scope of coordination of craft 
production for export via subcontractual relations and other informal mechanism is 
constrained by other forms of market failures and imperfections. Capacity constraints, 
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lack of access to relevant market information, opportunistic risks and socio-cultural 
practices are the domestic factors that impede the ability of the exporters to meet market 
requirements. Section 5.2 follows the introductory section with the analysis of 
competition from Asia. Section 5.3 looks at the microeconomic environment and supply-
side constraints to production. Section 5.4 is about subcontracting relationship between 
export intermediaries and the exporters and the benefits that are derived from these 
relationships. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.    
 
5.2 International Competition from Asia  
International competition from Asia had had the implications of putting some Ghanaian 
craft producers out of business while at the same time forcing other producers to improve 
their production practices and product quality in order to be competitive. Not only have 
these countries succeeded in copying typical Ghanaian designs and mass producing them 
but are also able to produce high quality products with good finishing at lower cost than 
their Ghanaian competitors, a processes which is gradually eroding the competitive 
advantage of the Ghanaian craft exporters. The Ghanaian exporters increasingly face the 
challenge of producing authentic craft products efficiently to reduce production cost in 
order to be able to compete favourably in the international market. Konadu-Agyemang 
and Adanu (2003) for instance have observed the success of Korean firms in mass 
producing Ghanaian craft designs and selling them in the international market at much 
lower prices. They queried whether Ghanaian producers can turn some of their art forms 
into mechanized mass products and compete with the Asian countries.  
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First, some of the small-scale producers are increasingly being squeezed out of the export 
market because of the superior finishing and the lower prices of the products by the Asian 
producers. Current trends, however, show that consumers are getting fed-up with the 
mass-produced African craft products from China and buyers are responding to this by 
shifting their procurement strategy to source of origin
6
. Jenkins and Edward (2006) in 
their analysis of the economic impact of China and India on the economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa observed the indirect competitive pressures from these Asian countries on 
African exports in the international market. When some of the exporters were asked 
about the challenges they face in the export market, they frequently mentioned 
competition from Asia, especially China, as their main source of worry as evident in the 
quotes below:  
The Chinese people are our main competitors…we produce mirror frames 
and the Chinese also sell similar things to these American buyers and they 
sell them so cheap that we cannot compete… (L‘Afrique Concept)        
 
I think the second issue is the competition from the Far East. You may for 
instance have an Akuaba doll, a typical traditional African/Ghanaian 
product produced by Taiwanese and sometimes whether we like it or not 
these people have better finishing than we have…when it comes to 
modernisation, they have the machinery, although is hand-made, they do a 
lot of finishing with machines…(Getrade). 
 
The buyers can buy a mask in China for $2 or even $1 but the same quality 
and even better quality… well, the issue of handcrafting, which makes us 
distinct and unique is losing out; because most of our products are for the 
open market and some of them they fix the ―made-in-Ghana‖ labels on 
them…(Afripech). 
 
I have seen Akuaba dolls produced in Chinese factories and they are made 
from plastics but they look better than ebony wood and they are being sold 
everywhere. I have seen Vietnamese baskets labeled Bolga Basket… (Adu 
Mensah) 
 
                                                 
6
 Chain Store Age, June 22, 2007. 
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Second the Asian competition is inducing some of the local producers to adjust their 
production practices and capacities in the bid to match the quality product finishing from 
the Asian producers. In the face of competitive pressures from Asia, some of the 
Ghanaian producers interviewed believed that their competitive strength comes from 
product ―origin and authenticity‖ and what they needed to do in order to compete 
favourably was to improve product quality and finishing.  
   
The keen competition among the global buyers has consequently led to the depressing of 
prices in the international market. Some commentators have observed that large U.S 
retailers and buyers of craft products operate in markets with extreme price 
competitiveness (Biggs et al.1994). A review of retail bulletins
7
 in the US showed intense 
competition and losses among the major retailers or the buyers of Ghanaian craft. The 
dipping of prices that follows are, in turn, passed on along the chain to the producers 
upstream. Price negotiation with U.S retailers is therefore crucial to achieving some 
reasonable margins within the context of global price depression and competition. This 
places additional responsibility on the exporters to understand all elements of their 
production cost to position them to be able to negotiate effectively with the buyers. The 
impression gleaned from the interviews suggests that price undercutting is also endemic 
in the craft industry. A respondent recounted an instance where a particular exporter 
quoted $16 for a product that could cost twice that amount to produce, all in the bid to 
out-compete rivals in procuring orders. The export agent in this case had to step in and 
negotiate with the buyer to secured $32 for the same product but at this price the exporter 
in question failed to execute the export order successfully. Some of the exporters argued 
                                                 
7
Chain Store Age May 25 and June, Home Channel News, June 2007, DNL Retailing today Nov.22 2006. 
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that when those individual exporters fail to execute their orders, it is the reputation of the 
whole Ghanaian craft industry that suffers and therefore argue for a regulatory 
mechanism potentially through the trade association to ensure that new entrants into the 
industry do have some basic understanding of export practices and product pricing. 
 
5.3 Imperfect Environment of Craft Export Production  
The reality pertaining to the craft industry is that most of the artisan producers and the 
craftspeople are unaccustomed to the stringent export market requirements relating to 
product quality dimensions such as colour, size, health and safety, labeling and packaging. 
The independent artisans and craftspeople who are subcontracted to execute export orders 
very often do not appreciate the consequences of non-compliance to buyers‘ standards 
and product specifications due to attitudinal and cultural factors. They are also ill-
equipped technically to respond to the export market demands and also lack the relevant 
market information to help design sellable products. 
 
5.3.1 Lack of Access to Market Information by Artisan Subcontractors 
It is often said that the Western market is a buyers‘ market and that to succeed in the 
export market demands that the producers and exporters adhere to complex market 
requirements pertaining to large order volumes, stringent product specifications, quality 
standards and tight delivery timelines. These requirements present unique challenges to 
the majority of the indigenous Ghanaian artisans and producers directly involved in the 
actual production process. The artisans generally lack information regarding buyer 
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specifications, product standards and products that are in demand. The quote below 
exemplifies the challenge of accessing the appropriate market information by the 
indigenous artisans in order to come out with product designs that meet the tastes and 
preferences of international buyers. Kofi is an itinerant master artisan from Foase; a craft 
village 10km from Kumasi who at the time of the interview was executing orders as a 
subcontractor for an export vendor in a suburban area of Accra. This is what Kofi had to 
say regarding the problem of access to export market information relevant to product 
development: 
 
…We don‘t often know what the buyers want when they come to the 
exhibitions so we use our imagination to create designs for them. When the 
buyers come they complain that the designs we present to the exhibitions they 
still have some in stock. But we hardly get to know whether those products 
have been bought or not. We produce almost similar products with little 
modifications. So when they come they don‘t select those items that are 
similar to those they have on stock… 
 
The conversation continued and Kofi was asked how he thinks this information problem 
could be resolved so as to avoid repeating designs the buyers have in stock. He pointed to 
the export vendors and the traders as actors who could help bridge this information gap.  
But he was also aware of the attempt by the export agents to sometimes frustrate any 
direct contact between the export vendors and the international buyers: 
I think it is the dealers that have to interact or communicate with the buyers 
and ask them what particular products that they want. I think the buyers 
would tell them…in fact the [export agent] would not allow them to interact 
personally with the buyers…it is the [agent‘s] officials who are in the 
position to interact and talk to the buyers to know exactly what the buyers 
want… 
 
So if the agents communicate with the buyers, don‘t they also channel the information 
acquired to you? (Interviewer)  
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Yes, they do communicate but it depends on your closeness with the agents 
and that you are the one who always executes his orders for him. He would 
for instance ask you to bring [a particular type of product] for him to present 
at the exhibition but he would not tell exactly what the buyer 
wants…sometimes they tell you the buyers are interested in ―shadows‖ or 
―unity‖ or furniture or stool. You may not be able to tell the exact type of 
furniture or stool that they like or the type of ―unity‖ they like. And the 
furniture or the stool you can‘t tell if the buyer wants Adinkra symbol or 
what. So we create our own symbols to see if the buyers would select 
them…  
 
5.3.2 Literacy and Technical Know-how of the Artisan Subcontractors 
The technical know-how of the artisans and the craftspeople is mainly knowledge 
acquired through the traditional apprenticeship system. The know-how of the artisans is 
increasingly proving to be inadequate in meeting the buyers‘ exacting quality standards 
and specifications. The majority of the artisan producers have no or minimal formal 
education, very conservative and less receptive to new ideas. The owner of Neocraft 
Ventures, which operates in the craft village of Ahwiaa, told of the advice that a 
Canadian consultant gave him and his colleague exporters to be innovative in order to be 
able to keep the craft industry going. This researcher then asked him whether he has the 
capability to innovate. His answer was that: 
I am but there are some buyers in the US who are giants and their 
requirements and specifications are difficult to achieve. Recently one such 
buyer came to Ghana and out of about 120 exporters, only one exporter‘s 
product suited them. Even that they had to sit with that exporter and made 
modifications. So you see, still in Ghana we are unable to meet their 
requirements. There was also one buyer; Target, they came and the standard 
they wanted was a bit difficult for us. I executed orders for them in all the 
years that they came to Ghana…you see the craft work face a lot of 
challenges because the education of our people is not all that good. For 
example if this product is to be cut at say 6×4 inches, the craftsman will cut 
it at 6.2× 3.8 inches and if you give it to Target, they won‘t accept it. They 
prefer uniformity or consistency in the products. In some companies the 
products are passed through a single machine. But for us the products pass 
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through about 10 or 15 different carvers or hands. So at the end of the day, 
you get lots of variations in the quality… their standards were a bit difficult 
for us the Ghanaian producers. They (Target) would have come this year but 
we haven‘t heard from them again.      
 
The training of craftsmen in production for export is considered important for bridging 
the knowledge/capability gaps between them and market requirements. The question is 
who should bear the cost of training? The exporters who hire the artisans are reluctant to 
invest in the training of the artisans for the reason that they can easily lose them to their 
competitors overnight. The exporters regard training of the artisans as a ―public good‖ 
and therefore there is little private incentives to invest in artisans‘ training. An exporter 
had this to say in connection to his frustration over training the artisans and later losing 
them: 
…my experience has been that each time that I try had to train them 
[artisans] and use them to produce that is when they always take advantage 
and decide to leave and make it on their own…so we eventually lose them. 
In fact, for some time it was very difficult for me to train new hands. I have 
come to realise that no matter what I do, I would lose them because these 
are guys are so ambitious…there have been instances where other exporters 
have approached me and suggested that we put resources together and train 
artisans and then put them in a pool so that we can share. There is also equal 
evidence that, I know ATAG has tried it before, they had  training camps at 
Kokobeng and another one at Kpando but  at the end of the day controlling 
them became difficult.. (Interview with Fritete, 2007).        
 
It is, however, worthy to note that ATAG has been instrumental in helping to upgrade the 
skills of the local artisans. Wolff (2004) summarized ATAG‘s roles in training Ghanaian 
craft artisans and also helping them to develop new products that can compete 
successfully in local and global markets to include the following: 
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 ATAG trains field advisors who help to identify individuals who display 
entrepreneurial skills and invite them to participate in workshops in product 
development and best business practices;  
 
 Artisans who demonstrate promise of success are sent to Aid to Artisans, USA for 
further training and opportunity to attend the American gift and craft shows. At 
the shows the artisans not only get a sense of market trends but also internalize 
ideas for adapting Ghanaian products to American market; 
 
 Some of the artisans play entrepreneurial roles as leaders of artisan groups, while 
others become ATAG field advisors who work with producer artisans to 
encourage innovations in response to market trends. The advisors work both in 
village-based artisan groups and contemporary urban workshops by entrepreneurs 
in the cities. 
 
 
5.3.3 Unstructured Export Production or Lack of Production Scheduling 
Most of the independent artisan subcontractors are oblivious of the advantages of 
production scheduling. Their production activities are not structured according to any 
time schedule, even though the export market to which they produce for is time-sensitive. 
Exporters who produce for large volume buyers normally have three months to ship their 
order from the date the order contract is sealed. Speed is a necessary ingredient to success 
in the export market and delays are least tolerated by buyers;  
Most of them [artisans] are illiterate and their understanding about time and 
action, production scheduling etc is very low. He doesn‘t see the reason why he 
should carve 10pieces today and then another 10pieces tomorrow and finish 100 
pieces in 10days. They would decide to play around today and attempt to finish 
100pieces tomorrow. Their production schedule is not well structured and so 
sometimes you go to the field and realise that they had just started producing at 
a time when you expect them to have gone far with production (Interview with 
Marcus, 2007). 
 
5.3.4 Artisan Subcontractors Lack of Appropriate “Export culture”  
As indicated earlier, time is a precious commodity in the export market. The buyers 
operate in a market that is highly seasonal and therefore have minimal tolerance for 
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delays in fulfilling orders. The business culture of indigenous producers permits 
―contractual flexibility‖ in local business transactions to insure parties against delays 
caused by infrastructural problems, input sourcing difficulties and other social obligations 
(Biggs et al. 1994; Fafchamps 1996).  Fafchamps (1996) succinctly describes this 
problem as follows: 
The need for contractual flexibility is …probably accentuated in Ghana by 
the low level of economic development. …the respect of contractual terms 
regarding consistent quality [and] rapid delivery …is difficult. Markets for 
raw materials, intermediate goods, specialized services, and capital 
equipment are thin or nonexistent….Whenever technical difficulties or 
shortages of [inputs] arise, they cannot easily be circumvented and tend to 
ripple through downstream economic activities. These factors combine to 
create delivery [and] quality problems. Ghanaian businesses adapt to the 
situation by displaying a high degree of contractual flexibility (Fafchamps 
1996, p444). 
 
The lack of respect for time is attributed in part to socio-cultural factors. The artisans 
have very little appreciation for scheduling their production activities or even to work 
overtime in order to meet export deadlines. An exporter queried: what is it about to meet 
deadlines that they have to work 16hours daily for two months because the autumn 
collection has been determined in America? What is that for? (Interview with Wild Gecko, 
2007). The incident of artisans stopping work halfway through production to perform 
farming activities, attend a funeral or other social functions is widespread. In this 
circumstance, export orders that are subcontracted to artisans in these communities are 
bound to suffer serious delay setbacks during the farming seasons. 
 
The cultural stereotype of some craft communities is that it is the lazy people who go into  
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craft production. In other cases, it is considered a taboo for a section of the community 
dwellers to engage in the production of certain craft production. A key informant 
recounted the cultural impediment to craft export this way:  
We undertook a contact promotion programme to the North America in 
1990 and that took us to Atlanta Georgia to participate in the international 
house-ware show. That was the first exposure for Ghanaian craft companies 
abroad. After that show, we got some orders mainly for baskets and we were 
to do it for one of the biggest US companies for US$ 600,000. 
Unfortunately three months into the production of a six month period order 
we had not done 5% of the orders. So when we got back to the buyer; Avon 
Cosmetics they offered to bring two consultants from Preston University to 
hold orientation workshops in Bolgatanga and its environs for 200 women 
in basket weaving (Interview with an informant, 2007).  
 
 
The informant specifically attributed the initial difficulties to the execution of this order 
to local cultural barriers:  
 
We didn‘t select men because at that time it was considered a taboo for men 
to be weaving baskets.  So the fact was that when the women got the money 
to buy raw materials for commercial production, the husbands were not in 
favour of their wives getting that good money and it resulted in a lot of 
people beating their wives and taking the money from them (Interview with 
an informant, 2007).     
 
The business culture that accepts excuses for delays in the execution of export orders is at 
odds or dichotomous to the demands of the export market. The work ethics of the artisan 
producers do not reflect the sense of urgency that is required by the export market. The 
attitudes of the local producers and their business practices are discordant with the culture 
of the export market that requires subcontractors to execute orders speedily and diligently 
to meet seasonal demands. These factors together limit the competitiveness of the 
Ghanaian craft export. Some of the stakeholders in the industry recognize this: 
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…If we continue to do things the way our forefathers did, we would really not be able to 
compete enough with these products coming from Asia (Getrade). 
 
 
5.3.5 Export Risks, Opportunistic Behaviour and Supervision Difficulties 
The main sources of risks identified in the craft export industry included what is 
referred to as buyers‘ ―charge-backs‖, which emanate from non-compliance to 
product standards and specifications, penalties for delays in meeting delivery 
deadlines and the risk associated with artisans and craftspeople either absconding 
with advance payments, delays in executing export orders, and more importantly the 
fluctuations of demand in the export market. Most of the exporters are not able to 
predict the purchasing behavours of the buyers nor are they able to determine the 
changing market trends, which are always in the state of flux. A buyer may change 
his sourcing strategy without giving prior notice.   
 
In the context of falling product prices and dwindling margins, the exporters have 
very little room to gamble with any of these sources of transaction risks. There is the 
general sense of zero-tolerance for any of the above risks among the exporters; 
however, the large exporters in relative terms are better able to deal with these 
sources of risks. It would become evident later in the subsequent discussion in chapter 
six that the craft factories that have control over production, well-connected, 
possessing rich and multiple supplier and buyer base are better able to respond to 
changes in export demand and adapt to product changes fairly well than many of the 
small export vendors.  
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5.3.5.1 Export Risks 
The artisans and the craftspeople contracted to execute export orders almost always 
receive advance payments from the exporters to execute their orders without having to 
make any substantial financial commitments in the production. The financial 
arrangements the exporters have with some private banks enable them to secure private 
loans, which are then advanced to the artisans and the craftspeople as working capital. 
The independent artisan subcontractors bear virtually no risks when it comes to the 
financing of production. The repayment of the loan is often tied to the receipt of 
payments from the buyers. What this means is that should there be huge buyers‘ ―Charge-
backs‖ and penalties resulting from the delivery of sub-standard products and delays, the 
exporters‘ margins may be eroded or they may incur losses which would make loan 
repayment difficult. Also some of the exporters indicated that they are made to pay 10% 
penalty of the order value if they fail to meet delivery deadlines. These risks are very 
much related  to the work ethics and lack of professionalism on  the part of the artisans 
and artisan subcontractors—behaviour which is at variance with the demands of the 
export market, lack of understanding of, and lack of production capability to meet, buyer 
specifications and quality standards. The two quotes below are views expressed by a 
leading local export agent and an exporter, which echo the risks and the liabilities the 
exporters face in the craft export industry: 
 
The issue of late shipment and the issue of sub-standard goods and therefore the 
buyer coming back with charge-backs…. that would be one of the ways that the 
buyer punishes the vendor [exporter] for non adherence to quality and product 
specification …. If you look at the face value, the artisans and the craftspeople 
might not even have any sort of liability in this industry. There could be the 
liability of the items getting mouldy and the vendor is charged…..If there is a 
charge back, it doesn‘t go to the artisans; it instead goes to the vendors. It is the 
vendor who bears the risk; the artisans would have taken all his money. In this 
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particular situation the craftspeople have absolutely no risks for whatsoever. 
There are very few vendors who are at the same time craftsmen (Getrade). 
 
 
Another respondent corroborated the risks involved in the export trade by 
recounting his own experience of having to pay charge-backs for shipping sub-
standard products to a buyer:  
 
Let me tell you one of my experiences. I executed some orders for export 
sometimes ago. The buyer came to tell us that the products were wet. They sent 
to us charge-backs for the reason that our products were wet. I had to pay 
US$15000. Imagine that I have gone for a bank loan, the items produced and the 
craftspeople paid off and in the end I had to pay so much…. The export entails a 
lot of risks. Some of the vendors have run into serious debts and have become 
fugitives. I heard some of them have had their properties seized because they 
defaulted in paying their bank loans. So if you don‘t organise yourself well you 
can ran into serious problems (Acarve Enterprise) 
 
 
It is important to stress that the use of financial penalties for late delivery and sub-
standard products are employed by the buyers, though harsh but effective, to elicit 
compliance. This is largely employed by the large international buyers who 
frequently seek impersonal relationships with the exporters. This is not the case with 
the small international buyers who establishes more informal and intensive 
relationships with the exporters.   
 
The other risk pertaining to the export market is the situation whereby the buyers switch 
from sourcing products from the suppliers or the country as a whole. This mostly happens 
when there are changes in consumer tastes and preferences and when the suppliers fail to 
fulfill orders consistently to meet buyers‘ requirements or exogenous factors, for example, 
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the September 11
th
 attacks in the US, the main source of market for Ghanaian craft 
products, caused demand to dip in 2001
8
.  
 
5.3.5.2 Opportunistic Behaviour and Supervision 
There are other forms of transaction risks that are local in nature and touch on lack of 
candour and contract indiscipline on the part of the independent artisans and craftspeople 
contracted by the exporters to execute production orders. These take the form of artisans 
taking advance payment and absconding with it or failing to deliver the required quality 
and quantity on time. Most of the exporters interviewed complained about these as major 
obstacles to organizing local production for export.  
 
There were stories of artisans in the villages taking orders and running away with 
advance payments, using raw materials procured for them to execute orders of other 
clients. This is a human problem, which increases the cost of supervision and monitoring. 
Some of the exporters appoint agents, usually the master craftsmen, in the villages to 
supervise production on their behalf, yet the physical presence of the export vendors at 
the production sites to monitor production is considered important in ensuring that orders 
are executed speedily and at the required quantity and quality. The majority of exporters 
in Accra, for instance, frequently complained about the negative effects of the deceitful 
behaviours of the artisans on their businesses. These vendors in Accra frequently have to 
travel tens of kilometres to Kumasi and other craft producing communities, book hotel 
rooms for days and personally monitor the production process to ensure that their orders 
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 See appendix 4 for a story carried by the Washington Post on the cascading impact of the global economic 
recession on the craft export industry in Ghana.     
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are executed to meet the required product specifications; all adding to the cost of 
transacting. These costs ultimately eat into their dwindling margins. Among the exporters 
interviewed, the export vendors were those who persistently complained about the high 
supervision costs. In the quote below it is evident that spatial proximity may help in terms 
of supervision to reduce deceit and meet other contractual obligations but in other cases, 
it may not necessarily be an antidote to dealing with supervision difficulties (see section 
6.4). This interviewee who is the only exporter in the craft village, Foase, indicted how 
his geographical closeness to the craftsmen facilitates monitoring and enforcement unlike 
his Accra counterparts. He also recognizes the deceit on the part of the exporters who 
sometimes fail to fully finish payments for orders executed by the artisans and the 
craftspeople.   
One of the problems that the vendors face with some of the craftsmen is that 
some of them are not reliable. You give them your work, they will take your 
money and in the process of executing your orders, they would stop your 
orders and take somebody‘s orders.  That is why I was saying that the fact 
that I reside in this village is an advantage because the carver cannot take 
my money and run away with it because I monitor them. But if you are in 
Accra and you give orders to somebody in this village, how do you monitor 
the person. If you are not lucky he would cause you to incur a lot of debt. 
Some of the vendors also do not treat some of the carvers well. Some of the 
vendors sometimes fail to complete the order payments to the carvers. These 
two problems apply both to the carvers and the vendors. If you are a new 
entrant into the industry you may be deceived. Some of the carvers are not 
honest so are some of the vendors (Acarve enterprise). 
 
5.3.6 Modest increase in Trade Volumes and the Risk of Deceit  
The volumes of production orders that are subcontracted to the craftspeople in recent 
times are relatively large as well as the working capital required to execute production 
orders compared with orders that they used to get in the early days of the industry‘s 
development.  The exporters are therefore very apprehensive to advance large sums of 
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monies to the independent artisans and craftspeople, especially, if they have doubts about 
their competence and cannot trust them to adhere to the contract terms. The export value 
of the industry during its formative years in the early 1990s was a little above $1million 
but this figure for instance increased to over $10million in early 2001. This increase has 
translated into relatively large transactions, raising the risks that the exporters are exposed 
to should their subcontracted artisans behaves opportunistically:   
 
Now the monies involved are large and nobody would want to advance large 
sum of money to the artisans but the other problem is that when you give 50% 
advance payment it has been proven to be insufficient to enable them to finish 
the job so we end up paying the 100% before he even finishes the work and 
this actually increases the risks should the artisan abscond with your money 
(Celebate Services). 
 
This does not in any way suggest that the other actors such as the export agents and the 
artisan subcontractors do not bear any risks in the industry. It is an issue, which borders 
on who makes direct investment in the actual production process and takes ownership of 
the final product and is therefore more likely to suffer from the risk of deceit.  In most 
instances, it is the exporters who commit financial resources into the actual execution of 
export orders and take ownership of the final product. The artisan subcontractors may 
design the initial product samples and the export agents may facilitate financial resources 
for the exporters yet none of them lay claim to the ownership of the final products. 
However, the evidence also suggests that there are some export agents who combine 
intermediation roles with actual production and thus make direct investment by way of 
making advance payments to the artisan subcontractors to finance production. In this 
sense they are also more likely to suffer from losses from opportunistic artisan 
subcontractors. 
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5.4 Subcontracting Relations between Export Agents and Export Vendors/Artisan 
Subcontractors 
This section analyses the subcontracting relationship between the export agents and the 
export vendors/craftspeople. The role of the export agents fills an important link between 
the myriad of export vendors/artisan subcontractors operating in peri-urban areas/villages 
and international buyers. The export agents provide market channels for the small-scale 
exporters to the international market; an activity that is almost impossible for majority of 
the individual export vendors to undertake. The analysis in this section looks at the 
benefits and constraints embedded in the relationships between the export agents and the 
export producers. Qualitative services such as product development/design, quality 
control and monitoring, financial intermediation, shipping and export processing, and the 
organization of trade exhibitions embedded in the subcontracting relationships are 
discussed. To the buyers, coordinating production from the disparate vendors and artisan 
in an unfamiliar terrain of high transaction costs and uncertainties is a cumbersome and 
expensive exercise. The role of the export agents significantly helps to take this burden 
off the shoulders of, especially, large volume international buyers. One significant theme 
in this analysis is that whilst the intermediary services provided by the export agents are 
crucial in enabling the small-scale exporters to enter the export market, the export agents 
lack the capacity to raise or improve on the current levels of their services that is required 
for greater competition. In addition, there are limited incentives to invest in creating high 
order services because of various forms of externality.  
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According to AFE (2004), two export agents handle about 40% of Ghanaian craft export 
sales for large US buyers. They charge commission on marketing, monitoring and the 
logistical services they provide to the exporters. There are other export agents who do not 
necessarily charge commission for the services rendered to the export producers but this 
cannot be regarded as altruistic since the cost is taken care of during price negotiations 
with the export vendors. The export agents provide these services to the export vendors 
who in turn pass them on to the small artisan subcontractors and the craftspeople. The 
intermediary functions of the export agents sometimes overlap with production activities 
of the export vendors. Some export agents have moved a step beyond brokering to 
undertake certain production functions such as finishing and packaging in-house.  
 
Characteristically, each export agent has built a special relationship with groups of 
exporters. Some of the export agents have up to 100 different export vendors operating 
under their umbrella who in turn subcontract to hundreds of small artisan subcontractors. 
It is through these subcontracting arrangements that the services of the export agents 
trickle down to the other subcontractors and craftspeople. The export agents possess rich 
information about the trustworthiness of the export vendors and non-performing members 
are excluded from the group.  
 
5.4.1 Organization of Trade Exhibitions and Buyer Contact Functions 
The export agents organize local exhibitions for international buyers in Ghana. Export 
vendors take product samples from the artisans and present them at the fairs and when an 
order is secured, it is then subcontracted back to the artisan subcontractors and 
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craftspeople who designed the samples. The Ghanaian export agents/brokers have 
designed an exhibition model that enables the buyers to do one-stop-shoping of a variety 
of Ghanaian craft products.  
 
The exhibition model of the Export Brokers 
…Under the model they [export agents] have developed, they invite the large buyers to come to 
Ghana two times per year for 5-day product exhibition (they play an important role in 
communicating with these buyers and entice them to attend the exhibitions). During each visit 
they organize fifty to eighty ―production export companies‖ to do a presentation of their products 
(usually at a well known facility). Part of this process is the selection and screening of companies 
to participate in the show (they will only choose those with a capacity to produce).The buyers go 
to the stands of each production company, select products, and negotiate prices directly with the 
owners of the company. Once they finish, all orders are consolidated with the export agent—who 
assumes responsibility for monitoring production, packaging and shipping…    
Action for Enterprise & DFID (2004) 
 
This arrangement fills an important gap in bringing the numerous export vendors together 
on one platform in order to meet the volume requirement of the large volume buyers. 
This exhibition platform is also responsive to the sourcing strategy of the large home 
product buyers who frequently seek to find a wide range of craft products from the small 
producers who individually do not have the capacity to produce the range of products and 
the volumes required by the buyers; 
 
The large home product buyer is driven by the need to find a wide assortment 
of product. Individual firms are typically to small and narrow focused to 
provide a range of products. Home product buyers typically source from a 
number of producers. Home product buyers, thus shop in a country the way 
consumers shop in a department…but buyers are short of time and resources; 
they prefer to buy products from destinations that offer a wide range of 
potentially marketable products and cost of transportation low (Biggs et al. 
1994, pp30-31)   
 
The relationship, under this arrangement, between the exporters and the artisan 
subcontractors are reciprocal. When an order is secured from the buyers, through the 
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instrumentality of the agents, the exporters are then obliged to subcontract the orders to 
the artisans who designed the samples. It must be indicated that this relationship is under 
threat due to mistrust and dishonest behaviours on both sides of the relationship. The 
exporters may divert orders to other artisan subcontractors other than those who designed 
them. Likewise, artisan subcontractors may divert resources procured for them to execute 
orders of other client exporters. 
 
The open bargaining of prices, whilst it promotes transparency, leads to a situation 
whereby the exporters try to out-compete each for orders and thereby undercut each other 
on prices. The buyers also take advantage of this situation and play the exporters against 
each other in order to beat down prices.  
 
The current trend is that the export vendors do not interact directly with the large buyers 
let alone to negotiate prices with them at the exhibition hall. An export agent had this to 
say in connection to an exhibition he organized for the American buyer Cost-Plus; 
―…they [the buyers] just walked into the exhibition, selected whatever that they wanted, 
the buyers offered their prices…it was like a barter trade; no interaction but it was 
smooth‖. In this situation of anonymous interaction, the export vendors miss out on 
qualitative information exchanges with the big international buyers.  
 
In addition to local exhibitions, some exporters and the export agents occasionally take 
product samples from their subcontractors and present them at international trade fairs. 
To the majority of the vendors participating in international fairs, it is an expensive 
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venture and the prospects of generating orders from international buyers cannot always 
be assured. The export vendors, unlike the moderately well endowed craft factories and 
workshops, patronize mainly retail international fairs instead of the lucrative buyer fairs. 
The incentive to attend retail fairs is that it affords the export vendors the opportunity to 
sell their wares to meet their traveling expenses at the same time that they seek to attract 
orders from buyers. The general perception is that retail fairs are not the appropriate 
forum for attracting lucrative buyers and orders compared with buyers‘ fairs—attending 
buyers‘ fairs is however much more expensive and the risks are high. The ability of the 
few craft factories and workshops to attend international buyers‘ exhibitions in Europe is 
taken to be a measure of their capability to meet or match the requirements of the buyers.  
 
Privately I have undertaken or attended exhibitions abroad but it is very 
expensive. Sometimes you may have to spend about US$3000-4000. 
Though I learned but to be able to cover the expenses was difficult…In 
Germany we have what we call retail exhibition and buyer exhibition. We 
normally attend the retail exhibitions because we are not in the position to 
spend US$4000 on buyer‘s exhibitions and at the end of the day don‘t get 
immediate financial returns. So we normally attend the retail exhibitions 
where we can sell some of our products and say get about US$2000 to 
defray our travelling expenses (Neocraft Ventures). 
 
 
This respondent recognized the benefits of attending international buyers‘ 
exhibitions and went further to explain the dynamics involved as follows;  
 
But with the retail exhibition it is difficult to get orders unless you attend the 
buyer fairs, which we are not allowed to sell our wares; your sample may be 
selected but sometimes this happens after you have consecutively attended 
the fair for about three times. This year you will go, the second year you 
will, third year they would say that this producer has been here three times 
so if we give him orders he would be able to execute them. This most of us 
in Ghana cannot undertake. For buyers‘ fair I can say that about 5-6 
exporters are able to participate. The bank also used to give us loans for the 
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fairs but because we were not getting the expected returns they advised us to 
stop (Neocraft ventures).    
 
In addition to private efforts at organizing trade exhibitions locally and participating in 
international fairs, the government of Ghana occasionally sponsor the exporters to attend 
international fairs; very often with financial assistance from donors who pay for 
exhibition stands abroad. But this is not without difficulties as there were complaints of 
government officials favouring their friends and relatives who are not necessarily 
connected to the craft industry in any particular way to attend trade missions abroad who 
at the end of the exhibition would abscond and never return to Ghana.   
 
…you realize that the support normally goes to the industry leaders and 
those of us in the field are left out…recently there was a fair at Japan. Those 
of us who are exporters did not get the chance to go to Japan. Instead those 
individuals who are not in the craft business got the chance because they 
had the money to pay. What I am saying is that they organized a fair through 
MOTI (Ministry of Trade and Industry) for craft exporters in Japan. The 
money they demanded before you could attend the fair, there was no way I 
could afford. So if you are connected to a big man, even though,  you may 
not be a practitioner in the craft industry, you just have to look around and 
buy some craft products from the open market, pay your way through and 
join the group.   
  
Another craft producer narrated a similar pattern of official under-hand dealings when it 
comes to government-sponsored trade missions abroad: 
 
…recently at Mamponteng District Assembly, there was a guy who is not 
even a resident of the district, there was an exhibition in Switzerland, they 
requested this district to bring one representative from the craft business. 
What happened was that this guy came around got some samples and they 
bought ticket for him. In fact he never returned. These are some of the 
things that impede the progress of the business.  
5.4.2 Shipping and Export Processing Functions 
The individual export vendors lack the volumes or the economies of scale to undertake 
their own shipping arrangements in a more cost effective manner to international markets. 
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The export agents deal with these by assembling the executed orders from the various 
export vendors and consolidate them into single shipments to international destinations. 
 
Getrade consolidates export orders from about seventy export vendors and ship them to big 
American buyer AMC/Marmaxx. The agent has a warehouse at Tema port where the export 
vendors who are scattered all over the country converge and present their finished products for 
inspection and on-ward shipment. The products from the various exporters go through a quality 
screening process at the port before they are packed into sea containers. During the boom era, the 
agent was consolidating export orders up to hundred 40-footer sea containers per annum. 
Currently, the agent consolidates about sixty 40-footer containers for shipment. Getrade prepares 
all the export documents and deals with freight forwarding and customs issues on behalf of the 
export vendors. 
Source: Fieldwork interviews, 2007. 
 
The big American retail and wholesale firms almost always source Ghanaian craft 
products through the local export agents. They source mainly simple and traditional 
decorative craft piece in large volumes. The exporters interviewed frequently made 
references to orders from these big international buyers as ―mass products‖—alluding to 
the large order volumes of relatively simple and unique traditional craft products for the 
large American buyers. This scale of production is beyond the capacities of the individual 
small artisans and artisan groups. The factory space that achieves this scale of production 
is constructed as a subcontracting arrangement encompassing interconnected enterprises 
specializing in some aspect of the craft production process, including the small producers 
from the craft villages such as Foase, Ahwiaa,  Aburi, Asamang and Kokobeng to the 
export vendors and agents in Accra who undertake finishing, labeling, packaging, 
shipping and logistic functions to ensure that the products reach the shop floors of the 
retail stores such as T.K Maxx, Home Goods, Cost Plus and Pier 1 in the USA in good 
condition. If not the intermediary role that is being played by the export agents, the task 
of sourcing and coordinating products from small scale producer groups scattered all over 
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the country would have been very daunting for the buyers to undertake considering the 
fact the buyers have limited time to stay in a single country to shop for a range of 
products.  
 
5.4.3 Quality Monitoring and Control 
The export agents and some of the export vendors appoint supervisors; leaders of the 
craft producers or master craftspeople to monitor performance to ensure that the 
craftspeople and the artisans conform to quality standards, product specifications and to 
ensure timely delivery. Often the export vendors and the master craftspeople are given 
some training in quality management techniques and they in turn pass on the knowledge 
to their subordinate artisans and craftspeople. During the execution of orders, some of the 
agents and the export vendors personally visit the production sites to monitor the progress 
of production, though they do so infrequently because of time and cost constraints 
involved in frequent travels. The responsibility for quality assurance is often left on the 
shoulders of designated field supervisors who sometimes fail to strictly enforce adherence 
to quality standards and product specifications. The literacy levels of the majority of the 
artisans as indicated previously are very low and therefore adjusting to new quality 
demands and buyer specifications is always problematic. Even though it is stressful and 
costly to manage quality, some of the export vendors realize that meeting the buyers‘ 
quality demands enables them to get good price for their products and reduce the 
incidence of product rejection.  
 
When the AMC buyers were experiencing a decline in the quality of Ghanaian craft products they 
employed quality inspector  somewhere in 2002 to monitor and control the product quality of all 
the export vendors and producers who operate under the agent; Getrade. The quality inspector, 
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Mr. Marcus, prior to his employment by AMC buyers worked for the Centre of National Culture 
(now Art Centre) in charge of the craft sector. He holds a degree in industrial management and 
wood technology and received all his training in quality assurance from the AMC buyers.  
 
Mr. Marcus undertakes two forms of quality inspection anytime that there are orders to be 
executed for the AMC buyers, which he called as DUPRO (Inspection done DUring PROduction) 
and FRAI (Final Random Inspection, which is done at the port). During the fulfillment of export 
orders, Mr. Marcus visits the sites of the exporters to assess their performance and where 
necessary offers corrective support to improve compliance to quality requirements and 
specifications.    
 
At the port of exit, Mr. Marcus inspects every single piece that is brought to the port for shipment. 
He matches the products with a check-list written by the buyers detailing the product 
specifications such as colour, dimensions, design and price labeling that needs to be met by the 
export vendors. Also he randomly checks the moisture content of the products presented by the 
vendors using moisture tester. When he is satisfied with the quality and the specifications of the 
products, they are then packed into boxes and loaded into 40-footer sea containers for shipments.  
 
Mr. Marcus recognizes the insufficiency of the reach and intensity of the quality management 
services that he offers to about seventy export vendors operating under Getrade/AMC. He 
indicated that in the final analysis the ultimate responsibility lies on the individual exporters to 
manage quality internally. Mr. Marcus had this to say in response to whether or not the service 
offered by AMC is enough: ―I think in reality, AMC is doing its best. The main issue has to do 
with the individual factories. They would have to augment the control process because for AMC, 
if you are told to do things in a particular way and you deliver at fault or fall below the standard, 
your items would not be shipped….as far as AMC is concerned, it is a lot of work though, maybe 
an additional QA person would do. But I believe that the bulk of the responsibility or the job lies 
with the individual factories‖. 
 
Marcus makes a distinction between exporters who believe that they are selling an image and 
carving a niche for themselves through product quality and are pursuing this by instituting 
internal systems to improve quality compared with other exporters who are in the industry just to 
make quick money with no recourse to quality and image. In response to the new exigencies 
confronting the craft industry such as meeting the quality requirements of buyers, Getrade has 
trimmed down the number of export vendors operating under its umbrella from 120 to 70 aimed 
at getting rid of those exporters who are having difficulties adapting to the basic quality demands 
of the buyers.     
Source: Fieldwork interview, 2007. 
 
5.4.4 Product Development and Design 
Product development and design remain critical to sustaining the craft export industry. 
Almost all the exporters interviewed pointed to the Ghanaian design concepts and the 
authenticity of Ghanaian products as their competitive strengths. However, the range and 
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the product types have remained significantly unchanged over the years. An exporter had 
this to say regarding buyers‘ fatigue of the traditional craft products; ―…the buyers have 
become saturated with some of these old designs; they need something new but we are 
also not able to create new designs‖ (Getrade). The quotation from a World Bank report 
brings to the fore two fundamental factors that impede product development. A gap exists 
in assembling relevant market information for developing new products and the lack of 
local capacity to adapt to changes in design trends even if the information is available 
(see the presentation in section 5.3.1 about the information problems that the artisan 
subcontractors often face).  
 
Lack of design skills is a big handicap. Traditional, authentic designs are 
often enough to penetrate new markets, but functional ethnic designs 
(typically products of Western origin which have African decorative features) 
are needed to become a middle-ranked handicraft exporter. Buyers 
increasingly seek functional products which Ghanaian producers have 
difficulty designing and producing mainly because they are not familiar with 
Western lifestyle and the use of handicraft in Western homes… wood is often 
not sufficiently dry, hence, it can warp and crack, making it unsuited for most 
practical applications in Western markets. Even when managers are familiar 
with market requirements, they cannot transfer the information effectively to 
the local artisan producers‖ (2001, p 39). 
 
 
There is an overarching need to create new product designs that do not narrowly target 
the African-focused market but also appeal to the broader Western market for sustainable 
growth and profitability. The literature reports of product development and design 
process whereby international buyers provide innovative ideas and design information to 
their suppliers or may directly develop new products in tandem with their suppliers. 
Unlike in Asia, the story of Africa and in this case Ghana is that the local 
exporters(vendors) and buyers seldom engage in intensive inter-personal trade 
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interactions that could serve as source of product design innovations(see the analysis of 
African markets and institutions under the theoretical chapter). The evidence gathered in 
the field clearly supports this claim especially when we consider the trading relationship 
between the export vendors and the big international buyers that source products through 
local export agents. The manager of one leading export agent had this to say in 
connection to the lack of direct upgrading support from international big buyers:  
 
They [big international buyers] are not here to help you to develop your 
products. They can tell you I am interested in stools or this time around I 
think the market is good for drums so let have a lot of variety of drums or a 
lot of variety of stools. But they are not here to have time for you to develop 
your products. They have very few days to stay in this country and go so if 
you are talking about design, then it is another area where maybe you decide 
on how to get other people to come and design. Individually, the people 
might not be able to afford the design too (interview with Getrade 2007). 
 
However, the evidence also points to a situation where certain type of exporters i.e. the 
visible craft workshops and the craft factories do maintain collaborative relationship with 
the international buyers, especially the small international buyers. The craft factories and 
workshops have accumulated over the years the reputation of having the capacity and 
competence to meet the standards and specifications of middle-ranked functional craft 
products. Thus the buyers are willing to deal directly with them. The qualitative 
relationship between the craft workshop/factories and the buyers will be returned to in the 
next chapter. 
 Exporters are hesitant to invest in new product design as they fear that products will be 
quickly copied by local competitors. Some keep their ―fresh‖ designs in-house as long as 
possible and only provide new designs to suppliers when production can no longer be 
done internally. 
 Export companies limit their investment in product design as the return on investment is 
not always immediate. 
 Most export companies lack professional design training. 
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 Some export companies consider product design to be a public service and therefore do 
not invest themselves. 
 Most of the Ghanaian export companies do not attempt to innovate products on regular 
basis—while some of their international competitors come up with new collection 
developed by professional designers twice a year.        
     Source: AFE/DFID, 2004       
 
Some of the exporters are professional designers who when given the right incentive 
conditions could frequently come up with new product designs to feed the craft industry. 
These professional designers even though seek to control their designs by producing in-
house yet they find it difficult to protect their designs from being copied by their 
competitors and artisan subcontractors. Excessive design copying is a disincentive for 
future investment in innovative designs. Some of the professional designers interviewed 
were prepared to forgo actual production and focus solely on product designs, if their 
effort would be rewarded in financial terms. The potential for professional product 
designs exist in the industry for it to be harnessed given that there are sufficient economic 
incentives in place.  
 
Robert Ashong and Del Boampong are both professional designers and about ten of their 
colleague exporters who produce similar products like them, are appalled by the extent to which 
their product designs are constantly being copied by their local and international competitors, 
which damages the competitiveness of the craft industry. According to Ashong, ―the practice of 
people copying from others affects us because when a buyer sees this product at Wild Gecko and 
the same product at Unique ceramics, naturally, they get fed-up. So the way out is to motivate the 
designers‖  
 
They are willing to come up with new designs to feed the industry only if the other exporters are 
ready to pay a fee for their services. Mr. Ashong indicated that he has a lot of designs but do not 
have the capacity to produce them. He had this to say: ―if somebody is ready to pay for my design 
services, I can sell those designs; we will enter into an agreement… help to develop samples. If 
you sell you pay me a commission of 2% on each one. This happens abroad but here people don‘t 
understand‖. Contract as an institutional tool to curtail design copying and provides the incentive 
for undertaking productive activity in this case by investing effort in design is absent.  Ashong 
further attributes the problem to non-existence of copyright laws or if they exist they are not 
properly enforced: ―They would rather copy because the copy right laws are not well 
implemented. It is only in the music industry that they are enforcing it but with the visual 
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arts…also textiles that are produced in China, there are anti-piracy people that go around arresting 
people in the market for selling pirated textiles from China. Because the textile companies have 
invested a lot in human resource training and equipment only for people to be ripping them off. 
They just copy the designs and send them through emails to companies in China, produce them 
and sell them at about a quarter of the price. So in our industry nobody is enforcing anything. So 
people are copying left, right and centre‖.  
 
Likewise, Del Boampong main concern is about dishonesty in the craft business: ―I would prefer 
working as a designer. That is my background… So if I create and another person takes and I 
know that with every piece that is produced I am getting a certain amount on it, I don‘t have any 
problem with that. But the risk is that there is dishonesty in the business. If the first order comes 
say 10,000 pieces, he would say we had this order of 10,000, how about repeat orders, how about 
hybrid products?‖    
Source: Fieldwork interviews, 2007 
 
It is important to note that the more technologically-centred benefits (i.e. quality 
management and product designs) unlike other market services are least addressed by the 
subcontracting arrangements between the export agents and the exporters due to negative 
market externality. A report by UNCTAD in 2007 highlighted similar market failures and 
imperfections that constrains the Ghanaian craft industry to include limited skills, lack of 
capacity on the part of the firms, lack of economic incentives to invest resources and time 
in developing new product designs as well as training of artisans.  
 
 
By the early 2000s, it was evident that, although they were important, these services that were 
embedded in the transactions of the value chain were falling far short of achieving their full 
potential. In particular the more ‗technology-centred‘ services were seriously constrained by a 
combination of limited skills in firms and limited incentives to invest in creating or hiring them—
because of various forms of externality. This can be illustrated, for example, by the case of 
product design. Exporters sometimes passed on to their suppliers ideas about new product designs 
they receive from importers. However, this was a relatively ‗passive‘ process‘. The importers 
seldom had the design skills or time required to work with exporters on more purposeful product 
development. Also, besides lacking design capabilities, the exporters were hesitant to invest in 
new product designs because these would be rapidly copied by competitors.     
Source: UNCTAD, 2007 
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A case that was often cited by many of the exporters interviewed was in the early 2000s 
when a key US buyer (Pier 1 import); stopped buying Ghanaian craft products and 
switched to China and other Asian countries. This led to a decline in the volume of export 
orders in the early 2000. The buyers‘ switch was partly attributed to the lack of new 
product designs. The Government of Ghana report on the craft industry, for example, 
attributed the looming crisis of the declining interest by major American buyer to field 
more in-country buying missions (Pier 1 One Import and AMC/MARMAX)  to the lack 
of capacity by the exporters to come out with innovative  products (PSI  on craft, 2005).  
The extreme design copying in the absence of patenting laws is not only a disincentive 
for inducing private actors to come out with more innovative designs but may also be a 
source that discourages buyers from buying from the country as was indicated by this 
exporter: 
One thing that makes Cost-Plus and other big buyers that offer better prices 
not to trade actively with Ghana is that here in Ghana we don‘t have 
copyright and patenting laws or brand the crafts we produce. If you design a 
product and give to a buyer at a higher price, somebody else would copy the 
design and sell it at a cheaper price to another buyer. At the end of the day 
the same product type somebody is selling at a low price and the other high 
price, though the quality may not be the same. That I believe cause the 
buyers to stop from buying from Ghana. I think if they should have 
exclusive rights to specific products, they would continue to come to Ghana 
because when they come to Ghana they always say that they don‘t want the 
things that have been sent to this or that particular buyer…sometimes our 
designs are one way. We don‘t create new designs. All come back to this 
issue of patenting. I have a background in rural art and sculpture from the 
university but if you spend time and effort to come out with new designs 
and after trading it once, twice somebody else picks it and that is that for me. 
(Katalvic Enterprise).  
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5.4.5 Financial Intermediation 
The Ghanaian small craft exporters benefit from trade arrangement that enables them to 
access formal financial resources, thus setting them apart from many other small 
enterprises operating in the informal sector. Here the export agents and the National 
Association of Handicraft Exporters (NAHE) play crucial roles in this financial 
arrangement. The local private commercial bank, Prudential Bank, has been the major 
financier of the craft export since 1997. The bank has a special relationship with NAHE, 
the trading association that represent craft exporters in Ghana. For any craft exporter to 
qualify for a loan that individual must first be a registered member of the association and 
the association has to confirm to the bank the membership of the exporter as having a 
good standing as exporter.  
 
Once the buyer places the export orders after the exhibitions, the export agent puts them 
together and present to the private bank to facilitate the acquisition of loans for the 
individual exporters. Even though the loan facilities are processed under the group name 
of the agents, the final responsibility of repayment solely lies with the individual 
exporters. The exporters are not required to provide physical collateral for any amount 
that is less than ¢100million. When the loan application is approved, it is then disbursed 
in tranches to the exporters at the prevailing interest rate. The bank initially lends out 
about 60%-70% of the order value to the exporters to begin production and the remaining 
percentage release to them towards the end of production. It is out of these loans that the 
exporters make advance payments to the craftspeople and the production subcontractors 
to pre-finance production.     
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When payment is received from the buyers, the bank then deducts the loan and other 
charges including the commission to be paid to the agents and the remainder deposited 
into the accounts of the individual exporters. For one leading export agent who 
consolidated export orders worth $15.5million dollars between 2000 and 2007, the bank 
granted a loan of $7million to the exporters operating under this agent.  
 
The bank has also instituted certain ―safeguards‖ against possible default or to minimize 
default in the absence of movable collateral. The bank charges a three percent fee on total 
loan amount to the exporters to use as an ―insurance pool‖ against possible default 
(AFE/DFID, 2004). The major source of loan default comes about when the exporters fail 
to adhere to the buyers‘ quality standards and specifications. The exporters may fail to 
repay their loans if their products fall below the required quality standards and 
specifications and therefore the buyer refusing to pay them. This makes effective 
monitoring to enforce compliance with buyers specification and quality standards critical 
for loan repayment.   
 
There are limits to the use of intangible or soft safeguards as guarantees for securing high 
risk loans. The exporters are required by the bank, for instance, to provide movable 
collateral for any amount exceeding ¢100million. Many of the exporters with the 
ambitions to invest in production infrastructure and equipment in order to meet new and 
challenging buyer demands raised concerns about their inability to raise such investment 
capital from the banks for lack of collateral. It is estimated that about 80% of the craft 
exporters are small-scale enterprises whose capital base per annum rarely exceeds 
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US$100,000 meaning that many of them cannot provide the needed collateral securities 
for long-term commercial loans (Government of Ghana/PSI on Craft, 2005).   
 
Neither the export agent nor the trade association (i.e. NAHE) bears the risks of loan 
repayment, yet their reputation may be on the line if their members fail to repay loans—
the loan repayment is solely bore by the exporters. The success by the export agents in 
facilitating future loans for its ―members‖ is linked to how well their members performed 
in executing previous orders. The agents would have to monitor their members to ensure 
that they are producing exactly to specifications and sometimes confirm to the bank the 
stages of production its members have reached. By granting loans to the exporters under 
the umbrellas of the trade association and the export agents, the bank seeks to use group 
pressure to enforce compliance and loan repayment. The members feel that they are ―in it 
together‖ and therefore encourage their colleagues to be always mindful to deliver 
according to the terms of the order agreement in order to be able to pay their loans. 
Besides, the bank maintains a closer and informal relationship with the exporters, which 
helps it to minimize transaction costs. In a response to a question about what is unique 
about the bank‘s financing of the craft export sector to the extent to that the exporters 
continue to deal with it, the bank official had this to say: ―There is a closer bond between 
us and it is more informal…some of them if you come and see us talking you may think 
that we are talking about family issues; that sort of closer relationship between us…the 
relationship to which we have reached at the moment, I would call it more or less risk 
free, and the risks are minimal‖. This quote and the one below further reinforce how the 
commercial bank relies on inter-personal relations, group dynamics and reputation effects 
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as guarantees or intangible safeguards to minimize risks of loan defaults in the absence of 
other forms of physical collateral: 
 
Every member in the group qualifies for loan. The only thing you need to do is 
to be a member of the group, obtain an order and their name confirmed by the 
agent or the group. Immediately they enter into the contract that is where the 
group pressure works. Because the group has certified that the applicant is a 
member and can deliver, when the other members are moving and the member 
in question is not doing well the group tries to impress upon the member to 
perform as well… Each member of the group bears its own risk but we have 
this group dynamism, because of the idea that they all belong to the same group 
and that if one does not perform it affects all the group members and you know 
how group pressure works. It is some sort of shared-responsibility; they 
wouldn‘t want their name to suffer. But when it comes to the repayment of the 
facility, it is individual risks executed under the umbrella of the export agents 
and the association (Interview with Prudential Bank Official, 2007).     
 
Although the bank relies on the rich knowledge the export agents/trade association 
possess about the exporters, and their enforcing powers, it also undertakes its own 
monitoring and adopts other enforcement arrangement to ensure loan repayment. The 
producers and the exporters are scattered throughout the country and therefore monitoring 
them to ensure that they use the credit to execute their orders is time consuming and very 
expensive. However, the bank reckons it is less expensive to monitor than to recover 
loans from the small-scale exporters—for the loan recovery process is much more 
expensive and frustrating. 
 
In the event of default (due to sub-standard products or unanticipated production cost 
overruns), the bank sometimes defer repayments subject to future export orders instead of 
adopting the convectional court actions to retrieve loans from the exporters—the reason 
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being that using court action is cumbersome and also it could strain its future relationship 
with the exporters. They only issue threats of court actions:      
 
It is less expensive to monitor than to recover loans. The recovering process 
in Ghana is very difficult. You go to court and for about two years you 
would still be going to court. So if you have the means and the opportunity 
to monitor and achieve perfection than to recover it is better to do 
that…When they default for them we only threaten them with court actions 
and letters because going to court would be too difficult and we also don‘t 
want to break their backs….and the point is also [about] our security…when 
you take them to court one, two, three and somebody in the judiciary hints 
them that there is no collateral…they would be stubborn. By letters, 
communication we try to convince them to try and get orders and then 
deduct the loan in small amounts (interview with an official of Prudential 
bank, 2007). 
 
 
Also embedded in the above quote is the idea that resolving commercial dispute using the 
court may not only be due to the financial cost and cumbersome bureaucratic process but 
also by the fact that the informal contractual relationship may make it difficult to resolve 
contractual disputes in legalistic manner. The court system requires litigants to tender in 
evidence of written agreements specifying the conditions of default and guarantees (i.e. 
physical collateral) that could be used to service default. The implication here is that even 
if the court system is effective, the use of informal contracting (contract lacking hard 
evidence) would discourage litigants to use the courts. In this instance, partners would 
continue to engage in on-going inter-personal discussions to resolve informal contract 
disputes (Lorenz, 2000).   
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5.4.6 Mistrust between Agents and Exporters 
As much as these services provided by the export intermediaries enable many of the 
small-scale firms to participate in the international market, contrary evidence indicates 
that the intermediation role play by the export agents is far from ideal. The export 
vendors persistently complained about the situation where some officials of the export 
agents are unofficially engaging in export production. These officials who are well 
positioned in terms of access to important market information from buyers sometimes use 
this information to their advantage without passing them on to the other export vendors. 
Besides, repeat orders from the buyers are often withheld and executed by these officials 
(some of these officials have their small firms operating ―underground‖) without the 
knowledge of the rightful exporters who designed those products. The analogy below was 
used by an exporter to illustrate how the perceived mistrust in the industry stifles 
specialization in the industry: 
 
I believe that the agents, exporters, producers, carvers and finishers should 
play their individual roles as such so that there would be transparency in 
the industry. We expect an agent to play the role of an agent. If you are a 
player we expect you to play the game as a player and if you are a referee, 
we expect you to play that role. But if you play the role of a player, a 
coach and a referee at the same time, it raises a lot of problems. There is a 
lot of mistrust in the system. The situation whereby one (this refers to the 
export vendors who are next to the export agents in a hierarchical order) 
gets information from the carvers whenever a buyer is visiting is not the 
best. Why do we hear the buyer‘s visit from the carvers? It means that the 
referee (the export agents) is involved in the game because he goes to the 
carvers at the villages to create his samples (Celebate Services) 
 
 
It is noteworthy that mistrust though impedes the subcontracting relationship between the 
export intermediaries and the exporters; it does not largely negate the positive 
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commercial role that is being played by the agents in linking many of the small exporters 
to the lower end of the export market. The issue here is more than mistrust. It also has the 
undertone of power relationships between the actors, which are shaped by who controls 
what resource along the production chain.  The powerful position of the export agents in 
the local value chain is derived from the special relationships they have established with 
international buying agents and their relatively rich access to market knowledge. It is 
therefore not surprising that the agents closely guard this relationship to deprive the 
export producers (those without the capacity to undertake buyer search abroad) any direct 
interaction with buyers during in-country trade exhibitions.  In the hierarchy of power 
relations, the international buyers are on top follow by the local agents. This is how one 
official of an export agent constructed the power relationships along the Ghanaian craft 
chain:   
 
…these are the issues that we have looked at and talked to the buyer about, 
but the relationship is like master-servant relationship. If you talk too much 
the buyer would say I am not coming [back to buy again], so we…in fact 
what the [agent] has actually tried to do is to dance to the tune of the buyer. 
So for 10 years it has been so…let me say it in this way. There is this chain. 
You look at the buyer at the top, then comes [the agents] and the export 
vendors; the two are tied together because [the agent] doesn‘t have a say in 
whatever the buyer is giving the exporter(apparently referring to prices 
buyers offer). But from the exporters to the artisans the chain is broken…the 
artisans have more power than the export vendors…so you have the export 
vendors in there with less power even though they come next after [the 
agent]…     
 
In the view of this interviewee, in the natural sequence of things, the artisan 
subcontractors at the bottom of the chain should wedge less power than the export 
vendors but the opposite is the case in this instance. The strong bargaining power of the 
artisan subcontractors in the chain is attribute to the fact that they possess unique artisanal 
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skills, which majority of the export vendors does not have. This ―broken chain‖ between 
the export vendors and the artisan subcontractors makes it difficult for the former to 
control the latter with implications for enforcement of contract obligations. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The object of this chapter has been to highlight the external market forces and local 
economic and environmental conditions, which influence the general performance of the 
craft export industries and the subcontracting relations/informal mechanisms deployed by 
the exporters in coordinating craft production for export. On the global front, the Asian 
countries have succeeded in copying Ghanaian products and mass produce at high quality 
and finishing thereby pushing the frontiers of competition from price to issues of quality. 
These coupled with buyers‘ specifications and requirements place competitive pressures 
on the local exporters to adjust organizationally and materially in order to stay afloat in 
the export market. Factors pertaining to the local environment also present unique set of 
challenges to the exporters. The artisan subcontractors often lack the technical capacity to 
execute orders to meet the required buyers‘ demands. Unstructured production schedules, 
socio-cultural factors and the lack of understanding of export culture on the part of many 
local producers could cause undue delays in executing and shipping orders.  Also 
endemic in the local environment is the risk of opportunism that the exporters have to 
grapple with in their transactions with the artisan subcontractors. The relative increase in 
the volume of trade makes the threat of opportunistic behaviour and supervision even 
more costly. Through subcontracting relationship with export agents and artisan 
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producers, the export vendors are able to access certain critical resources, which they 
would have otherwise found it difficult to generate internally such as working capital, 
labour and market information.  
 
Many of the exporters described in chapter 4 as ―export vendors‖ depend predominately 
on the export agents for market access and other trade intermediation services such as 
quality inspection, shipping and export processing services. This enables the numerous 
export vendors to overcome their own capacity limitation to generate some of these 
activities by themselves. However, the subcontracting arrangement via the export agents 
are restricted to low-order activities regarding quality management and product 
development; factors considered critical for greater success in the export markets. The 
export agents are less enthused to invest in product development and design either 
because they do not have the skills and the capacity to undertake those activities or due to 
negative market externalities. The export agents consider product development and 
design as ―public good‖ because of the lack of excludability to the use of these activities 
and the fact that it is difficult for the export agents to prevent other actors in the industry 
from free riding. Specialized firms that provide quality management and product 
development services are not popular phenomenon in Ghana.  ATAG can expand its third 
party service provision on a fee-paying basis to the artisans since its dependence on donor 
support makes it difficult to provide such services in a consistent manner.     
 
The other limitation regarding the marriage between the export agents and the vendors is 
that, while informal mechanisms are used as intangible safeguards to minimize the risks 
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of loan defaults, it is however not enough to enable the export vendors to secure long-
term loan for capital investment to meet more difficult production challenges. The banks 
always demand formal and movable guarantees, which the majority of the small-scale 
export vendors do not possess thus limiting their prospect of improving their production 
capacity for greater success. The lack of finance for capital investment tends to confine 
majority of the exporters to simple and traditional products, which are sellable at the low-
end of the export market. This implies that intangible assets or informal systems are not 
sufficient to insulate the banks against high risk loans.  
 
The subcontracting relations both with the local artisan producers and the export agents 
have been instrumental in enabling the exporter to integrate into the export market. 
However, these relationships are increasingly being undermined by opportunism, mistrust, 
cultural constraints and capacity difficulties; factors that make it difficult for the export 
vendors to meet the requirements of the export market. Trust as important prerequisite for 
sustaining subcontracting relations for coordinating production activities even for simple 
cultural products is being eroded through opportunism and lack of contract discipline.  
 
The next chapter discusses how some large-scale producers and craft workshops organize 
their production functions and seek to overcome some of these environmental 
uncertainties and production challenges through inside-contracting arrangement. The 
character of the inside-contracting as it pertains to the export industry and the motivations 
underlying this system is explored in detail in the next chapter.     
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                                                    CHAPTER SIX 
INSIDE-CONTRACTING: “NEW” RESPONSE TO UNCERTAIN PRODUCTION 
ENVIRONMENT AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the production strategy of the ―in-house‖ craft exporters. The 
thrust of the discussion in the chapter is that the exporters with in-house facilities are 
relatively successful in meeting quality specifications, speed and volumes compared with 
the export vendors who mainly subcontract their production orders to outsiders. Noting 
that external subcontracting had been the main channel for coordinating craft production 
for export in the industry, partial production in-house (inside-contracting) is a ―new‖ and 
modest response to the increases in the complexity of the export transactions, risks and 
uncertainties. It is an institutional arrangement that is adopted by the exporters to gain 
control over the production processes in order to reduce agency problems.  In other words, 
the move to overcome coordination difficulties and extreme risks pertaining to the local 
environment and export market pressure are the motivations underlying the trend towards 
the partial internalization of production activities in-house by some of the craft exporters. 
Given the uncertain production environment and opportunistic risks, the loose market-
like subcontracting arrangement seems a weak approach for organizing craft production 
for export. This production arrangement adopted by some of the exporters does not 
strictly fit into the typical vertical integration mode of production prescribed in the 
transaction cost literature. It is a partial in-house production arrangement in that the 
owner of the firm engages artisans on contract basis to produce inside his workshop or 
production premises instead of the more formalized employment relations. It is an 
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arrangement that mixes an external subcontracting regime where trust plays an important 
lubricating role and an internal contracting regime—in which the essence is to gain 
control over the production process in order to address the different exigencies of the 
domestic environment and export market requirements. Not only does this category of 
exporters maintain multiple relations with suppliers but also with international buyers. 
This characterization of the complexity of inside contracting strategy  as adopted by 
exporters also demonstrates a change process where the arm‘s length subcontracting 
relation served as the basis for the development of the in-house contracting system.         
 
6.2 Inside-Contracting Production Arrangement: Character and Dynamics 
The historical accounts given by the in-house producers indicate that they began mainly 
as exporters who operated mainly as traders without any on-site production facilities and 
used to subcontract whole of production functions to independent artisans and 
craftspeople. This is a ―new‖ mode of production i.e. from non-factory environment to a 
seeming in-situ factory production organization in the industry. 
 
These exporters/producers have invested in in-house production facilities with some of 
them going a step further to mechanize certain stages of the production processes using 
modern or intermediate equipment. These producers are integrating upstream and 
downstream in the local production chain. The core area of activity of these exporters was 
to secure export orders from international buyers by participating in buyer exhibitions 
organised by the domestic export agents and subsequently subcontract them to the 
craftspeople in the craft villages that possess the artisanal skills. But now these exporters 
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are loosely integrating production functions in-house to the extent of undertaking their 
own shipping and export processing functions without having to rely on export agents.  
 
They have organized production lines that mimic the discrete specialized activities 
performed by artisan groups in the craft villages. Each specialized activity, including 
carving, designing, finishing and packaging, is supervised by experienced and skilful 
group leaders or master artisans. Most often the masters who act as subcontractors 
negotiate the price of each piece to be produced with the owner of the enterprise and in 
turn pay the artisans working under them by the piece.   
 
Some exporters who have on-site or in-house facilities have offended so many 
people. By getting the good craftsperson to stay in-house you step on some 
toes. The guy was working for some other people and you have taken him, 
which means you deprive other people from utilizing the guy and that breeds 
bad feelings among the exporters (Celebate Services). 
 
Engaging the skilful artisans to produce from the premises of their hirers is not without 
controversy in the industry as depicted in the above quote. There is an indirect 
employment relation between the craftspeople/artisans and the enterprise owner. The 
owners provide the factory space, the equipment and the raw materials for the artisans to 
execute the orders. This is not to say that they have completely abandoned the use of 
simple tools; there are certain aspects of the production process such as the initial carving 
that continue to rely on the use of simple tools. Even though the craftspeople are 
independent contractors, producing within the confines of the factory or workshop space 
provided by the lead exporter enables him or her to closely monitor the artisans to ensure 
compliance with quality standards, product specification and prevent opportunistic risks. 
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The owners of the principal enterprises are not themselves artisans or craftspeople but are 
knowledgeable about the requirements of the export market and therefore transmit their 
acquired market information internally to the artisans they contract to work for them.  
 
The narratives below are the stories of two leading craft exporters who were just traders 
but have developed their businesses to become successful in-house producers with a well 
organized production set-up; typical of the inside-contracting regime being discussed in 
this chapter. These narratives provide a prelude to the thematic discussion of the inside-
contracting system as it relates to the craft industry. The narratives demonstrate the 
learning process and adaptability of the enterprises in question to changes in export 
market demand and local-specific challenges. The case firms; Tekura Enterprise and 
Fritete African Art Works together have the capacity to produce about US$700,000 worth 
of export orders annually. The narratives are constructed based on information obtained 
from fieldwork interviews and secondary data sources (Webber et al. 2007).  
 
Case: 1 Tekura Enterprise 
The origins of the company: It is a craft export company that specializes in simple 
traditional craft products, home décor and furniture. Josephine Forson, the owner of 
Tekura Enterprise Ltd started her career as an employee with Aid to Artisan Ghana, an 
NGO that helps to build the capacity of craft businesses in Ghana. She carried with her 
the experience gained from, and the buyer contacts made at, ATAG to establish Tekura 
Enterprise Ltd in 2000. Tekura started as an export vendor with minimal on-site 
production capacity and initially relied entirely on individual subcontractors to execute 
her export orders. Josephine runs the company with her husband, who resigned as an 
account with Red Cross Society in 2003 to join the company. Tekura has about 44 
craftspeople as subcontractors who operate from the company‘s production premises 
located in Adenta, a suburb in the outskirt of Accra. The company has over the years 
invested in machines such as band saws, mitre saw, planning equipment, drying oven etc. 
In addition, the company has a showroom and a warehouse where samples of various 
crafts products and finished products are displayed and stored respectively. According to 
Josephine, she occasionally subcontracts some of her traditional items to subcontractors 
to carve outside her production premises and the finishing, incisions, sanding and 
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polishing completed in-house. However, all the production processes relating to the high 
premium home décor and furniture are performed within the company‘s production 
premises in order to control quality. From modest export sales of $35,000 in its 
embryonic stage, Tekura increased its export sales to $180,000 in 2004, and $200,000 in 
2005. The year 2006 witness a decline in export sales because one of the company‘s big 
buyers did not place export orders.  
 
Declining Margins due to demand changes and competition: Tekura began selling 
traditional animal and human figurines and masks to the high volume US buyer; Pier 1 
Imports. Early year sales were good, which resulted in good margins. In the early years, a 
12-inche wooden mask had an average sale price of $8-9. However, in 2003, for almost a 
decade in sourcing craft products, Pier 1 began reducing sourcing from Ghana partly 
because its clients started developing interests in functional products and increasing 
disinterest in traditionally based ethnic craft products. It was also partly due to the fact 
that other retailers such TJ Maxx and Marshall‘s, which compete on price and had 
entered the Ghanaian market virtually out-competed Pier 1 Import in the US market for 
Ghanaian craft products on price. Order volumes began to decline in 2003 and buyers 
started to squeeze more margins from their orders. Masks that Tekura used to sell for $8-
9 in 2002 were later sold for an average price of $3.50 by 2003.     
 
Horizontal Collaboration to raise capacity to enter up-end market and meet increase in 
order volumes: In 2004, West African Trade Hub (WATH) linked Tekura and other 
exporters to the US retailer Target, Inc. Target was sourcing home décor products from 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East for its ―Global Bazaar‖. Target placed 
27,000-piece order (US$365,000) for Getrade Ghana Ltd, Fritete African Works and 
Tekura to produce for its Global Bazaar in 2004. Tekura was successful in producing 
some of the items ordered by Target, but there were equally other unique items that 
Tekura had no experience in producing. In the end Tekura was able to complete 70% of 
the 9000 order pieces due to capability problems. Likewise, Fritete also failed to fulfill 
his order completely. Regardless of this shortfall, Target expressed the willingness to 
place another order in 2005. In view of the capacity problems Tekura encountered in 
executing the previous orders, Tekura sought additional resources and capacity 
improvement in anticipation of the orders promised by Target in 2005. Tekura teamed up 
with Fritete (the other company, which failed to complete previous years orders but 
possesses reasonable production capacity), to form a joint venture; Premium Export. Also 
a German-based handicraft expert was brought in through the assistance of WATH to 
analyze the production systems of Tekura and helped implement some changes in the 
areas of building templates and jigs for woodcutting to reduce waste and ensure 
uniformity in size and also improving drying techniques of wood products to reduce 
warping, cracking and moulding during transit. Tekura secured loans through local 
financial institutions to make capital investments. Band and mitre saws were purchased 
between the first and second Target orders. 
 
In 2005, Target returned with an order of 48,000 pieces to which Tekura was responsible 
for producing 13,000 pieces of items, including masks, wooden figurines, candle stands 
etc. The production difficulty encountered here was how to obtain the necessary funds to 
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finance these huge orders. Tekura had in previous occasions relied on an informal 
arrangement with a local private bank to secure loans to finance production but this time 
around the bank would not grant huge loan request without a solid guarantee. She lacked 
the collateral then but the joint ventureship with Fritete enabled her to obtain an Exim 
Guarantee (attracts 3% interest rate), which enable her to obtain private loans from local 
banks. The collaboration between Tekura and Fritete yielded good results. They were 
able to complete the orders at the required quality and quantity.  
 
Changes in Buyers’ Behaviour: As it pertained to Pier 1 Import, the tastes of Target 
customers changed and so Target responded by shifting its focus within its Global Bazaar 
product offerings from country of origin and artisan uniqueness to emphasis on 
affordability, colour theme, category and item dominance. Instead of the broad mix of 
product purchases, Target focused its 2006 African home décor purchases to woven 
baskets from women‘s groups in Ghana. Pier 1 imports returned to Ghana in August 2007 
and Tekura is expected to secure orders. The return of Pier 1 is linked to the losses that 
the buyer has been incurring in recent years. Its new recruited buyers have been directed 
to purchase merchandise ―that is more akin to Pier 1‘s historic roots rather than the 
modern craftsman approach the company dabbled in unsuccessfully‖9 in sourcing from 
Asia. This shift in buying focus seemingly favours countries like Ghana where Pier 1 has 
traditionally been sourcing authentic African products. 
 
Diversifying client base as a response to sporadic buyer switch: With the vacuum that 
was created by the loss of Target in 2006, Tekura, has learnt to anticipate the sporadic 
buying habits from large ―big-box buyers‖ and now constantly seeks new niche markets. 
The big buyers can stop buying without giving any notice and so an exporter relying on a 
single big buyer faces the danger of going out of business if the buyer switches.   
 
Tekura continues to produce and sell home décor item to Marmaxx and has sought to 
expand into other markets by joining a consortium of Ghanaian artisans and 
manufacturers called ―living Ghana‖, which is comprised of 15 Ghanaian companies, and 
started by attending trade fairs in Berlin and also work with German designers to improve 
their product offerings. The consortium sells to the European market through a variety of 
German and Swiss boutiques. Tekura also teamed up with African Heritage Collection to 
launch exclusive, higher-value home décor products. In 2006, Tekura was selected as part 
of the Design Africa Initiative, sponsored by Trade Facilitation Office of Canada, to 
participate in the Montreal International Interior Design Show and the prospect of getting 
buyers from this show looks good.  
 
In addition, Tekura sells to other smaller and niche market buyers such Swahili Imports 
and Bambolla both in USA. The order quantities from these buyers are small and may be 
up to US$ 10,000. The benefit derives from these buyers is that they send down their 
designers to Ghana to work with Tekura to develop new product samples. When these 
buyers get orders for the samples they give them back to Tekura to produce. Unlike, 
many other exporters, Tekura do not have a problem communicating with the big buyers; 
however, the frustration that she sometimes faces is the bureaucratic channels that she has 
                                                 
9
 Chain Store Age, June 22, 2007. 
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to go through in communicating with the buyers‘ Africa regional agents stationed in 
South Africa. Mrs. Forson believes that the direct communication and the visits to the 
production premises by the buyers are as a result of the confidence the buyers have in her 
company. She had this to say: ―The buyers come down to us. They have agents in the 
country and when you are well organized they bring the buyer to your workplace. When 
the buyers come they see products that are different and they are excited and if they want 
some of them, they ask for some changes and if you are able to organize and quickly 
effect the changes they tend to feel more comfortable with you‖.  
 
 
Seeking reputation through quality: Tekura believes she is not just selling products but 
also reputation and therefore do not compromise on quality. Apart from personally 
getting involved in quality control, payments done for work are tied to the level of quality 
achieved by the craftspeople. One of her big buyers; Marshall has a local quality control 
officer who visits her premises during production to undertake quality inspection; a 
process Tekura learns from. 
 
Teaming up with Fritete allowed Tekura to take advantage of the economies of scale and 
the resources necessary to complete their orders with Target. As margins, continue to 
decline, Tekura needs to adapt to new production techniques and input sources to lower 
their costs. Tekura use wood from trees left lying in the forests as a result of reforestation.  
In an effort to improve their market position Tekura has continued to improve the designs 
of its home décor products to appeal to different tastes.   
 
Case 2: Fritete African Art 
The origins and company’s profile: This Company is one of the pioneers in the craft 
industry. It was established in 1987 by Mr. Robert Ellis who started as a vendor or a 
collector of African Art works. Until he began collecting craft products, Mr. Ellis worked 
as an IT officer at Ghana‘s Drivers and Vehicle License Authority (DVLA).  Fritete was 
initially established to produce and export crafts products, however, the company has 
acquired a new function as an export agent. The company has the capacity to produce 
$500,000 worth of export orders annually. The company is sited at Agbpgba-Haatso, a 
suburb of Accra and it boasts of investment in modern machines, and other infrastructure 
including, storage facilities, production sheds, haulage vans, showrooms, drying ovens 
among others. The company produces and exports a wide range of craft products 
including documented African figurines and museum reproduction, traditional and 
contemporary furniture, mirrors, frames, musical instruments and the like. Its production 
space can accommodate 150 workers whom he engages on piece rate basis and also 
subcontract orders to hundreds of production subcontractors in the craft villages. The 
company negotiates the price of each piece with the artisans; this in most cases is done 
between the masters under whose direct supervision the craftspeople and the artisans 
work. Engaging the artisans on piece-rate basis enables the company to adjust to 
fluctuations in export orders. Mr. Ellis indicated that the company used to engage the 
artisans on permanent basis, even when there were no export orders, to produce for stock; 
in an attempt to fully utilize the artisans and not to lose them to its competitors. This was 
however discontinued because keeping product stocks always played into the hands of 
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the buyers to beat down prices and loans were also ―locked up in the stocks‖, which 
needed to be serviced(the storage rooms of a number of exporters visited by this 
researcher revealed huge piles of stocks of unpolished carved products). During off-
seasons the company only keeps a handful of artisans in-house to create new product 
samples for trade exhibitions. 
 
Learning about market trends through private/sponsored participation in international 
fairs: Mr. Ellis has participated in both local and very lucrative international trade fairs 
and missions. Between 1987 and 2007, Mr. Ellis participated in nine major international 
fairs in Europe. In a particular instance, he repeatedly participated in these fairs every 
year from 1999 to 2007
10
. In terms of fair participation, he stands out among all the craft 
exporters. Two decades ago, the craft industry was regarded by many Ghanaians as a 
cottage industry reserved for school drop-outs and as a pioneer craft exporter who always 
place emphasis on good product presentation, it was easy for him to catch the eyes of 
government authorities and be selected to participate in government and donor sponsored 
international fairs. Unlike many of the scale-scale export vendors, he does not primarily 
measure his success at the fairs by how much sales he makes, instead he goes to these 
international fairs with the prime objective to learn about trends in the export market, 
tests his new products, seek the views of the buyers and the consumers on pricing, 
finishing and presentation and the feedbacks incorporated into his final product designs. 
Mr Ellis always returns from international fairs with a dossier of information, which 
enable him to improve on his designs and product range. Fritete always seeks to diversify 
its product designs and the functionality of the products in line with trends in the export 
market.   
 
According to Mr. Ellis, his first major exposure to international trade mission was 
somewhere in 1992, when he was selected among other companies by the Ghana Export 
Promotion Council through the sponsorship of the Commonwealth Secretariat to 
undertake trade mission to North America to explore the market for buyers. This 
happened at the stage in his company‘s life when raising the money even for air thicket 
was a major hurdle for him. This mission, according to Mr. Ellis, was successful because 
in the end they were able to secure export orders from a major American buyer. The 
success of the trade mission to the North America became a springboard for him to sell 
his company for slots in future government sponsored international fairs.  
 
Multiple clients from different countries: Fritete has been dealing with rich and multiple 
buyers. This, according Mr. Ellis, is the result of his approach to participations in 
international trade fairs. Fritete has been exporting almost to all the big US buyers 
including Cost-Plus World Market, Pier 1 Imports, Marmaxx, Target Corporation. The 
company also transacts or has transacted business with a number of buyers from countries 
such as Peru, Mexico, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Germany, Cyprus and Norway. Mr. 
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 Ambiente fair, Germany from 1999 to 2007; Birmingham Spring Fair, 1999 and 2000; Bordeaux 
International trade fair, France 1989; AMK Berlin Trade fair, Germany 1990, 1991 and 1993; Import Shop, 
Berlin, Germany 1998-2003; Paris International trade fair, 1987-1990; Premier Trade fair, Germany 
1995;Tendence Trade fair, Germany 1996, 1998 Trieste International trade fair, Italy.  
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Ellis indicated that orders from Germany where he plies most of his trade fair 
participation has been growing in recent years.    
 
 
Functional upgrading and learning through intensive relationship with a big buyer: 
Fritete typifies a company that has upgraded its functions as craft producer by adding to 
its activities the role of an export agency. When Mr Ellis was approached by the 
American buyer; Cost Plus to be its local agent, he was initially reluctant to take up the 
offer because he felt he did not have enough experience and understanding of the 
operations of an export agent. Notwithstanding, his experience in production and 
exposure to the export market was considered enough initial prerequisites by the buyer to 
take up the new role as an export agent. His in-depth understanding of the needs of 
buyers and the investment he has made in production facilities were enough to convince 
the buyer of his capability to deliver as its local representative. The buyer also offered to 
give the company some assistance. This is how Mr Ellis expressed this concern: ―the 
experience I had was in production and export and not agency work. These big buyers, 
they have different documentation issues that you need to understand. At the moment I 
am working with about 13 different desks and you have to be able to understand them. I 
have a buyer, assistant buyer, purchase order management team, changes team, shipping 
team, distribution team; all in the US who work with me. Sometimes when it becomes 
necessary we organize telephone conference where we can explain things to the 
understanding of two or three people. Then I didn‘t understand those means of 
communication and I needed to understand so many things which were not within my 
abilities but they offered to give me guidance and direction. In fact as at now, most of the 
vendors went against most of the strict regulations and normally when you do that they 
slap you with charge-backs but because of the special dispensation to use this relationship 
as a learning platform for my agency we are normally given waivers‖.  
 
Fritete currently operates as an export agent and is in the process of reorganizing in order 
to cede the organization of actual production to another company; Treasures of Africa 
(owned by Tina the wife of Mr Ellis). Fritete is also the regional representative of Cost-
Plus and coordinates export orders from Burkina Faso and other West African countries 
for the buyer.    
 
Just when the company had started to do business with Cost Plus, Fritete was fortunate to 
get involved in a training programme organised for craft vendors on export guidelines by 
WATH. He received training on product development, order negotiations and executions, 
and export procedures including; packaging, labeling and post-shipping trust and 
confidence buildings with buyers. The knowledge gained at this training programme was 
in turn imparted to most of the craftspeople and artisans working under Fritete; majority 
of whom do not have formal education.  
 
Informal-formal credit arrangements with private bank to meet large export orders: 
According to Fritete, the first exhibition organized for his new buyer in Accra was a great 
success. The obstacle that immediately confronted Fritete and its vendors was the lack of 
finance needed to execute their export orders. When the orders for Fritete and its vendors 
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were finally sealed by the buyer, the company used its influence to facilitate bank loans 
for the vendors. The order volumes were huge and as such required huge working capital; 
the kind of money the private bank i.e. Prudential Bank, was reluctant to advance to the 
vendors without a secure guarantee and as it is the case with many small enterprises, the 
vendors lacked the requisite physical collateral as guarantee to back their loan requests
11
. 
So Fritete had to design a monitoring and a guarantee system to ensure full loan 
repayment.  First, Fritete visited the production sites of the vendor applicants to access 
their levels of preparedness or the level of investment that they have made in their 
production infrastructure. Based on this assessment, the company then recommended to 
the bank to advance the loans to the vendor that is commensurate to the value of the 
vendor‘s production infrastructure. The loan disbursement was done in tranches and the 
initial loan installment was made to commensurate how much the vendors have invested 
in production facilities. Fritete took the responsibility to monitor the recipients and 
reported back to the bank on the progress of work of the individual vendors. Further loan 
disbursement was based on the performance of the individual vendors in successfully 
using the loan to execute the previous stages in the production process. Mr. Ellis had this 
to say in this connection: ―The bank was giving the money in tranches, so if its 
gives ¢50million to the vendor, I should be able to report back to the bank to convince 
them that the money has actually been used in production and that the individual is on 
track and I should also be able to tell how much more money the individual needs or that 
the individual is having problems with production and that the bank should slow down on 
monies to that individual‖. This arrangement, according to Fritete, was so effective that 
they succeeded in full repayment to the bank. Following from this, the bank has decided 
not to deal directly with the individual producers or vendors but instead write all loan 
agreements for the export orders in the name of a subsidiary company of Fritete. As a key 
exporter with a better understanding of the industry, the bank was confident Fritete was 
well positioned to know who the real performers in the industry are and is less likely to 
advance monies to under-performing producers or vendors. Making the company to bear 
the foremost risks was also meant to induce Fritete to further tighten the monitoring of its 
subcontractors to ensure that its vendors are always on track. To the bank, dealing with an 
umbrella exporter such as Fritete meant a reduction in transaction cost (monitoring and 
enforcement) in dealing with myriad of producers or vendors who are scattered 
throughout the country and also overcame the information problem regarding the ability 
of the exporters to execute orders diligently.     
 
Internal quality control checks to meet quality requirements: Mr. Ellis understands the 
changes that have taken place in the craft export industry over the years in terms of 
consumers‘ tastes, product quality standards and the need to respond to these changes 
appropriately in order to stay in business. With this understanding, Fritete has responded 
to these changes by investing in modern machines, which enables him to achieve 
consistency in product quality and also ensures that product quality is controlled right 
from production to packaging. At the start of the production of each order, the company 
internally transmits information on product specifications to its craftspeople and artisans 
and design jigs and templates for achieving the required product sizes and dimensions. 
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 The interviewee mentioned that some of his vendors needed financial request or loan in excess of 
¢300million from the private bank, an amount that requires fixed collateral by the bank. 
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Every craftsperson is obliged to ensure that each product produced fits very well into the 
jigs before they can move to the next stage. According to Mr. Ellis the leaders of the 
craftspeople acts as supervisors who check product quality and enforce compliance at 
every stage of the production process. Crafted items are then taken to the drying base for 
oven drying. Mr. Ellis prefers oven drying to air drying or kiln drying because it is quick 
and enables him to meet deadlines. On the issue of product quality this how he puts it; 
―the quality issue is not the concern of the manager and the supervisors only, it is as well 
the concern of the individual producers and artisans from the beginning to the end of 
production‖. He told of his experience of some difficulties he encountered in executing 
export orders for Target Corporation because of some lapses in quality control during the 
production process; the quality control personnel engaged by Target undertook the 
quality checks at the port of exit instead of during production.  He felt that checking 
product quality at the Port was flawed and therefore refused to allow that arrangement to 
go on. The buyer agreed to allow the officer to offer the quality control services during 
production. This according to Mr. Ellis made the quality control officer to appreciate 
some of the practical challenges that they often face during production.  
 
6.2.1 Bipolar Contractual Arrangement 
The fact that these producers are building internal capacity and integrating production 
activities in-house does not in any way suggests complete abandonment of their 
traditional subcontracting to independent artisans operating in the craft villages. The craft 
factories and workshops combine internal contracting within their production premises 
with external subcontracting to independent artisan subcontractors operating outside their 
production premises. This approach can perhaps be referred to as a ―Bipolar‖ contractual 
or production strategy whereby the entrepreneurs decide to outsource certain activities to 
their trusted independent subcontractors and at the same time decide to perform some 
other activities in-house. The decision to adopt internal or external contracting is 
influenced by the product type or the complexity of the product, issues of buyer standards 
and specifications, order volumes, delivery deadlines, the extent of exposure to 
opportunistic behaviour and whether the artisan subcontractors can be trusted to execute 
the orders diligently.  The relatively complex and difficult to produce products are hardly 
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outsourced to independent artisans operating from the craft villages. Where they choose 
to contract out externally, it is normally the simple or the traditional crafts, which are 
produced for the mass market but where order volumes are huge and quality could easily 
be compromised, production is then centralized in-house to enforce compliance to 
product quality and specification. Also in-house production has the potential of limiting 
the range and variety of products, which are often required by large international buyers. 
The motive to subcontract externally, in addition to in-house production, is also meant to 
ensure that they are able to broaden the base of their product range.  
 
6.2.2 Trust and Subcontracting relationship with Artisan Subcontractors 
These exporters possessing in-house production capacity were relatively comfortable in 
subcontracting their simple craft orders to their distance subcontractors and able to 
assemble skilful artisans to produce from their production premises with relative ease. On 
the contrary, the vendors without in-house production facilities, especially those in Accra, 
who specializes in the same simple and traditional products expressed apprehension in 
subcontracting to independent artisan subcontractors in the craft villages because of the 
risk of deceit (see the analysis in the previous chapter). The most important factor 
explaining this difference is trust. The relationship between the in-house exporters and 
their subcontractors is characterized by trust building. The texts below by two exporters 
with in-house production capabilities recognize the role of trust as an important 
ingredient in enabling external subcontracting to be deployed with minimal supervision 
or helping the entrepreneurs to attract the artisans to produce in-house without having to 
establish formal and permanent employment relationships with them: 
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This is a human problem….at the end of the day controlling them (artisan 
subcontractors) becomes a problem. Now we don‘t use numbers. Now we use 
quality; very few reliable producers and the attraction around these quality 
people is that they always have influence on the new generation of producers or 
artisans who would want to be like them. So they get attracted and I use them as 
the contact point. Most of them are reliable and you can entrust them 
with ¢20million, ¢40million or ¢50million, no problems….They are so reliable 
and then the other thing I do is that when we have orders that need to be done in 
great numbers we centralize it. I bring it here, gets the materials and then I 
mean reaching the carvers is not difficult; because we have the networking. We 
get them to come and reside here and then they work (Fritete). 
  
One of the disadvantages of working with the piece-rate is that once they are 
not salaried and they wait and you are not getting orders for them naturally they 
would not stay… But the good thing is that once you maintain a good link with 
them like me…once I have orders I call them, they come and help me, I pay 
them off and then they go back. So that is when you maintain a good 
relationship with them…. But if you ever treated them badly or they have 
course to feel that you cheated them then when they go they say good-by to you; 
they don‘t want to come back. When my wife died and I was not here, they 
organized the one-week celebration; I was in New York. When we brought the 
corpse they came to help with the funeral arrangement. There are two boys in 
Accra…they came to Kumasi to help us with the funerals …. In a way it is also 
good because you don‘t have to be paying them when they are not working. Of 
course it is linked to productivity (African Dream). 
 
Trust is necessary in enabling the in-house producers to manage their relationship with 
the artisan subcontractor, yet it is not enough to sustain their continuous stay in-house. 
The economic circumstances of these artisan subcontractors and the fact that they are 
highly mobile occupationally make it imperative that the producers secure enough and 
frequent orders to engage them on a regular basis least they lose them to their competitors. 
One producer who specializes in good quality home décor products for the niche markets 
in Italy and at the same time produces for volume US buyers indicated that his motivation 
for securing high volume orders was to ensure that he keeps his workers busy: 
 
The Marmaxx order is just to keep the system busy, pay my bills, pay the staff 
and keep the workers occupied. If you don‘t keep the workers occupied and 
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there is an order somewhere they would leave and it is difficult to get them back. 
So the Marmaxx orders, Cost-plus orders, the ―mass‖ orders are just to keep the 
system busy (Kottage Originals).       
 
 
6.2.3 Multiple Producer-Buyer Relations 
The in-house producers maintain multiple trade relationships with buyers including large 
wholesale and retail buyers, especially from the US, and smaller quantity or niche buyers 
from both US and Europe. A marketing brochure obtained from a one leading exporter 
showed that this producer had had business interactions with ten big volume buyers from 
North America and eleven other small buyers from seven other countries outside North 
America. The type of buyer, either small or large influences the quality of interactions 
between the buyers and the exporters and to some extent the decision to produce in-house 
or to subcontract. The detailed discussion of the trade relationship and the benefits therein 
between the craft producers and the different type of buyers would be turned to in section 
6.2.4. It must be indicated, however, that the competition for the craft products dominated 
by the big buyers is stiff and it is this particular segment of the market that the local 
competitors as well as the Asians have succeeded in copying the designs thereby 
depressing prices and profit margins. Conversely, and as should be expected, the 
competition for the good quality craft products, which are predominantly patronized by 
the small niche international buyers attracts higher prices and entry barriers are relatively 
high. However, whilst the small international niche buyers offer premium prices, the 
frequency of export orders from this source is low as compared to orders from high 
volume international buyers who visit Ghana at least twice every year. One producer, 
African Dreams, made a comparison between their responses to the different market 
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segments within the current competitive environment within which they operate and the 
survival responses of some University lecturers during the economic crisis that hit Ghana 
in the 1980s; 
 
When Ghana was going through difficult times in the 80s, a lecturer friend from 
UST [University of Science and Technology] had this to say; in fact in the 80s 
you could find a lecturer who would come to Tech junction to pick passengers 
to town with his Benz and charge them some fees. So what he said was that you 
may need that Benz that would give you the comfort and also you can take one 
or two passengers and charge a few cedis or run some car hiring service with it 
and that one is exclusive and it is not for anybody. You can be sure not many 
people would come and hire your Benz so you must have a Trotro (mini-buses 
for mass transit) also which would be working everyday and would bring you 
the small, small pesewas and the Benz would bring the big money.  
 
According to this respondent the lecturer was in effect: illustrating the point that 
when you go out into the working world you need to identify products that you 
can mass produce, it is good to maintain that kind of market; high volume, low 
margin which you usually have the capacity to produce and brings in a dollar or 
50cents. And then you can have the exclusive products or the niche market 
where you sell smaller quantities but for higher price. They all have their 
advantages. When the small buyer has not brought an order and the big buyer 
brings you some, you know you can get something. If you are able to organize 
yourself well you will be able to make something from the different markets; 
that is the way things are in this industry.  
 
This researcher could count 12
12
 of these exporters who have developed the capacity to 
meet these diverse market segments. Apart from emphasizing the different market 
segments that the exporters target (diversification), the above quotation also buttresses 
the bipolar contractual strategy that is deployed by some of the Ghanaian craft producers 
to meet the demands of the different segments of the export market. Trading with 
multiple buyers puts the exporters in an advantageous position in that it to some extent 
insulates them against the volatile and unpredictable demand changes in the export 
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Africa, African Dreams (1993), Kottage Originals(1999), Lorenpee African Version, Wild Gecko(1993), 
All-round Marketing 
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market and also minimizes the effects of buyer switch, which are characteristic of 
especially the large international buyers who sometimes decide to stop sourcing from a 
particular country or a firm overnight.  
 
6.2.4 Impersonal and Informal Relationships with Buyers 
The relationship between the exporters and the different buyers are constructed 
differently. Most of the exporters interviewed, describe their business relationship with 
their volume US buyers as formal and that with the small international buyers as informal.   
 
The formal relationship is very much akin to market relationship where there is very little 
inter-personal interaction between the producers and the big international buyers. There is 
very little qualitative information flow between the producers and the big international 
buyers:  
 
The other thing I would say about working with the small and the big buyers is, 
the small buyers tend to have a more personal relationship and more informal. 
The small buyers can travel all the way to my shop; they come to me in Kumasi, 
they know my family. I have a whole room dedicated to one of my buyers. The 
relationship is more informal but with the big buyers it is so formal. As I talk 
now, I have never spoken to the buyer of Pier 1; we had neither met nor shaken 
hands. The first order that I did for them; it was a product somebody picked 
from me and presented at their show. They work more through their agency and 
it is the agency who deals with us. But with the small buyers, they come with 
their agents to Kumasi to visit and spend 2-3 days with us, we do product 
development, they come with their concepts I make my input, they leave a list 
of things they want me to design and then they go, I do the samples and send to 
them, which is not what often happens with the big buyers. So it is like on-site 
product development and adaptation. The producer benefits because eventually 
you get to know exactly what the buyer needs. It is also very motivational 
because you get to see how committed they are to what they are doing....what 
helps to maintain the quality is the fact that I maintain good contacts with the 
buyers. They feed us with information on what has happened to our products. 
  
 
207 
For instance, if the products get there and there is a major problem they take 
pictures of them and send them to me. So it helps me to know what problems 
were they. Those kinds of feedbacks we receive from the buyers have always 
helped me to be quality conscious. 
 
The lack of collaborative interaction between the producers and the buyers is in part 
attributed to the deliberate attempts by the export agents to frustrate direct interaction 
between the producers and the international buyers. The other reason is that the buyers 
cannot just trust many of the individual producers to deliver on contract terms, either 
because they do not have the capacity to deliver on quantity and quality or there is the 
high propensity for the producers to behave opportunistically if not monitored by an 
external agent. These generally conform to the long held view of the untrustworthiness of 
African producers and the lack of professionalism as constraints to building collaborative 
relationships with international buyers. Let us consider the response of the owner of 
Delata enterprise to this question that was posed to him: You said some of the 
international buyers like Bamboula and Swahili have been doing business with you for 
13years and 15 years, so what has kept your relationship with them for such a long time? 
 
First of all it is trust and professionalism. Because they see us Africans as 
people who don‘t know how to do business, we are not honest, we cut 
corners. But by my background I am open and transparent. We have that 
relationship based on transparency and we try to do our best. The Americans 
for example they want results. So it is trust and transparency. And 
communication is very key, even if there is a bad situation they want to 
know (Delata enterprise, 2007). 
 
The observation by this respondent on one hand, confirms the general perception that 
―weak-ties‖ (Granovetter, 1983) have failed to develop between African entrepreneurs 
and foreign buyers because of dishonesty. On the other hand, it also shows that 
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investment in trust building and a good professional attitude towards work could strength 
collaborative trade relations between the local suppliers and international buyers.  
 
Contrary to the earlier observation about the impersonal relationship that exists between 
the volume buyers and the exporters, the evidence also shows that some of the in-house 
producers with internal production facilities and the capacity to undertake some logistical 
or shipping arrangements do engage in business transactions directly with the volume 
international buyers and benefit from market information sharing:  
 
So at least the big people we go to dinner with the buyers and then we ask them 
the problems they face with our products whether they are in competition with 
[other big buyers] (L‘afrique concept).   
 
The relationship with a UK buyer; Alexander Rose and the local manufacturer of high 
quality furniture for export also exemplifies an intensive collaborative interaction 
between a large foreign buyer and a local producer. Through the technical assistance that 
the producer receives from the buyer, it has been able to upgrade its furniture production 
to a world class standard. This qualitative relationship is captured in this quote: 
 
Alexander Rose provides us with a lot of technical support in terms of 
design, in terms of how or what material should be used. At the same time 
they assist by bringing down an expatriate staffs who are responsible for the 
quality control. Most of the time our production managers are outsiders; 
expatriates and that together with the local staffs creates awareness about 
different dimensions of product quality…they have trained our people and 
the training is very important…at times they bring people down to come and 
tell them what exactly should be done…so that has been the strategy that 
enable us to achieve that high quality and they continue to give us a lot of 
feedback, especially, from the various shops and also what  their 
competitors are doing(Official of Scanstyle Limited). 
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It ought to be indicated that the craft exporters with the performance records, good 
reputations in terms of organizing production to meet buyers‘ quality standards, quantity, 
and timelines, all fall into the category of (quasi)integrated producers. They are also 
among the few exporters capable of participating in expensive international buyers‘ fairs 
which in itself is a test of their capability as exporters to diligently meet buyer 
requirements. This clearly shows that possessing production capability is not only an 
important prerequisite for attracting foreign buyers but also for engendering collaborative 
trade interaction between the local producers and the international buyers. These are 
clearly the advantages of size, which in this study is largely related to the extent of 
investments that have been made in physical production infrastructure and human 
development. These firms, though relatively young with the oldest in the sample 
established two decades ago, have accumulated a reasonable amount of physical 
production infrastructure to boost their production capacities. None of these firms in the 
study sample were in existence prior to the implementation of trade liberalization and 
SAP policies in the early 1980s. The oldest among them was established in 1987 and the 
youngest in 2000. At the birth of their establishments they operated as export vendors 
who relied heavily on the rudimentary production capacities of artisan subcontractors to 
execute their export orders. In effect, the ability to build performance enhancing ties with 
external agents is a function of the economic characteristics of the in-house producers.   
 
The trade transaction between the producers and the international small buyers is 
described by the producers as a family affair and very informal. The products type 
involved in this form of business interaction as one producer puts it: are complex and 
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beautiful… [and] I keep those products for the small buyers who pay something 
additional for them and order small quantities. The complexity of the product 
development requires some level of inter-personal relationship for information sharing 
between the trading partners. The small buyers provide the producers with market 
information relevant to product development and design; this information is provided by 
the small buyers without any financial cost to the producers. These buyers occasionally 
send their consultants down to directly get involved in developing new products with the 
producers. The information they provide to the exporters are sometimes more specific to 
the product standards of the individual buyers. Regardless of the fact that the buyers 
make some investments in the transactions and the product designs are tailored to their 
needs, the exporters are in this case not locked into exclusive relationship with the buyers. 
This could be attributed in part to the fact that the investment the buyers make in the 
product design and development process are not substantial enough to warrant such a 
relationship. These exporters do have good business reputations and therefore the buyers 
can trust them to deliver without necessarily having to lock them into exclusive 
relationships to increase monitoring and supervision.  But should the exporters benefit 
from huge and specific investment from the buyers dependent relationship is inevitable, 
which is in keeping with the predictions of the transaction cost theory. Let us again 
consider the relationship between Alexander Rose and the Ghanaian furniture 
manufacturer (though not in the usual category of craft production) where the former 
makes substantial investments in the product design and development process of the latter: 
We have CNC machines, which can be used for any type of design. We have 
the professionals who can handle them so any type of product we can design. 
In terms of adapting to anything with the help of our technical team in the 
UK is not much of a difficulty.... (Official of Scanstyle) 
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Noting the multi-purpose technology that is possessed by the company and the flexibility 
that comes with it in terms of adapting to different tastes and preferences this researcher 
further asked if the company has any other clients that they supply their products to apart 
from Alexander Rose. This was the answer given by the respondent: 
 
We started; now we have lots of buyers in Ghana and Nigeria…when we 
started selling to the Nigerians the buyer was scared that maybe the people 
would come and buy and then re-export to Europe. It is like a marriage of 
convenience.  
 
So who pays for the technical support that is provided by Alexander Rose? 
(Interviewer) 
 
It is a relationship that they try to help us. All the designs come from them. 
So if for instance I want to sell to another buyer I have to seek permission 
from them that this gentleman wants to buy so and so and they would look 
at it and say well…It is not colonization but it is a marriage of convenience.      
 
Though the respondent wouldn‘t openly accept the locked-in relationship with the buyer, 
the statement that ―it is not colonization but it is a marriage of convenience‖ implicitly 
suggests that such is the case.   
 
It is worth noting that not every buyer is interested in exclusive relationships with the 
suppliers given the seasonal nature of export market demand, which dictates that partners 
maintain flexible relationships with each other. The lack of preparedness by the buyers to 
enter into exclusive trade relations with the exporters is in part due to the volatility of the 
export market within which they operate; tastes and preferences are always in state of 
flux. An exporter pointed out that the buyers are not interested in exclusive relationships 
and the reason in his opinion is that:   
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…..these are seasonal items, these are trendy items, they change so nobody 
wants to put all his money in a product and keep repeating the same product, 
they want to change…. every buyer wants exclusivity, it is only that they don‘t 
want to buy your entire production because they are not sure whether it would 
sell or not. So the middle or the midway situation is that if you are that 
experienced what you do is that you develop some colours, you develop styles 
and indeed every importer that we deal with has got the product forecast for 
trends and we keep receiving on very regular basis all these information from 
the buyers. In fact the trend for next year…they supply the information free of 
charge. ….. For example, Cost-Plus will come and say this year our theme is 
ethnic India and then they would bring some designs or some patterns. So you 
take a cue from the trends or the design concepts and then you try and then find 
local colours that would compare favourably. 
 
The trade relationships between the ―in-house‖ exporters and the international buyers 
take two forms—they are either market-like or network-like or both. The relationship 
between some of the in-house exporters and, especially, large American volume buyers 
are impersonal or market-like and lacks one-on-one trade interactions. The interaction 
between the exporters and the small-scale international retailers is network-like because 
there is the qualitative flow of market information, and light touch support for product 
development, that are achieved through informal or trust-based trade relationship.  
 
Noting that the exporters maintain multiple clients, the question that arises is how the 
producers/exporters are able to meet the idiosyncratic product standards and 
specifications of their different clients. This raises the question of the capacity of the 
supply base to flexibly adapt to the different needs of the buyers. It is an issue that 
borders on the alignment of the design and production capacity of the exporters or 
producers to the requirements of the buyers. The initial product design is always done by 
the producers and once a buyer expresses interest in a product sample, it is then adapted 
to the buyer‘s specification. Product adaptation is considered to be a normal practice in 
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the industry. Most of the firms, it is observed, are able to cope, especially, those who 
have control over production; … there are certain technical implications …so you would 
have to understand all these and convince the buyer with your experience or know-how 
(interviewee).  The product adaptation is always undertaken in tandem with the buyers, 
agents or consultants appointed by the buyers. The product adaptation process enables the 
producers to adjust their product designs to the standards and specifications of the buyers: 
 
The issue about adaptation is normal with our industry…. for example if a buyer 
comes to me and wants to buy a Fritete brand; the buyer would start by selecting 
a number of items. They may not have the same finishing or colour and the 
buyer would say can you then give me all these as a collection in the same 
colour or product finishing; it is product adaptation. Now the buyer can equally 
select a lot of items and say for packaging reasons I want all these to be one size 
and price. It is a form of product adaptation. Now once you do it once, twice 
with buyers A and B, the next buyer who comes, you even go ahead to sell. 
These are some of the trade secrets that we have. Once you meet the buyer you 
have to assure the buyer that that is an added plus with your ability to adapt to 
the buyers need or specification (Interview with Fritete, 2007).  
 
Though recent trends suggest relative increase in the complexity of craft products 
demanded by buyers and some exporters have responded by employing the use of 
intermediate equipment or machines, however, the craft products of the exporters largely 
remain traditional and greater part of the production process relies on the skilful hands of 
the artisans. The shift from traditionalism is not enormous to present greater 
technological and capacity challenges to the producers. As indicated earlier, the 
investments by the buyers in the relationship are not huge enough to call for rigid 
dependent relations. Hence the ability of the producers to adapt their product 
development process to the different client needs. It is yet to be seen if the producers can 
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continue to demonstrate the same capacity flexibility to meet the demand for complex 
and higher value products at the upper end of the export market.     
 
6.3 Integrating Buyer linkages, Shipping and Export Processing Functions 
The export agents as discussed in the previous chapter play very significant roles in 
export processing and shipping arrangements for most of the craft exporters. Besides 
internalizing actual production functions, the ―in-house‖ producers are also developing 
the capacity to undertake their own shipping and other logistical arrangements without 
having to rely overly on the local export agents thus eliminating the constraints that the 
local export intermediaries place on them, in terms of the wedge they create between 
them and the buyers as well as the commission fees they would have to pay to the export 
agents. Their well organised in-house production capabilities and their history of 
successful execution of export orders make them more attractive to the buyers. The 
buyers do have confidence in them to deliver on contract terms. For a buyer to agree to 
do business directly with an exporter in an  uncertain setting as it is the case with the 
Ghanaian craft industry, the buyers need to be convinced that the producer do have the 
required capability to deliver according to the order specifications. A local representative 
of a US agent (buyer AMC) emphasized the importance of building internal production 
capabilities as one of the prerequisites for developing a direct interaction with the buyers; 
short of this the roles of the export agents are regarded indispensable in linking the 
exporters to international buyers: 
Cutting off the agent is not possible unless you are very well organised, unless 
you are very good and even the big ones are themselves […] then you are 
talking about somebody who has a huge place and carves everything, have in-
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house craftspeople, they carve everything there and produce there and therefore 
if a buyer comes, the buyer would want to see this person and see if he can get a 
variety of items from this person (Interview with Getrade, 2007) 
 
 
The risks of also encroaching on the core area of activities of the international agents are 
high for exporters seeking to deal directly with international buyers unless again they do 
possess enormous resources to enable them to participate in international fairs in a bid to 
attract their own buyers; an exercise which is too expensive for the majority of the 
exporters interviewed. An exporter who attempted to bypass the US agent, AMC, and 
deal directly with a buyer recounted her experience as follows: 
 
That is one of the reasons why we didn‘t do Target orders. I am giving you an 
example; Target came through AMC and then Getrade. That time we were 
shipping directly to Peter [the buyer]. So that is the disadvantage of dealing 
directly with the buyer. If you don‘t go through the agent, if another buyer is 
coming you can‘t exhibit for that buyer. So that is also some of the advantage of 
coming back through AMC. With AMC, if another buyer is coming they ask 
you do you have this stock or that. So they bring the buyers. AMC brings the 
buyers. 
 
When this exporter was pressed further to explain her decision to return to do 
business with AMC, the cost involved in the distribution of her wares abroad was 
also given as her reasons: 
  
That is what I was saying. If any buyer is coming you don‘t get the opportunity 
and also the expenses involved were too much. Sometimes it takes about a 
month for the goods to get to the buyers‘ country and whenever it gets there we 
have to go there and look for a warehouse, unload the goods and then call their 
transport manager who would then come and take the products to the 
distribution centres. The expenses on the plane ticket and the hotel bills were 
too much and the buyer too was not willing to pay more. So in the end we don‘t 
benefit much.  
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Another exporter (Lorenpee) corroborated the difficulty and the expensive nature  of 
attending international exhibitions, carrying out one‘s own export processing and 
shipping functions; reinforcing the importance of the role of the export agents: 
 
In those days I used to travel a lot. The problem with travelling abroad is 
that it makes it difficult for you to concentrate on production. I have 
attended a lot of international exhibitions but they are very expensive. It 
means that the little profit I get from this work, I would have to use it to buy 
plane ticket, book hotel rooms, in-country transportation expenses, pay for 
exhibition stands etc. At the end of the day all my profit would have gone 
into exhibition. So if I travel abroad and fail to get orders it means all my 
effort here would have come to naught.  
 
 
The respondent went further to suggest ways of making the relationship between the 
export agents and the exporters more effective. He stressed the need for trust building as 
necessary precondition for bringing about specialization between the exporters and the 
agents: 
The agents play important role in this regard. But what they needed to do is 
to make their functions effective. First, they have to facilitate one-on-one 
interaction between the exporters and the buyers. There are other areas that 
we would still need the agents; shipping, how to get cargo containers, 
loading and paper work. Are you going to combine actual production with 
these functions? Think about it and if you give to the agent is he going to do 
it the way you want it? It is a matter of trust. You trust that the agent for 
instance understand its role. We don‘t seem to understand specialization. 
Because at the end of the day I have to procure wood from the village, 
supervise production and undertake shipping activities. No! That is hectic. I 
have tried it and it is not wise to do that. 
  
As discussed in the previous section, the individual export vendors do not have the 
volumes to enable them to ship their finished products at competitive transport cost. 
Through the consolidation of orders from the individual exporters, the export agents are 
able to achieve the volumes enough to ship at competitive transport cost. The craft 
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factories and workshops do possess reasonable capacity to execute order volumes larger 
than the other category of exporters; however, their orders are not large enough  to 
achieve economies of scale; they pay the same freight charges for the cargo container 
regardless of whether it is full or not. It is also common for these producers to team up 
and ship their goods together in situations where they produce for the same buyer.   
 
6.4 Inside-Contracting to gain control over the production process  
This section specifically discusses the motivating factors that influence the decision by 
some of the craft exporters to coordinate production activities in-house, instead of 
contracting out entire orders to external subcontractors. It is a direct response to 
overcoming uncertainties surrounding the coordination of production locally and to 
reduce export risks associated with non-compliance with buyers‘ quality requirements. 
The craft exporters operate in an environment characterized by high transaction costs. 
These costs and risks provide the catalyst for those exporters who can afford to partially 
internalize production activities in-house to increase control over the production process 
in their quest to minimize those risks.  
 
The statement below by an exporter who organizes production at her premises identified 
the need to control product quality and also to meet delivery deadlines as the motivations 
for organizing production within her production premises. According to this exporter 
relying on independent artisans operating outside her production premises could lead to 
delays and poor quality products due to the difficulty of monitoring the artisan 
subcontractors who may take orders from other exporters without recourse to their ability 
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to meet product standards and volumes within the specified delivery timelines. When she 
was asked whether she would prefer to subcontract production orders to outside artisans, 
her response was: 
No! We don‘t subcontract much because of our quality. You won‘t be there to 
check…. If you don‘t use your ―workers‖ and you go and use ―outside workers‖; 
they take money from everywhere. They won‘t do your work. If somebody 
comes and the person gives…you know these carvers are not many and these 
orders that come in are huge orders. So it is the same people that everyone is 
chasing. So if you don‘t bring them in-house they won‘t do your work. They 
would do small of yours, they would get money from another person…this 
business too we have time, we have deadlines to meet. That is why we prefer 
them here and then make sure they do quality work (L‘afrique Concept). 
 
Lorenpee enterprise employs about 25 artisans on a piece rate basis and they are 
recruited to work from the firm‘s workshop whenever there are orders to be executed. 
The owner claimed that keeping the workers on the production site helps him to 
physically monitor the work in order to improve on the quality of his products, 
something that is difficult to achieve when the workers are producing from faraway 
places.  He believes that the improvement in his product quality over the years is as a 
result of his strict supervision within his production workshop.  He had this to say: 
―what accounts for the better quality is the supervision and also being strict and don‘t 
let go certain things such as playing with the work. I am strict and if you play with the 
job I fire you. I don‘t accept ―I beg you‖ neither do I accept excuses otherwise I won‘t 
achieve the quality that I want‖. In the course of the interview in his office, the 
interviewee requested that he be excused and asked this researcher to join him in his 
workshop to continue the interview there; apparently he realized that his workers 
have been left in the workshop unsupervised and that could compromise his product 
quality. The interview continued but this time in his workshop: 
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When you came I was at the workshop, when I left here for few minutes you 
see how everything has slowed down. That is the nature of this work. So 
most of the time if you keep most of them at a place where you don‘t have 
direct supervision, expect that if you get 10pieces, 5 of them would be 
faulty…that is the attitude of the ordinary Ghanaian. It is Ghanaian 
character…there are few places that you would go, especially in the private 
sector that,… the government sector is even worse; when the boss is not 
there the staff adopts lackadaisical attitudes, lack of seriousness, lay their 
heads on a table and take a nap or be reading newspapers when he is 
suppose to work. I don‘t often subcontract orders. I don‘t often get charge-
backs, which I think is the result of my strict supervision.     
 
A Kumasi-based in-house exporter, Katalvic industry, also indicated the need to 
control product quality and minimize supervision cost as the reasons for not 
subcontracting orders to artisan subcontractors even though his factory is spatially 
proximate to the craft villages and that supervision could be less of a difficulty. When 
the manager of Katalvic industry was asked to explain the decision to organise 
production activities on-site instead of subcontracting to the artisans in the villages 
his response was as follows: 
 
It comes down to quality aspect of the production. When you have the 
carvers on-site, you are able to check the quality and they also work. 
Because being at the factory or on-site, distractions are also a bit less. At 
first we used to go to the villages to execute orders.  Most of the time you 
realize that there may be one order in which the sample could be produced 
only by an Ahwiaa artisan, another sample only by Foase artisan and the 
other only by an Aburi artisan. This means that I had to recruit three 
supervisors to check on the quality of work and progress.  
 
This respondent went further to attribute the motivation for production in-house to the 
need to gain control over the labour process in order to reduce supervision cost: 
It was much more costly to monitor. But if the artisan is on site or factory, I 
can always check everything to ensure that they produce according to 
specification of the sample. The problem has to do with supervision. 
Sometimes when they produce from the villages, they get drunk and sleep 
instead of executing the orders and give a lot of excuses such as I am sick, I 
  
 
220 
attended a funeral etc. But when you have them on-site you are able to have 
some control. I have developed something like a gang; consisting of a 
master and he would have about 10 members under him. When the order 
comes I take the sample, give it to the master and negotiate the price with 
him and then come into an agreement that I need 500 pieces of this can you 
do it for me. So he picks it and then sublet it to the others. The master 
artisan brings the carvers to the site otherwise; it is sometimes difficult to 
control them.  
 
Similarly, some of the export vendors who contract out greater part of their 
production to subcontractors and do not yet organize greater production function in-
house also expressed the preference for investing in in-house production facilities. 
The appropriateness of in-house production, according to these exporters, arises from 
the uncertainties that surround the execution of orders by subcontracted artisans and 
craftspeople. Often the failure or delays in executing export orders also results from a 
situation where the artisan subcontractors add onto orders
13
 from other clients without 
full appreciation of their limited capability to execute such orders in time; they often 
bite off more than they can chew. As indicated by the exporters, it is difficult to 
control these subcontractors and the cost of monitoring them in faraway places is very 
high:  
Until recently, when we started experiencing the down-ward trend, and those 
with production facilities are gaining the upper hand; I personally didn‘t see the 
need to invest in permanent structures but now I think there is the need for 
people to control production. The need is that if you give your money out to a 
carver to execute an order for you, there is no guarantee that you would get the 
products. The cost of even chasing the person is even more than the eh eh eh eh.  
If it is in-house you buy the wood for the craftsmen and then negotiate the price 
of each piece with them and then take the price of the wood from their money. 
That one you are safe… in your premises you have control over him. Initially, 
there wasn‘t the need to have all those in-house things but now there is the need 
for it otherwise you won‘t be able to meet your target. They would delay it for 
                                                 
13
  The craftspeople, indeed, are not able to predict when the next order would be coming their way and so 
with the least opportunity they take on as many orders as possible without a good estimation of  their 
capabilities to execute all the orders within the specified delivery time.   
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you. Somebody can even collect your money and runaway with it (Celebate 
Services). 
 
I would very much like to carry out all my production activities in house instead 
of subcontracting to craftsmen at Kumasi and other places. The reason is that it 
would… increase my control or monitoring over them… monitoring is a big 
problem, because if you give your job to them and someone also give them an 
order, they can leave my work and attend to that person‘s order. But having my 
production site, help the process to move faster and quality can be achieved 
(Agyadu Creations).  
 
Not only does organization of production in-house enables the exporters to control 
product quality, it also allows the producers, within the context of high level of design 
imitation, to control their product designs from being copied by their competitors. 
This producer who specializes in the export of home décor for the niche market in 
Europe (Italy) and the domestic market had this to say:   
 
Actually these are designer pieces and production in-house is actually to 
regulate process and products. We don‘t want it to be copied. It is easier for me 
to work at my workshop because I can control the design. Some of the finishing, 
I do them myself and this is a way of controlling copying (Kottage Originals). 
 
Generally, quality control seems to be the predominant factor influencing the decision 
of those exporters that are integrating their production functions in-house whether it is 
about the production for the mass market or products for the premium market. The 
craft market has been shifting from basic craft products, once dominated by collectors, 
to product types patronized by a vast array of clients conscious of product standards 
and quality. Thus the use of machinery in some aspects of the production process to 
achieve consistency in product quality:  
 
In the past most of these items were used or consumed by people who were 
collectors. Today craft is not used or consumed by any special people. The 
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general public, the general consumers who go into the stores and buy decorative 
items, they are the ones who do buy and nobody has the time to buy a piece and 
go and rework it for it to stand.  It is my responsibility to make the product to fit 
the specification of the buyer (Interview with Fritete, 2007). 
 
The use of machines is regarded as unorthodox in Ghanaian craft production but their 
use is necessitated by the changes in the export market and more especially the quest 
to meet the changes in quality demands. The investment in machines in the 
production of crafts is specifically to help achieve consistency in product quality, 
reduce waste and enhance productivity, and to meet delivery deadlines.  The 
competitiveness of Ghanaian craft products has been derived from the cultural 
uniqueness of the African designs and the fact that they are hand-made. However, 
handcrafting alone is regarded inadequate. It is difficult to produce large volume 
orders with consistent product quality using simple hand-held tools. The acquisition 
of modern machinery is regarded by many of the exporters as a necessity to meet the 
new challenges facing them. The government of Ghana policy on the development of 
the craft industry recognizes the need to transform the industry from a cottage-based 
one to a modern industry based on the use modern machinery for mass production 
(GOG/PSI, 2005). The success of the Chinese and other Asian countries in craft 
export has been attributed in large part to their ability to mass produce high quality 
craft products at lower cost using modern machines (Konadu-Agyemang and Adanu, 
2003). The general preference for organizing production in-house and the use of 
modern machines in craft production stems from the urgency among the exporters to 
match competition from the Asian countries. The use of machinery in craft production, 
according the exporters, is a needed production requirement to meeting export market 
demand for consistent and high quality products. However, few of the exporters (craft 
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factories and workshops) have been able to acquire intermediate technology for mass 
production instead of relying on the simple tools of chisels and hammers. The quote 
below succinctly captures the justification for investment in machinery for craft 
production to control quality in mass production and also enhance efficiency.  
 
For machinery, once you get into large scale production, then you need to 
consider more important issues like quality control. There is no human-being 
who can produce thousand of these pieces and then turn them with chisel and at 
the end of the day put there and they would stand. …..machines increases 
productivity, it reduces waste and also allows you to meet deadlines. So the use 
of machinery in mass production or in export production is to ensure that the 
quality aspect; your target for quality you attain it… lots of production that I get 
outside from these premises; most of the things that I presented to my current 
Pier 1 importers, the importers have asked me to provide extra base because of 
standing problems …. The other important issue about this machinery thing is 
that most of the companies like Target etc when you go you find out that the 
items are displayed in planograms and these shelves have got specific 
measurements. When you involve mechanization, what it does is that now you 
control the sizes using machines (Interview with Treasures of Africa, 2007). 
 
 
6.5 The Challenges to Sustaining Inside-Contracting Arrangement 
Producing in-house has its own challenges. The main issues that emerged were the ability 
to continue to keep labour (i.e. artisans and craftspeople) who are contracted on flexible 
terms inside the production premises without losing them to competitors, the difficulty of 
continually securing export orders from buyers to justify the cost of building in-house 
production facilities, and the challenge to ensure that internalization does not whittle 
away product variety or range; something the vendors without much in-house production 
capacity are able to achieve by way of subcontracting production orders to their 
numerous subcontractors who have unique specialties.  
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The products mass produced by large in-house producers tend to compromise on the 
range and the variety that is often demanded by the buyers. The mass-produced craft 
products are relatively homogenous in terms of design and thus tend to lose out on 
uniqueness required by niche buyers; a feat that they are able to attain by sourcing their 
products from numerous subcontractors. 
 
The business is becoming more and more delicate. The solution is to have the 
craftspeople in-house but this also has got its own problems. The issue is that we 
export different range of products which we source from carvers with unique 
specialty and hardly can one get an individual carver to produce the entire product 
range….in-house (Celebate Services). 
 
 
Again to be able to sustain the organization of export production in-house requires 
more secure and frequent orders— extremely difficult to achieve in the volatile and 
demand-driven export market—to justify investments in fix assets:  
Also building ones internal capacity would be based on what I said earlier on that 
if you are sure that this buyer is going to come once or twice a year, you could do 
that. But what if you secure a production site, you have everything in place and 
the buyer doesn‘t come? What happens to that site? It comes at a cost. So initially 
everybody was trying to get a production site; almost everybody. We secured this 
site, we had a metal workshop, we had equipments, and we do have some 
equipment still in there; about 6years now, brand new things, which we have not 
used. There was a slump or a dip in the whole industry and now you don‘t want to 
commit, you don‘t want to invest into it. So you see these are some of the 
challenges (Interview with Delhouse, 2007). 
  
The successful in-house producers balance internalization of production functions with 
flexibility that is required to adjust to the export market. Even though the craftspeople 
and the artisans are brought in-house, they are engaged on a piece-rate basis and are not 
on payrolls of the exporters, enabling the exporters to adjust the size of labour to changes 
in export market demand. Despite the difficulty of labour control associated with the 
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piece-rate employment relationship, some of the in-house producers are able to extract 
some degree of loyalty from the artisans they have been working with over the years. 
Again some of the specialized producers who produce for the high end of the market 
claim to use ―mass‖ orders from volume buyers as bait to attract and keep experienced 
artisans.  
 
6.6 Performance of the Exporters 
One major shortcoming during the fieldwork was the inability to secure primary data on 
the profit margins of the craft exporters in order to be able to obtain a clear picture on the 
performance of the of the different categories of the craft exporters. However, a study 
done by Pageau (2004) reported on the differences in performance between exporters 
with the majority of the artisans working in-house and exporters who largely subcontract 
to craftspeople and artisans working off-site. Using the 2003 total export sales of six 
exporters in each category of exporters, the study concluded that the highest production 
rates were achieved among exporters possessing workshops equipped with proper 
equipment, storing rooms and majority of the artisans working within production 
premises of the exporters.  Conversely, the production rates of exporters, who subcontract 
greater part of their production orders to individual artisans and craftspeople; using 
mainly simple tools, tended to be lower. Generally, the extent to which the exporters 
address factors such as speed of production; product quality and organizational flexibility 
are often used as measures of success in the export market. How well the producers 
respond to these critical factors in many ways influences their profit margins. The tables 
below, adapted from Pageau/GTZ, illustrate the total export sales of exporters or 
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producers at the opposing ends of the scale. The total export sales for six in-house 
exporters in 2003 totaled US$ 1.1million
14
, which was more than a quarter of the total 
export sales of the whole industry. 
 
Table 2: Sale of Producers with Equipment and most Artisans On-site in 2003 (US$ ‗000) 
Producers Prod 23 Prod 17 Prod 27 Prod 24 Prod18 Prod22 Total 
Sales 158 240 355 60 301 30 1,144 
Source Pageau (2004) 
 
Table 3: Sale of Producers Subcontracting to Artisans working Off-site in 2003 (US$‘000) 
Producers Prod 11 Prod 10 Prod 28 Prod 3 Prod 26 Prod 15 Total 
Sales 8 6 50 7 6.2 6 77 
Source: Pageau (2004) 
 
Meanwhile, these six producer/exporters constitute just about 2-3percent of firms that are 
into craft export. On one hand, this analysis suggests a seeming concentration of export 
production in the industry. On the other hand, it gives an indication of the fact the in-
house producers with efficiency enhancing equipments and with most of their 
subcontractors working on-site; giving them control over the production process, are able 
to achieve higher production rates than vendors who operate within non-factory 
environment.  Notwithstanding these differences in the sales performance of the exporters, 
another way of looking at the issue of success in participating in the export market is the 
effect of participation on poverty reduction. The villages that are linked to the craft export 
industry tend to benefit from the employment that is generated through the subcontracting 
                                                 
14
 The total export sales for the whole industry was US$ 4.2 million in 2003 aftermath of 9/11; a sharp drop 
from US$14.9million in 2001. The crude estimate of producers in the craft export industry is considered to 
be between 200-300 producers.  
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relationships established with the artisans domiciled in these villages. The World Bank 
(2001, p41) reported that:  
 
…the income generation impact of the handicraft sector is considerable with 
artisan carvers being paid as much as a skilled machine operator in a factory. 
In the case of one firm which employs up to 100persons, wood carvers are 
paid US$70-US$200 per month. This is even more remarkable when one 
considers it is in a remote location served by dirt tracks and the owner is 
illiterate and non-English speaking.  
 
The narratives below are also the perceptual illustration of the influence of the craft 
export industry on the living conditions of artisans at the Foase craft village. In this sense, 
success in the export market is not judged in terms of firm-specific indicators such as 
output or total sales instead it is also assessed through the influence the industry has on 
the living conditions of the artisans. The small-scale subcontractors or artisans may not 
be growing in terms of their contribution to total output but their ability to secure export 
orders regularly may contribute to the improvement of their poverty situation. Through 
subcontracting relations the benefits of integration into the global market cascade down 
to these remote communities. The case below on one hand demonstrates the direct impact 
of export on improving the material conditions and raising the social status of the village 
folks of Foase. On the other hand, it reveals how viable source of demand could motivate 
the young rural dwellers to take up occupation in craft production. Jamison (2000) made 
a similar observation about how the availability of market could serve as the motivating 
factor in attracting individuals and communities who otherwise are uninterested in the 
craft production to take it up as an occupation: ―The perceived economic viability of the 
craft produced, i.e. whether a market is  believed to exist for such crafts and how regular 
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and predictable demand for these products are outside of Africa, are important 
considerations in motivating people to engage in these activities‖(p70). 
 
The Poverty effects of Craft Export on Foase Village    
Foase
15
 is one of the main craft villages where traders source craft products for exports. It 
is located about 10km from Kumasi; the second largest city and about 265km from Accra. 
Though the village is geographically remote, it is linked to Accra and beyond through the 
craft trade. This manifests itself in the form of subcontracting relationships that have 
developed since the 1980s between the artisan subcontractors operating from this village 
and the export traders, the majority of whom are domiciled in Accra. These trade linkages 
symbolize the integration of a rural community into international trade made possible 
through various personalized subcontracting relationships.  
 
Prior to 1987, there wasn‘t a huge commercial value for the artisans‘ products. Carving 
was practised as a means for obtaining income for daily survival. The teaching of carving 
as a subject in the village‘s ―continuation school‖ by one village teacher, Mr. Addai was 
not even enough to motivate the young rural folks to take up occupation in the industry in 
the 1970s. They did not see carving as viable occupation. Historical accounts traced the 
origin of the industry in the village as commercially viable export industry to the 1980s. 
It was during this period that the craftsmen began to get market for their products; first 
through the purchases made by foreign tourists who visited this village and second by 
small-scale buyers who bought small quantities of craft products and re-export to North 
America and Europe. The emergence of this market inspired the artisans to take the craft 
trade as a serious occupation. The expansion of craft activities during the early 1990s in 
the village corresponds to the entrance of more international retail and wholesale buyers 
into the Ghanaian craft industry.  
 
There are about 200 master craftspeople in the village who also engage hundreds of 
artisans to work for them. About 10percent of the total population (5000) of the village 
are associated with the industry in different ways. A respondent had this to say regarding 
the effects of the craft industry on the village‘s development: ―it is an occupation that has 
significantly contributed to the development of this village. We were mostly peasant 
farmers but the emergence of the craft business has…any young man you find in this 
village as well-to-do is a carver. Some of them through the industry have managed to 
build their own houses in Kumasi. It is all because of the craft business‖. This respondent 
went further to indicate how the industry also influences migration: ―if a person has a job 
to do, he hardly migrates. It really reduced emigration in this village. In fact, people were 
even coming from Kumasi to this village to learn the trade‖.  
 
                                                 
15
 Foase village was not mentioned in the available documented historical accounts of craft villages that 
surrounded Kumasi (see Johnson, 1979 and Browne, 1981b). It has no historical links with the Ashanti 
court crafts, suggesting that the village as a craft production site is more recent. 
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The experience of a local Baptist Pastor: This pastor is a key player in the craft industry 
in the village of Foase. His involvement in the industry dates back to 1984 when he 
returned from Nigeria in an unsuccessful attempt to seek greener pastures there. He came 
to settle in Foase in 1987 purposely to work as a wood carver and also to plant a church.  
He actively got involved in the craft business and fortunately for him in 1997 he secured 
a contract from Getrade to execute a large export orders; marking a significant entry into 
the export sector. This order, according to him enabled him to build his first house. He is 
not able to tell exactly how much the artisans working for him earn per contract because 
the order size keeps changing. However, he gave an example where in the previous year a 
carver earned about US$760 for an order he executed within two months. He claims that 
because some of the artisans, especially, the master craftsmen get orders from many 
sources, they could earn up to US$1,000 for a two-month period.     
 
The experience of a master craftsman: Christian Okyere is a well known master 
craftsman who until becoming a carver was a shoe-shine boy in Accra. The quest to see 
improvement in his standard of living failed to materialize as the days went by as a shoe-
shine boy. So he decided to change course and lacking formal education he saw an 
opportunity in the craft business as where he could get improvement in his standard of 
living. So in 1993 he went to Kumasi to start a new life as an apprentice trainee. Two 
years later he graduated and set-up his small firm in Foase through the help of ATAG. He 
began by producing and sending his products to Ghana‘s neighbour countries for sale but 
at the moment he produces for a number of export vendors in Accra and Kumasi as well 
as small-scale international buyers. In corroborating the Baptist pastor‘s claim about the 
poverty impact of the industry, Okyere indicated how the craft industry has helped him 
and his peers in the village: ―even though here is a village, most of the young guys have 
been able to buy plots of land and build 2-3 bedroom houses. But for the craft industry, it 
would have been very difficult for them to build. If you go to their rooms, you will see 
that they are well-furnished with modern electrical gadgets. Theft and robbery cases are 
uncommon in this village. I was a shoe-shine boy. I neither dreamt of buying bed 
mattress to sleep on nor did I ever imagine that I could buy car tyres, cement or iron 
rods…I have been able to build this house and I drive my own car. Whenever my 
extended family is in any difficulties they call on me to make contribution financially or 
materially, by my age I am not suppose to do so but through this trade I have been 
accorded that social status‖.        
 
 
6.7 Conclusion   
Chapter six discussed how some other exporters rely on inside-contracting arrangements 
to coordinate craft production for export. These exporters inside contract their export 
orders to contracted artisans to execute within the confines of their production premises. 
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The logic underlying this emerging trend towards inside-contracting is to minimize 
quality deficiencies, reduce monitoring and transaction costs, gain control over the labour 
process and flexibly respond to changes in export market demand. Another visible feature, 
apart from coordinating production in-house, is the multiplicity of relationships that the 
exporters maintain with different trading actors. They occasionally subcontract orders to 
external artisan subcontractors they have built trustful relationships with when they have 
large order volumes to execute. By maintaining informal relationships with small-scale 
international buyers (and to a limited extent with large American buyers) the exporters 
tend to benefit from export market information, product development and sometimes 
financial resources. The collaborative relations between the in-house exporters and the 
buyers, and the benefits derived the relations are clearly linked to the characteristics of 
the exporters who demonstrate professionalism in their work, educated and highly 
entrepreneurial, possess organizational flexibility and have invested in internal 
production capacity. There are, however, problems sustaining inside-contracting 
(building internal capacity) without a sustained export market demand. There is also the 
difficulty of getting the skilful artisans to stay in-house if the exporters cannot assure 
them of frequent orders. In the nutshell, the inside-contracting arrangement enables the 
exporters to have control (but less rigid) over the production process and at the same time 
enables them to flexibly adjust to fluctuations in export market demand.      
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                                             CHAPTER SEVEN  
                        SYNTHESIS: COMBINING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE                                          
 
7.1 Introduction 
The object of this study had been to explore how small-scale craft exporters coordinate 
their production and export activities to mitigate high transaction costs, address market 
failures, meet stringent demand requirements and succeed in the market. The dominant 
viewpoint in the new institutional economics literature is that institutions shape markets 
to work effectively. The argument goes that markets are prone to risks or the markets 
may fail to operate effectively in the absence of economic incentives and strong 
institutions. The conceptual framework in chapter two sought to capture the transaction-
cost-reducing perspectives of institutions and other market coordination mechanisms; and 
the conditions under which transaction costs and uncertainties could be reduced. 
Institutions help to minimize risks and correct market failures require institutions. Strong 
institutions and the associated enforcement mechanism provide stability to uncertain 
market transactions (North, 1990). Alternatively, in the absence of strong formal and 
informal institutional mechanisms to help minimize risks and enforce compliance with 
quality standards, agents internalize functions they otherwise exchange across firm‘s 
boundaries; to minimize uncertainty, save on transaction costs and to meet product 
quality standards (Coase 1937; Williamson, 1975). This study, which is situated within 
these theoretical perspectives, attempted to address the following questions: 
 What economic and environmental factors constrain the activities of the small-
scale exporters? 
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 What is the nature of the market and institutional arrangements utilized by the 
small-scale exporters and how sufficient are these arrangements in enabling the 
exporters to succeed or otherwise in dealing with the limitations placed on them 
by the uncertain local economic environment and export market forces? 
 
The craft export industry was used as a case for addressing these questions because of the 
moderate success of the small-scale exporters in entering the export market and the 
possibilities it offers for understanding how the small-scale exporters vertically 
coordinate their production activities in response to local constraints to production and 
new export markets requirements. The common understanding in the literature is that 
small firms in underdeveloped economies mostly rely on indigenous practices and 
relational arrangements in their trading transactions in the absence of effective state-
sponsored institutions that provide trade support services, but the gap that remains largely 
unresolved in our understanding is how such local market practices and institutional 
forms satisfactorily enable the small exporters to surmount constraints (both domestic and 
international) to productions as they seek to trade in distant markets where there exist 
different trading culture; emphasizing stricter adherence to contractual obligations 
(Bigsten et al. 1998).   
  
The general pattern evident in the presentation of the empirical data in chapters five and 
six is that the market in which the exporters operate is highly uncertain; opportunistic 
risks are high, local cultural attitudes and practices impede production, and the 
monitoring of independent artisan subcontractors in order to meet order requirements is 
difficult to achieve. It was demonstrated in the previous chapters how informal 
institutions, informal subcontracting relations and partial internalization of production 
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functions in order to overcome market failures and opportunism. Though helpful in 
minimizing market risks and also ensuring the flow of critical resources; these 
mechanisms remain largely weak in engendering effective market exchanges in an 
environment characterized by stark local market imperfections and enforcement 
difficulties. The reason for the adoption of inside contracting by some of the exporters 
(the relatively successful ones) in the industry is to better mitigate some of the limitations 
placed on them by the uncertain local economic/environmental circumstances and 
external market forces. Noting that most of the transactions of these exporters take place 
outside the formal regime, the adoption of the inside contracting system by the exporters 
also reinforces the weakness of informal subcontracting arrangements as effective tools 
for reducing opportunistic risks and dealing with other market failures.    
 
The discussion in this chapter is sub-divided into five sections. Following the 
introduction is section 7.2, which summarizes the main features of the uncertain and the 
risky micro-environment pertaining to the industry, a discussion follows in section 7.3 on 
the extent to which subcontractual arrangements and the underlying informal ties enable 
the exporters to reduce transaction costs and also ensure access to needed resources, 
section 7.4 contains the analysis of inside-contracting as a ―new‖ path to arranging 
production activities by some of the exporters to partly deal with the  high transaction 
costs and gain control over  the production process and how it relates to the literature. 
Section 7.5 concludes the chapter with a summary of the discussions in the previous 
sections.                                                                                                                                 
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7.2 The Local Market Imperfections: Much of the Same  
Underdeveloped societies and particularly markets in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
characterized as imperfect so are the institutions that shape these markets (McCormick 
and Pedersen, 1999; Fafchamps, 2004; Luiz, 2009). The market imperfections regarding 
the Ghanaian craft export industry are consistent with other observations of the workings 
of the markets on the African continent. These risks emanate from opportunistic behavior, 
unprofessional and cultural attitudes that are at variance with the demands of the end 
markets, the lack of the requisite skills and capacity more especially on the part of the 
independent small artisan subcontractors to meet the required buyer standards. Also 
imperfect monitoring and enforcement of informal contracts make it difficult to achieve 
compliance with buyers‘ standards and specifications. These factors together make the 
execution of orders extremely unpredictable. These specific areas of market 
imperfections are discussed below 
 
Opportunism in the industry mainly takes the form of small artisan subcontractors 
absconding with advance payments, using the money for other extra activities other than 
the intended purpose of executing the orders or using raw materials procured for them to 
execute the orders of other clients and stealing of product designs from their principal 
contractors. Even when the offending artisans are traceable, the exporters are less likely 
to use formal coercive measures to retrieve their monies for two main reasons. The 
competition for getting skilful artisans to execute one‘s order is intense and therefore the 
exporters do not want to antagonize their relationships with the artisans whom they may 
need to execute future orders. The size of the transactions is most of the time not large 
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enough to warrant the expensive legal process; reinforcing similar observation by 
Fafchamps (2001) that when the size of the transaction is small, economic agents are less 
likely to resort to the more expensive legal process of dispute resolution. Stories abound 
of the situation where some of the exporters allow sleeping dogs to lie in cases of deceit 
and shirking and reassign the orders of the offending party to another artisan 
subcontractor.      
 
Opportunism is not a problem in competitive market environment but in the view of 
Williamson (1975) it becomes more costly to the lead producers when they make 
significant investments in the production process and the behaviour of the contracting 
party cannot be determined ex post. The exporters take bank loans and wholly pre-finance 
export orders subcontracted to the artisans making deceit on the part of the artisan 
subcontractors more costly to the exporters. The modest increases in the volume of trade 
has consequently led to increase in working capital requirement for executing export 
orders but this has not necessarily translated into greater profit margins. This means that 
the exporters and even those who could afford to reassign order execution to other artisan 
subcontractors in the event of breach cannot continue to accommodate deceit. It was 
therefore not surprising that most of the exporters interviewed expressed the reluctance to 
externally subcontract export orders for fear of being cheated by artisan subcontractors. 
The institutional solution that Williamson would offer to the craft exporters to counteract 
the risk of opportunism is to internalize those transactions in-house; the discussion on this  
would be turned to later in the analysis of inside contracting in this chapter.    
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Besides opportunism, there are other factors that add to the uncertain environment of the 
craft industry. These risks stems from the interface between local trading practices, local 
capabilities and attitudes of the artisan subcontractors on one hand and buyer standards 
and product specifications on the other hand. The empirical data evince a pattern where 
there exists a significant discordant between the indigenous production capacity 
possessed by the local artisans and the ever changing buyer requirements. This capability 
gap was long recognized by Keesing and Lall (1992) as a major problem that bedevils 
many developing countries‘ firms seeking to enter the international market. The small-
scale suppliers from developing countries are often required to meet stringent export 
requirements, something they are generally unaccustomed to and also without the 
requisite internal capacity to enable them to meet those demands.  There are risks to bear 
when buyer specifications and standards are not complied with.               
 
The typical problem of lack of appropriate technical skills that face many developing 
countries‘ firms is not uncommon among the artisans who are hired by the exporters. The 
indigenous know-how gives the exporters some competitive edge in terms of churning 
out indigenous designs; however, the new demands for high quality functional products 
and competition from Asia pose new challenges to the Ghanaian craft exporters to adapt 
these indigenous designs to contemporary trends. The artisans who are hired by the 
exporters to execute their export orders are mostly uneducated and therefore face 
enormous difficulties adjusting to new product designs and buyer specifications. The 
production activities of the artisan subcontractors remain largely unstructured; executing 
orders without recourse to any time schedules or scientific method of organizing 
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production. The artisans rarely appreciate the urgency to produce to meet deadlines and 
in many occasions other social and cultural factors may obstruct the smooth execution of 
orders.  Working overtime or on weekends in order to be able to meet deadlines is not 
part of the culture of the artisans. Other domestic trading practices such as contractual 
flexibility accept delays as adaptive mechanism to dealing with the difficult and 
unpredictable local economic circumstances (Bigsten et al. 1998; Fafchamps, 1996) yet it 
is incongruous with the export markets, which require suppliers to meet stricter timelines.  
 
There are other market failures that pertain to artisans‘ training and product designs. The 
initial attraction of the sector had much to do with the indigenous designs, which are 
increasingly losing appeal in the export market. The design content has largely remained 
the same over the years and buyers are getting fed-up with the over-copied traditional 
designs. Buyers now demand functional products and not merely African decorative 
items. The shift in demand from simple traditional products to functional products brings 
to the fore the training of the artisans to keep up with the new demands or induce the 
potential actors in the industry with the skills to come out with new product designs. As 
indicated above the artisans neither possess the requisite training/capability nor do they 
have the relevant market information to enable them to design products that meet market 
trends.  The exporters who can afford to invest in artisans‘ training are unwilling to do so 
for fear of losing them to their competitors. The professional designers in the industry are 
also reluctant to come up with new product designs because of negative market 
externalities (i.e. excessive design copying). Like many other sectors of the Ghanaian 
economy, copyright laws are not strictly enforced. As evident in the empirical chapter, 
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the practice of using formal contracts as an institutional tool to curtail design copying and 
provide the incentive for undertaking productive activity such as investing effort and 
resources in product design is absent in the industry. Some of the designers were 
incidentally willing to enter into bilateral contractual agreements with exporters who are 
ready to compensate them financially for their effort.  
 
This analysis sets the stage or provides the micro-economic and institutional contexts for 
examining the extent to which the subcontractual arrangements and other informal 
mechanisms enable the small-scale exporters to deter opportunism, enforce compliance 
and to ensure the flow of critical resources for greater success in the export market.        
 
7.3 Are Informal Mechanisms and Subcontracting Relations Sufficient for Small-
Scale Enterprises to Succeed in the Export Market?   
 
The general thinking in the new institutional economics literature is that in the absence of 
perfect formal institutions that facilitate trade, informal institutions emerge to mitigate 
agency problems (Fafchamps, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Anderson, 2004) and facilitate the flow 
of critical resources. Studies by Ensminger (1996) and Greif (1993) are frequently cited 
(see Fafchamps, 2004; Dixit 2004) to buttress this theoretical claim.  Further empirical 
studies that are specific to the organization of trade in Sub-Saharan Africa also bring to 
the fore the significant role informal institutions play in enabling small African firms to 
transact business and get access to critical resources for productive activities in the midst 
of opportunism and high transaction costs (Fafchamps, 1996, 2001, 2004; Barr, 1998; 
Brautigam, 997). The extensive reliance on informal institutions by small-scale African 
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entrepreneurs and the effects they have on reducing transaction costs had led some 
authors to argue that they could successfully substitute for weak formal institutions in 
shaping market transactions (Brautigam, 1997). Noting that informal institutions play 
significant role in trade transactions in developing societies where market imperfections 
are pervasive and enforcement of informal contracts problematic, they lead us to question 
the efficacy of informal institutions in deterring deceit and overcome information 
problems as trade expands (North, 1991; Dixit, 2004). The argument goes that informal 
institutional arrangements could substitute for formal institutions in minimizing 
transaction cost and address market failures. This study recognizes the need for caution 
and questions the sufficiency of informal institutional arrangements to reduce transaction 
costs and address market failures as trade complexity increases. Based on the empirical 
evidence, one theme that emerged is that informal institutions and informal 
subcontracting relations may help small entrepreneurs to minimize agency problems, and 
also ensure the flow of resources for productive activities. How adequate are 
subcontractual and informal arrangements in enabling small-scale exporters to access 
critical resources and also mitigate market failures and opportunism as trade expands? 
Inter-personal trust is an important requisite for successful inter-firm relations but the 
absence of it constrains any meaningful trade relations between partners. The trade 
relationships the exporters establish with artisan subcontractors, trade intermediaries and 
buyers as played out in the areas of access to trade credit, market access, quality control 
and monitoring, product development/design and access to skilful labour or artisans are 
given attention in the next discussion.    
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7.3.1 Informal Arrangements and Access to Trade Credit by the Exporters 
The formal financial institutions are often reluctant to provide credit to small firms 
because of high transaction costs and the problem of information asymmetries (Stiglitz, 
1998). The formal financial institutions often lack the relevant information on prospective 
small-scale loan applicants to determine their credit worthiness and also encounter lots of 
difficulties monitoring them to ensure that the loans advanced to them are used 
productively for the intended purpose to ensure repayment (Stiglitz, 1990) against the 
backdrop that these small firms often lack movable collateral that can be used to service 
default.  
 
The informal credit arrangements between the bank, Prudential, and the exporters 
demonstrate a formal actor reaching out to small-scale actors who are often considered 
marginal to the formal sector and in doing so tend to rely on the available assets; 
intangible and informal mechanisms to which informal small-scale firms have in 
abundance to minimize the risk of default. In the event of repayment difficulties, the bank 
prefers to use mere threats of court actions to enforce repayment or may defer loan 
repayment subject to future export orders. Using the court system to recover relatively 
smaller loans is expensive, cumbersome and may also strain the relationship with the 
exporters to which the bank wants to preserve. This lends credence to the position that 
when formal enforcement institutions are weak, economic agents may rely on informal 
mechanism to enforce loan recovery. Also the informal nature of the loan agreement (i.e. 
the use of intangible assets instead of movable collateral) makes the use of courts 
untenable.      
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Besides this intangible safeguard that is embedded in the relationships with the various 
exporters operating under the export agents, the bank has also instituted another system in 
which the exporters contribute a certain percentage of their loan amount into an 
―insurance pool‖ to use as safeguard against possible defaults. Similarly, Morduch (1999) 
noted that the Grameen scheme mixes a peer monitoring system with partial collateral 
arrangements, which require borrowers to make contributions to a fund as insurance 
against default.  
 
While these informal mechanisms and semi-formal arrangements are utilized by the bank 
to mitigate risks and at the same time allow low-income actors to access formal trade 
credit, it is important not to overstretch its role in facilitating non-collateral trade credit in 
an environment of high risks. There is a limit to the size of loan can be sustained under 
this informal arrangement. Morduch (1999) in a review of a number of group lending 
schemes in some developing countries indicated that the range of the average loan size 
under the schemes is $70-$1000. In the case of the Ghanaian craft exporters, the 
maximum credit threshold tolerable under this non-collateral regime is US$ 10,000. Any 
amount above this figure requires the borrower to provide fixed assets as collateral. 
Because of the huge trade credit that the graduated craft factories, for instance, require to 
execute high volume orders, they often have to provide fixed assets as collateral. The 
laxity of the informal group arrangement makes it insufficient as insurance against huge 
trade credit that is needed by some of the exporters to meet greater export demands. Let 
us refresh our memory about the narrative in section 6.2 case 2: When the American 
buyer, Cost-Plus offered huge export orders to Fritete and its affiliated export vendors, 
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the bank was initially unwilling to grant the exporters the huge credits they requested to 
execute their orders. The bank demanded that they provide movable collateral that many 
of them did not possess. In this instance, Fritete had to use the reputation it had built with 
the bank over the years and some other informal arrangement to facilitate credit for the 
vendors.  Though the arrangement was successful in ensuring repayment, the bank later 
opted to enter into a formal contract directly with Fritete by making the company the 
foremost risk bearer. To the bank, it meant a reduction in both administrative cost and 
transaction cost (information asymmetries and monitoring cost) in dealing with large 
number of export vendors. The move by the bank to formalize the credit agreement with 
the exporter attests to the implicit apprehensiveness by the bank to rely on informal 
arrangements to safeguard sizeable trade credits.          
 
7.3.2 Informal Subcontracting and the potential for growth in the midst of market 
imperfections 
 
Trust as was discussed in the conceptual framework is an important ingredient that 
sustains subcontractual relations between independent partners even if the relationship 
entails specific investment.  As it was evident in both chapters 5 and 6, the exporters 
maintain complex relationships downstream with export agents, international buyers and 
upstream relationships with numerous artisan subcontractors. Based on the relationship 
that the exporters establish with these trading actors, they are able get access to the export 
market, develop new products, get access to artisanal labour, as well as quality 
management and export processing services. Another theme that is manifested in the 
empirical section 5.4 is that despite the advantages the exporters derive from the various 
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subcontracting relations with their trading partners, the potential for generating high order 
production functions for export is constrained by market failures and mistrust. In effect, 
private enforcement and provisioning, though holds promise for firms‘ success, but for 
externalities that stifle the incentive for achieving greater success and opportunism that 
makes reliance on inter-firm trade relation more costly. This theme is discussed at three 
levels of contractual relationships to include exporters—export intermediaries relations, 
exporter— artisan subcontractors relations and exporters—buyers relations. 
 
 7.3.2.1 The Relationship between Exporters and Buyers 
There are two categories of international buyers that trade with the exporters. They are 
large volume retailers/wholesalers and small quantity niche buyers. The large volume 
buyers indirectly deal with the numerous small-scale exporters through local 
intermediaries. The trade arrangement between the large volume buyers and the exporters 
remains largely arm‘s length. The wish of the numerous small-scale exporters is to have a 
more intensive relationship with the buyers by which they could benefit from relevant 
market information or direct skill transfer. Qualitative trade relations have failed to 
develop between the exporters and the buyers, especially, the volume buyers because of 
the long held view about African business people, and also confirmed, by this study as 
being untrustworthy and also lacking good professional attitudes towards work. The local 
exporters also lack direct communication channels with the buyers. The inability of the 
exporters to directly communicate with the buyers is in part a direct orchestration by the 
export intermediaries who obfuscate any direct contact between the local exporters and 
the buyers. Again the individual exporters do not have the capacity to produce the 
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volumes that are large enough to warrant the exclusive attention from the large 
international buyers. The impersonal interrelations between the buyers and the exporters 
entailing little exchange of market information and technical information between them 
suits the product types that are exchanged in the transaction between the volume buyers 
and the small-scale exporters. The bulk of the products that are exchanged in this 
relationship are the low-quality and low-price products for the low end of the market (see 
similar observation in Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994, p 23). The converse is the case for the 
relationship between the small quantity international buyers (e.g. the niche buyers and 
sometimes large volume buyers) and the local exporters. They mostly trade middle-
ranked quality products and the transaction takes place within personalized and trust-
based arrangements. This happens in the case of the exporters with in-house production 
capabilities and has proven records of producing relatively good quality products. Local 
market imperfections, difficulties of individual producers accessing relevant market 
information, enforcement difficulties and other capacity constraints currently make 
achieving high quality products through impersonal market transactions between buyers 
and producers an unlikely path. The role of buyers or other external intermediary agents 
with enormous capacity would be crucial in helping number of the local exporters to 
move up to the high end of the export market by building their production capacities (e.g. 
WATH established by USAID has been instrumental in providing market and technical 
aid to numerous small firms in West Africa to enable them to integrate into the Western 
Markets).  
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Risks of non-compliance comprise buyers‘ ―charge-backs‖ for supplying sub-standards 
products, financial penalty for late delivery and at worst a buyer switching completely 
from buying from a whole country or an exporter. Some of these measures, though 
punitive but effective, are employed by the large volume international retailers through 
their local agents to enforce compliance. The hierarchical relationship the large American 
buyers establish with the small exporters enables them to extract compliance through 
financial punishments. This is also because they generally operate in an impersonal or 
arm‘s length trade transactions with the small-scale Ghanaian craft exporters in which the 
motive is not to build informal trade relationship. However, some large buyers and small 
international buyers that engage in personalized transactions with the exporters use 
penalties but rarely. In a study to investigate whether there are differences among firms in 
selected countries in Africa regarding the use of financial penalty to enforce contractual 
obligation, it was concluded that large firms that operate in less personalized manner use 
penalties to enforce contracts (Fafchamps, 2004). However, Asian-owned firms in these 
countries that place importance on and invest specifically in trust building relationship 
rely on informal and intangible enforcement mechanisms to extract compliance. These 
evidences reinforce the theoretical claim that harsh sanctions though effective in ensuring 
compliance in market transactions, may be inimical in fostering personalized trading 
relationship, if the motive is to build such relationships.          
 
7.3.2.2 The Relationship between Exporters and Intermediary Agents  
The export intermediaries play important trade bridging function between the numerous 
local exporters and the international buyers. Fafchamps (2004) in a review of the role of 
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traders in economic activities criticized the extensive attention given to producers and 
consumers in economic theory to the neglect of traders. According to him traders are 
often treated as redundant actors and the trade intermediation function that they perform 
is implicitly assumed to be so trivial that individual producers and/or consumers can 
easily undertake it at no cost. They are also wrongly assumed to operate in a transparent 
manner: they are powerful and do not just pass prices and commodities without affecting 
them. The rise of trade intermediaries in the craft industry was a spontaneous 
development following the entrance of major international buyers into the Ghanaian 
market. When the international buyers first visited Ghana, they faced coordination 
challenges and information asymmetries in properly estimating the production 
capabilities of the small-scale artisans (Biggs et al.1994). Fafchamps (1996) in his survey 
in Ghana showed that the institutional response Ghanaian firms have found in responding 
to enforcement problems locally is to deal with handful of suppliers and clients they have 
established personal relationships with. He argued that this limits the economic reach of 
the Ghanaian firms and reduce the local market into fragmented networks of small firms 
with consequence of restricting specialization and firm growth. However, the existence of 
trade intermediaries forms an important link that has enabled Ghanaian firms to engage in 
cross-border trade sometimes in anonymous way. On one hand, they help the buyers to 
overcome local coordination bottlenecks and ensure that the local exporters comply with 
contractual obligations. On the other hand, they help to link the numerous small-scale 
producers to the international market through the various functions they offer to them. 
The activities of the intermediary agents manifest in the areas of monitoring of the small-
scale exporters to ensure compliance with buyer specifications and quality standards, 
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export processing services, financial intermediation and market linkages services. The 
small scale exporters receive these services through the subcontractual relationships 
existing between them and the intermediaries. In majority of cases, the exporters do not 
directly pay fees for the costs of these services but they are covered through the operating 
revenue margins of the intermediaries. In other cases the exporters are made to pay 
commissions but only deductible from the earnings of the exporters upon receipt of 
payments from buyers. Unlike many intermediaries, the small-scale exporters to do not 
have to make upfront payment of service user fees. This and the fact that the services are 
―embedded‖ in the subcontracting trading relationship increases the accessibility and the 
outreach of these services to the small-scale exporters. The intermediaries are motivated 
to provide these services because by helping the producers to meet product specifications 
and quality standards the consequence is that it could strengthen their relationship with 
the buyers with the greater prospect of securing export orders in the future. However, 
there are questions about the sustainability of the services offered through this 
arrangement; the intermediaries only offer these services when the secured orders by the 
exporters are coordinated through them. Also the services offered by the intermediaries 
are classified as low order services, which do not require huge private investments. 
Investment in high order services needed for greater success in the export is not popular 
with the agents.  One re-occurring theme in this study is the fact that economic agents in 
the industry are often discouraged to invest in productive activities for lack of economic 
incentives to do so. This is also the case with the trade intermediaries. They cannot be 
certain that if they invest in high order services that go to promote high quality products 
they can reap the benefits of their fruits because of the problem of free riding. There is 
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also no guarantee that the small-scale exporters would be able to pay commission fees 
upfront for such high order services; the traditional problem many small-scale enterprises 
face in accessing third party services in developing economies. It is therefore not 
surprising that high order services regarding product development and training of labour 
are viewed as ―public goods‖ by many of the actors in the industry and are considered to 
be outside the functional domain of the export intermediaries. The relationship between 
the exporters and the intermediaries is not a-moral; it is also characterized by double-
crossing and mistrust. The intermediary agents were often accused for withholding 
important buyer information from the exporters. Some officials of the intermediary 
agents ―unofficially‖ compete with the local exporters by also going into production and 
sometimes divert repeat orders from the buyers intended for the exporters to their 
underground production sites. The conclusion that we can draw from this analysis is that 
in the absence of effective third party public enforcement and service provision, we 
cannot be certain that third party private enforcement and service provision would be a 
good substitute, for their effectiveness could be stifled by market failures and 
imperfections.     
 
7.3.2.3 The relationship between Export Vendors and Artisan Subcontractors  
The relationship between the exporters and the artisans is reciprocal but the relationship 
is being undermined by mistrust and opportunistic behaviour. The exporters obtain 
product design samples from the indigenous artisan subcontractors and present at buyer 
fairs for export orders and the exporters in turn reciprocate this gesture by subcontracting 
the orders to the artisan subcontractors. The ingredient that glues this relationship 
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together is trust. If the exporter has any reason to believe that the artisan would behave 
opportunistically, shirk or has ever cheated, the exporter would not accept product 
samples from him for exhibition let alone to subcontract orders to him.  Likewise if the 
exporter has ever reneged on contract terms such as failing to honour full payments for 
previously executed orders, the artisan who possesses the indigenous skills may not give 
his product sample to the exporter to present in an exhibition nor would he work for him.  
 
The study also revealed a deep seated mistrust between the exporters and the artisans. We 
know that the success of relational contracting as a form of organizing industrial activities 
in Japan are preconditioned on high degree of trust and commitment among the 
transaction partners (Dore,1983). Opportunism as defined by Williamson (1975) is 
counter-productive to fostering reciprocal trade relations that is built on trust and 
commitment (Fafchamps, 2004). The lack of trust
16
 in the artisans to conform to 
specifications/standards and deceit means the exporters have to expend a lot more effort 
and resources to monitor the artisan subcontractors to ensure compliance if they choose to 
rely on arm‘s lengths subcontracting arrangements. In effect, the absence of trust implies 
increase in monitoring costs. The fluid relation between the exporters and the artisans 
makes it difficult for the exporters to control the artisans. The powerful position of the 
artisans in the relationship is connected to their possession of the unique artisanal skills. 
Though the exporters do maintain some fairly personalized relationship, this is not strong 
enough to avoid losing them to competitors. The artisans are highly mobile and therefore 
could easily migrate from one exporter to another depending on who offers them the 
highest bid. Sometimes they are ―poached‖ by exporters who could offer a higher bid or 
                                                 
16
 Untrustworthiness may also mean the lack of capacity to execute orders to meet the required standards. 
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provide them with relatively frequent orders. Entering into exclusive relationship with the 
artisan subcontractors could offer the exporters some level of control but this can be 
maintained if they can assure the artisans of a fairly regular orders. It is worth 
emphasizing that the export vendors depend on other agents for export orders themselves 
and do not have the marketing capacity to secure, or predict with certainty the frequency 
of, export orders. Levy et al. (1999) reported of a similar situation in the Jepara Furniture 
industry in Indonesia where the exporters were confronted with the challenge of gaining 
control over production in order to enforce quality standards. The successful Jeparan 
exporters responded to this challenge by shifting from loose contracting arrangements to 
exclusive subcontracting arrangements in which the subcontractors agreed to work for the 
lead exporter only in turn for an ongoing flow of orders.    
 
This subcontracting relationship between the Ghanaian exporters and their artisan 
subcontractors correlate with the type one subcontracting arrangement described by Mead 
(1984 see the theoretical discussion). Mead observed that in a market characterized by 
market imperfections and distrust, the arm‘s length subcontracting arrangement becomes 
the less likely candidate to foster the growth of firms for the reasons that there is little 
sharing of qualitative information and the general reluctance by principal firms to invest 
in the capability of the subcontractor producer. Mistrust generally characterizes the 
relationship because of the tendency of the artisan subcontractors to cheat. The 
complaints of subcontractor artisans running away with advance payments or using raw 
materials procured for them to execute other people‘s orders abound. The artisan 
subcontractors are neither in captive relationships with the exporters nor are there 
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channels or common platforms for communicating information about cheating 
subcontractors at the industry level. This makes informal sanction like the artisan 
subcontractors losing their future trading relationship, less of a deterrent for opportunistic 
behaviours. The power relationship also explains the lack of control over the artisan 
subcontractors as alluded to in this quotation: ―…from the exporters to artisans, the chain 
is broken…the artisans have more power than the export vendors‖ (refer to full quotation 
in section 5.4.6). These factors together with the limited production capacity and 
unskilled labour that pertains to the local markets make the deployment of subcontracting 
arrangement (as a tool for meeting new and exacting buyer requirements and 
specifications) less effective. In instances of imperfect enforcement mechanism and 
imperfect market support services, market exchange only takes rudimentary form.  
 
Though least suitable for growth under the existing microeconomic environment, the 
fluid subcontracting arrangements allow a number of people to earn incomes as 
subcontractors and producers. The artisan subcontractors and the craftspeople in the 
villages earn their livelihood through the arm‘s length subcontracting linkages but the 
robustness of such arrangements to meet new market demands and the ability to foster 
long-term growth is constrained by market imperfections; including opportunism and 
difficulties of enforcing informal contract, shirking, inappropriate local and cultural 
practices, weak production capacity, lack of incentives to induce the producer to invest in 
high order product development and training of labour. This lends support to other 
observations that subcontracting is less widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa because of the 
difficult microeconomic environment that is characterized by deep seated market failures 
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and imperfections (Biggs and Shah, 2006). This discussion also raises the question of 
why subcontracting in the Ghanaian craft export industry, even at its rudimentary stage, 
would be difficult to sustain as market coordination mechanism but sophisticated 
subcontracting arrangements thrive in Japan. The answer lies not just in the stability of 
the micro-economic environment but also the quality of institutions that support 
subcontracting arrangements in both the Ghanaian craft industry and in Japanese 
industries.  The Japanese example of relational contracting is noted to be built on trust 
and effective enforcement of informal contracts. Even where market abuse cannot be 
curtailed by such informal arrangements, it is backed up with the use of formal contracts 
to minimize abuse (Dore, 1983).  In the Ghanaian case, inter-personal relations play a 
role in the subcontracting relationship but less robust since informal contract enforcement 
is weak and the trading partners rarely use formal contracts to reduce abuse.  
 
To address some of these market imperfections some of the entrepreneurs adopt inside-
contracting system (sometimes mixed with external contracting) to gain control over the 
production process and address some of the domestic market imperfections. It is 
important to note that the inside-contracting regime is not an institutional response only 
to domestic market circumstances but also to external market forces. It is an institutional 
attempt to meet buyers‘ demand for quality and also to match the intense competition 
from the Asian countries. The next section looks at inside-contracting as practiced by 
some of the exporters, the forces shaping its adoption and how it relates to what we know 
in the literature.     
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7.4 Inside-Contracting and Enterprise Success under conditions of Market 
Imperfections 
 
The transaction cost theory offers fundamental perspectives to understanding alternative 
choices of contract mechanisms. The pioneering works of Coase (1937) and Williamson 
(1975) offer refreshing perspectives with regards to the circumstances under which 
economic activities may be organized by the entrepreneur-coordinator within the firm. 
Coase argued that the rationale for establishing a firm is that there are costs to using the 
price mechanisms, which may include the costs of negotiating, concluding and enforcing 
contracts and that by allowing some ―authority (‗an entrepreneur‘) to direct resources, 
certain marketing costs are saved‖(p392).  He particularly singled out uncertainty in the 
market as the major cause for the emergence of the firm; ―the question of uncertainty is 
one which is often considered to be relevant to the study…of the firm [and] it seems 
improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty‖ (p392). 
Williamson expanded on the Coase‘s work and elaborated on how opportunism and the 
limitation on human cognitive ability to foretell possible actions of transactions partners 
create the conditions for the rise of the firm. The difficulty of assembling the relevant 
market information during contract negotiation and execution coupled with imperfect 
enforcement increases the uncertainty in the market (see the discussion under theoretical 
chapter). Williamson like Coase posits that under such conditions and with transaction-
specific investments economic agents or the entrepreneur coordinator would seek to limit 
uncertainty and transaction costs by organizing production hierarchically within the firm 
with correspondingly limited role for subcontracting. In a commentary on Williamson, 
Levy (1991) indicated that societies differ in their propensity for opportunism, with 
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activities involving specific assets more likely to be organized within the firm in 
opportunism–prone societies. The proposition is therefore that transactions with 
substantial potential for post-contractual opportunism will be organized within the firm. 
This theoretical perspective provides a starting point for our interpretation of inside-
contracting.   
 
The inside-contracting system in the literature contradicts external subcontracting in that 
the entrepreneur-coordinator organizes production inside the firm but also less rigid than 
the typical vertical integrated firm. From evolutionary perspective, it is considered a 
transitory stage in the development of the firm finding its place somewhere along the 
continuum between the arm‘s length market exchanges and vertically integrated firm. 
The inside contracting arrangement, according to economic historians, outlived its 
usefulness by the early part of the 20
th 
century, though the forces that led to its emergence 
are of relevance to this study and it would be safe to state that the fitness of the inside 
contracting system to the Ghanaian craft industry is in part due to the traditional stage of 
the industry‘s development. Though inside contracting is an old system its development 
in the Ghanaian craft export industry is new. Recapitulating the factors that led to the 
emergence of inside contracting is worth noting.  These factors of change included: 
 Increase in demand for the product in question, made it difficult to fill orders 
using existing arrangement by the entrepreneur without additional capital and 
labour. The concurrent emergence of the principle of interchangeable technology 
and the availability of contractors ready to be hired to produce inside the 
entrepreneur‘s factory made mass production possible (Buttrick, 1952); 
 
 The weakness of the traditional subcontracting system to address difficulties 
pertaining to the economic environment provides the impetus for other production 
arrangements like inside contracting, which gave the entrepreneur some level of 
control over the production process. Some of these factors, which have been 
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discussed under the theoretical section and fleshed out in the empirical chapters, 
include issues bordering on control of labour, quality control and product flow 
and unstable work commitment on the part of subcontractor producers, which is 
partly linked to other activities such as subsistence farming and other local 
cultural practices. Under the traditional putting-out system, entrepreneur 
coordinators could not directly control the producers working in dispersed 
locations and operating as independent producers; supervision difficulties resulted 
in  poor quality, widespread theft, opportunism and delayed deliveries (Lazerson, 
1990).      
 
The case of the craft industry exemplifies modest increases in the volume of trade in 
recent times resulting from a boost in demand from large US buyers. The increase in 
demand and the accompanying new buyer requirements and specifications had had two 
implications on the organization of craft production for export. First, the existing 
rudimentary production arrangement via subcontracting as discussed above is proving to 
be inadequate in meeting new demands requirements bordering on quality standards, 
volumes and delivery times. Second, the modest increase in volume of trade means a 
corresponding increase in the size of transactions and the investments the exporters make 
in their export transactions. Failure to meet buyers‘ requirements carries the cost of 
paying ―charge-backs‖ in much the same way that making direct investments in the form 
of working capital or supply of inputs could be costly if trade partners renege on contract 
agreements.  
 
How can the entrepreneur-coordinator organize production and be certain that the 
finished products he/she sends to the buyer is of the right quantity, the right quality at the 
specified delivery time so as to avoid penalties or how can they ensure that 
subcontractors do not abscond with monies advanced to them to execute orders? Some of 
the craft exporters have sought answers to some of these issues by internalizing 
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transactions that are prone to opportunistic risks and uncertainties. They however, 
recognize that rigid internalization deprives them the opportunity to adjust to fluctuations 
in market demands. Instead of permanent and rigid employment relations with the 
artisans, these exporters contract out the orders to the artisans inside their production 
premises. By maintaining a flexible relationship with labour inside the factory, the 
entrepreneur has the opportunity to adjust the size of the labour force to changes in the 
volumes of orders. However, the control over labour and the production process is not 
sacrificed by maintaining fluid contractual relationship. Producing on the factory floor, 
the entrepreneur has some level of control albeit indirect over the production process to 
minimize opportunism and shirking, and enforce adherence to product quality and 
specifications. The other advantage of the inside-contracting arrangement is that the 
entrepreneur who does not possess the craftsmanship skills tends to benefit from the skills 
of the artisan subcontractor producing inside the factory. The entrepreneur has the 
advantage of possessing relatively rich market information, which he transfers to the 
artisans producing inside his/her factory. By virtue of their participation in international 
trade fairs and their direct contacts with buyers, the owners of these enterprises described 
in this study as factories/workshops are much closer to the international market than the 
small-scale artisan subcontractors in the craft villages in terms of the understanding of the 
changes in market trends and buyer requirements.  
 
The exporters interviewed overwhelmingly adduced quality control, the urge to tighten 
supervision to reduce opportunism and indiscipline as the prime motivations for 
coordinating production in-house. The inside-contracting system helps to minimize the 
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indiscipline that is endemic in the industry and also assures product quality. Critics often 
point to the increase in overhead costs that confront the entrepreneur as he undertakes 
detailed supervision in-house to minimize risks. Others also argue that this is 
compensated for by the product quality that could be achieved (Dietrich, 1994). The 
views expressed by the exporters are consistent with the economies of quality control that 
is achievable through inside contracting. Let us consider a selection of specific responses 
offered by some of the Ghanaian craft exporters for choosing to coordinate production 
activities in-house instead of subcontracting externally to independent subcontractor 
artisans in the craft villages: 
               Motivations for In-house Contracting: Selected Quotations  
We don‘t subcontract much because of our quality 
If you keep most of them (artisan workers) at a place where you don‘t have direct 
supervision, expect that if you get 10 pieces, 5 of them would be faulty 
It comes down to the quality aspect of the production. When you have the carvers on-site 
you are able to check the quality and distractions are also a bit less 
It…would increase my control or monitoring over them (artisan workers); monitoring is a 
big problem in the industry 
Initially, there wasn‘t the need to have all those in-house things but now there is the need 
for them; otherwise you won‘t be able to meet your target. They (artisan subcontractors) 
would delay it for you 
I can always check everything to ensure that they produce according to the specification 
of the sample 
The problem has to do with supervision. Sometimes when they produce from the villages, 
they get drunk and sleep instead of executing the orders and give a lot of excuses…  
But having my production site helps the process to move faster and quality can be 
achieved  
Production in-house is actually to regulate process and products. We don‘t want our 
products to be copied 
Once you get into large-scale production, then you need to consider more important 
issues like quality control…the use of machines …in export production is to ensure the 
quality aspect; your target for quality you attain it. 
 
Inside-contracting is noted to be a transitory institutional arrangement consisting of ―ad 
hoc regulations, within the firm‖ and the reduction in its significance at the turn of the 
20
th
 century was occasioned by the formalization of rules and procedures within the firm 
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(Dietrich, 1994). In effect, there was a shift from indirect control based on informal 
relations inside the firm to direct control base on formalized relations between the 
entrepreneur and workers. Williamson (1985) made a similar observation about the 
development trajectory of the firm and argues that current modes of organizing 
production are superior to replaced modes in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. In the 
light of this he concluded that the ―progression from Putting-Out to Inside Contracting to 
Authority relation is especially noteworthy in that respect‖ (Williamson, 1985, p321). 
The case of inside contracting adopted by the Ghanaian craft exporters do not conform to 
Williamson‘s predictions in entirety.  What this study is not certain about is whether the 
exporters inside contracting could grow to become large firms. Much would depend on 
the market size and the ability of the entrepreneurs to learn and adapt to changes in the 
circumstances of the export market as well as the conditions pertaining to the local 
microeconomic environment. At the moment it is difficult to establish which direction the 
enterprises would head towards. They could, for instance, ―grow‖ to become vertically 
disintegrated or delinked firms relying on subcontracting relations given that there are 
improvements in the conditions of the microeconomic environment. This is a conjecture 
to which this study does not have the evidence to support and remains a question for the 
future. What this study, however, is certain of is that the exporters who are today 
adopting inside-contracting were once putting out entire production orders to outside 
artisan subcontractors. Almost all of the exporters since the formative years of the craft 
export industry were vendors with minimal on-site production capacity and relied mainly 
on artisan subcontractors in the craft villages to execute their export orders. The 
emergence of craft workshops/craft factories using inside-contracting arrangement marks 
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a new mode of organizing production in the craft export industry; a response to the 
changing market conditions and the uncertain local institutional and economic 
environment. Inside contracting in the case of the Ghanaian craft export industry is an 
offshoot from the putting-out arrangement as predicted by Williamson and the industrial 
organization literature and have lots of commonalities with the inside contracting system 
as it existed in the 19
th
 century in Europe and America in terms of the character of the 
system and the processes undergirding its development. 
 
But the study also established that the change is not a complete shift from external 
subcontracting to inside contracting; the exporters inside contract within their production 
premises and at the same time continue to put-out orders to outside subcontractors though 
on a limited scale. These exporters contract out externally to artisan subcontractors they 
have built long term relationship with and the products that are subcontracted in this 
fashion are the simple and traditional items, which do not have complex quality 
dimensions. As the study has demonstrated, a single entrepreneur-coordinator could adopt 
bi-polar contracting regimes in response to different exigencies. The coordination choices 
that entrepreneurs make in reality are far more complex than the uni-polar or singularity 
of alternative coordination mechanisms that are very often assumed in the transaction cost 
framework. Also there are numerous exporters who continue to rely on external 
independent subcontractors to execute their production orders in the industry. Inside-
contracting co-exists with external subcontracting in the industry.      
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Williamson also points to the superiority of internalization over arm‘s length market 
exchange in a risky environment. This study shows that the exporters relying on the 
internal contracting are more successful than the exporters relying solely on external 
contracting. Caution, however, is exercised here in making this conclusion since evidence 
on the performance of the exporters in terms of profit margins was not forthcoming.  
Scanty evidence on the export sales, used as proxy for performance, of the enterprises 
showed that the in-house producers were better performers. This gives an indication that 
if transactions are internalized albeit partially within the firm in an imperfect market, it 
gives the entrepreneur a performance urge. The inside contracting firms could be 
considered as growing firms whereas the majority of the export vendors and 
subcontractor artisans who rely on the traditional subcontracting arrangements do so for 
survival motives. Given the uncertain environment the informal subcontracting and the 
inside contracting relations lead to differing levels of the exporters‘ success, with the 
latter having greater prospect for success.   
 
In whatever form Internalization takes also carries some costs. Fixed costs or investments 
in fixed internal production infrastructure may increase as the entrepreneur seeks to 
increase control over production. Inside contracting and the associated moderate 
investment in production infrastructure requires frequent export orders to avoid the costs 
of allowing those fixed investments to sit idle. One exporter told about acquiring new 
equipments to expand his internal production capacity in anticipation of increase in 
export demand and suffered the cost of the his equipments having to lie idle because of 
the sudden slump in demand. Unfortunately, this exporter in question does not possess 
  
 
261 
the marketing capacity to search for frequent export orders. Infrequent orders suggest that 
transactions would have to take place in a spot market manner because the costs of 
building internal capacity cannot be justified (Sturgeon, 2002). Again, in the absence of 
frequent orders, it would also be difficult for the entrepreneurs to maintain the skilful and 
experienced artisan workers in-house, regardless of the informal relationships that they 
might have established with them. As the exporters adopt internal contracting, their 
products tend to be near standardization, which reduces the variety and range of their 
products.  
 
Some of the exporters with capacity to undertake buyer contacts trips abroad seek to 
minimize the problem of infrequency and the volatility of the export market demand by 
maintaining multiple client bases. Through this they are able to secure fairly frequent 
orders to keep their inside contractors busy; enabling them to extract near exclusive 
relationship.  
 
 The relationships with small quantity international buyers (and in few cases large 
international buyers) serve as a source of market information, product development, pre-
financing and learning. The inside contracting exporters that have the benefit of engaging 
in collaborative trade relationship with the buyers are visible and also demonstrate some 
reasonable level of capacity and professionalism towards production for export 
(competence trust). They could be trusted not cut corners or behave dishonestly. Though 
these exporters remain a minute constituent in the industry, they are increasingly 
controlling greater proportion of the industry‘s total export volume. They are rare case of 
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medium-scale indigenous African exporters (often perceived as opportunistic and 
incompetent) engaging in collaborative and information-laden trade transactions with 
foreign buyers. This is a testament to the fact that given the right conditions (i.e. 
trustworthiness, professional attitudes towards work, and reasonable level of competence) 
qualitative trade transactions can be developed between international buyers and 
indigenous producers in societies that have long being characterized as having endemic 
market imperfections.     
 
7.5 Conclusion        
This chapter sought to explicitly relate the empirical evidence presented in chapters five 
and six to the theoretical expositions in chapter two. The three main areas discussed in 
line with the research objectives were the incidence of domestic market imperfections, 
the extent to which informal subcontracting relations enable the small scale exporters to 
overcome some of these market imperfections and the emergence of inside-contracting as 
another form of market coordinating strategy for dealing with agency problems as well as 
addressing quality control concerns. The theme that is consistent throughout the 
discussion is that informal subcontracting relations and ties enable the small-scale 
exporters to assemble the relevant resources and overcome some coordination challenges 
in their engagement in distant trade. However, new demand pressures emphasizing 
quality, speed and order volumes coupled with supply side constraints including 
subcontractors‘ lack of capacity, the threats of deceit and the lack of contract discipline 
makes the traditional informal contracting relations imperfect strategy for achieving 
success in the export market and to ensure firm‘s growth. Stated differently, under 
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conditions of market imperfections, laxity of control and enforcement difficulties, the 
fluid subcontracting relations and other informal ties can at best enable the small firms to 
achieve imperfect results, especially, when they are required to meet more demanding 
changes in the market. The other theme that emerged is that other exporters partially 
internalize functions in-house (inside contract) to minimize coordination difficulties, 
reduce high transaction costs and enforce compliance with product quality standards but 
to be able to sustain this arrangement requires reliable and predictable source of demand. 
The inside contracting system as practiced by the Ghanaian craft exporters is far from 
being simple; they maintain multiple informal and trust building relationships with 
segmented buyers as well as  subcontractors  to keep the system operational.  
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                                              CHAPTER EIGHT 
                                                        CONCLUSION  
 
8.1 Introduction 
The study set out to explore how Ghanaian craft exporters coordinate their production 
activities given the context of the micro-economic environment. The specific objectives 
were to identify the micro-economic circumstances impinging on the activities of the 
small exporters, the responses to these conditions in terms of institutional and market 
arrangements and the efficacy of the chosen arrangements in dealing with the prevailing 
socio-cultural and economic conditions. The study, which relied on the new institutional 
economics framework as its theoretical foundation (chapter two) demonstrated that 
informal and private institutional arrangements i.e. informal subcontracting relations and 
inside contracting system constitute the media through which the small-scale exporters 
seek to mitigate agency problems, gain access to working capital, labour, and obtain 
market linkages and export processing services. The informal and private arrangements 
play instrumental role in the trade transactions of the small-scale exporters; however, the 
informal subcontracting relations between the exporters and artisan subcontractors are 
being undermined by the very presence of market imperfections. Lack of geographic 
closeness makes it difficult to enforce and monitor informal contracts to avoid shirking 
and opportunistic risks. But that is not all to the difficulty of enforcing informal contracts 
between the small-scale exporters and their subcontractors. The artisan subcontractors are 
very often not in captive trade relationships; making informal sanctions such as the loss 
of future contracts ineffective. Again, there isn‘t a common platform of information 
sharing, for instance, at the industry level about rogue artisan subcontractors (blacklist 
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dishonest ones), which would enable the exporters to avoid making any contractual 
commitments to dishonest subcontractors. At another scale of the trading relationship, 
international buyers through the institutional arrangement they have established with 
domestic export intermediaries are to some extent able to overcome information problems 
and enforcement difficulties through the intermediary agents who hold special position in 
the production chain and are able to use punitive measures to achieve compliance. 
Likewise, the informal financial arrangements between the exporters and the bank seem 
to work well because of the bank‘s ability to reduce information asymmetries and 
minimize the risks of default by using the platforms of the agents and the trade 
association for screening, monitoring and enforcement. In both instances, the position of 
the agents and the association is an important enforcing element to the cohesion of the 
system. Effective enforcement (power to enforce) and monitoring are critical in enabling 
private and informal institutions to work better as market constraining mechanisms.  
 
Other exporters seek to counteract enforcement difficulties by adopting inside-contracting 
system to reduce market risks and also to achieve economies of quality. Following the 
introductory section is section 8.2, which consists of the summary of the main findings of 
the study. This is followed by some policy prescriptions in section 8.3.      
 
8.2 Summary of main findings 
Studies that have delved into the instrumentality of informal and private institutional 
arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa allude to their usefulness in enabling market 
transactions to take place by minimizing risks and ensuring the flow of resources. These 
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studies, however, are often restricted to the localized or the domestic market. This study 
adds to this emerging literature by testing the robustness of informal and private inter-
firm relations beyond the scope of the local economic setting. This way, it enabled us to 
gauge how these local institutions and market practices fare in supporting trade 
transaction that extends beyond the local environment. In this direction, and as 
demonstrated in this study, private institutional forms are necessary given the current 
stage of development of the case study industry in facilitating market transaction between 
the exporters and their trading partners. That private channels offer the potential for 
success in the export market but for pervasive market imperfections and enforcement 
difficulties that renders relation-based contracting as ineffective coordinating and market 
constraining mechanism.  
 
The spill-over effect of the informal subcontracting relations manifests itself in the form 
of the flow of export market information, access to labour, access to raw materials, design 
ideas and working capital. Private export agents also play crucial intermediation role in 
the subcontracting arrangements by linking the numerous craft exporters to the export 
market through buyer linkages platforms, quality monitoring and export processing 
services they provide to the exporters. The spill-over effects though helpful is also a 
source of disincentive for investment in new designs and labour training under conditions 
where products branding is not a common practice, copy rights and patenting laws are 
non-functional or non-existent and the local control of  artisans very difficult to achieve. 
Also informal group mechanisms serve as substitute for conventional collateral for short-
term loan as working capital but less acceptable as guarantee for long-term loan for 
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capital investment. Ambitious entrepreneurs seeking to expand their production base 
often encounter difficulties raising the required capital for lack of physical collateral. 
 
Integration into the export market via various forms of personal subcontractual relations 
provides a source for enterprise growth. The study demonstrated that an exposure to the 
international market serves as a source of learning and access to new market information. 
Buyers‘ pressure and intense competition, especially from Asia, induces local firms to 
improve on their production process. The markets to which small firms in developing 
economies serve are often fragmented, small in size and rudimentary offering little for 
innovation and growth. The thinking therefore is that for small firms to grow beyond their 
local significance, they need channels that connect them to foreign demand or bigger 
markets (Hayami et al. 1998, Fafchamps, 1994). The linkages with foreign markets have 
provided some of the small exporters, who are largely informal operators and were 
mainly serving the restricted domestic and tourists‘ market, the opportunity to achieve 
some modest growth. This is peculiar in the context of the generally held view that 
microenterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa hardly grow to become even medium-sized firms. 
Feeding into innovate private trade channels that are linked to foreign markets presents 
the possibility for microenterprises to graduate to become medium-scale enterprises.  
 
Finding new markets and buyers are therefore crucial if the exporters are to continue to 
stay in business and grow. Apart from relying on export agents for international buyers, 
there are other channels through which they seek buyers; either through participation of 
government sponsored trade fairs abroad often with financial assistance from 
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international development agencies or the exporters undertaking foreign trade fairs and 
exhibitions by themselves. Both routes have their own difficulties. As demonstrated in 
chapter 5, donor-sponsored exhibitions executed through government intermediary 
agencies are fraught with corruption. Prospective exhibitors sometimes have to pay bribes 
to government officials before they are given slots to attend trade exhibitions abroad. The 
government officials sometimes trade the exhibition slots to individuals or give them to 
relatives and friends wanting to travel abroad to seek greener pastures but are not known 
craft exporters. Directly undertaking retail and buyer exhibitions abroad by the individual 
exporters is potentially the effective buyer-contact development channels. However, 
private undertaking of these foreign trips regularly are expensive and beyond the 
financial strengths of many of the small scale exporters. Donor sponsorships for 
exhibitions abroad could yield positive results if directly targeted at visible private actors 
in the industry and where possible the support extended beyond market linkages 
programme to include effort aimed at helping the promising small-scale producers to 
build their local production capacities. Local NGOs and representatives of international 
development agencies could also play a crucial role in facilitating market linkage 
programmes.           
   
Inside-contracting is a new institutional arrangement adopted by the ―in-house‖ exporters 
to save on transaction costs, achieve product quality and meet delivery timelines. 
Products with complex quality dimensions left with difficult to monitor and uneducated 
artisan subcontractors in the craft villages would mean quality could be poorly enforced. 
From the perspective of the transaction cost model, inside contracting could be viewed 
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either as an alternative to, or an offshoot, from the putting-out subcontracting system. The 
study showed the relative strengths of both the traditional subcontracting arrangements 
and the inside contracting to enterprise success in terms of reducing transaction risks and 
addressing other forms of market imperfections. The exporters who have achieved 
modest increases in output sales against the backdrop of difficult market conditions are 
the ones that are partially internalizing functions within their production premises and 
have developed the internal capacity to be able to produce middle-ranked quality 
products. This gives theoretical strength to Coase (1937) and Williamson‘s (1975) 
position that the firm is better able to deal with high transaction costs under extreme 
uncertainties compared with arm‘s length market coordination arrangements. The firm 
that is being discussed here is far from the vertically integrated firm as predicted by the 
transaction cost framework. It is a quasi-firm that mixes the attributes of informal and 
external subcontracting relations with fluid control mechanisms instituted inside the 
entrepreneurs‘ production premises. This is a survival production strategy that is still 
embroiled in traditionalism.  
 
 
8.3 Implications for Institutions and Policy Interventions 
The thrust of this study has been that informal (private) institutional arrangements are less 
robust in helping to reduce agency problems under conditions of market imperfections 
and enforcement difficulties. Following from this, the logical thing to do implicitly is to 
seek institutions that are better able to deal with high transaction costs and expanding 
trade; possibly formal institutions. Regardless of this position, informal and private 
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institutional mechanisms would continue to persist as a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies suggest even in modern economies. The issue is not about replacing 
informal private institutional arrangements with formal institution. It is about improving 
the microenvironment for informal private institutional arrangements to thrive and the 
simultaneous incremental development of modern formal institutions in commensurate 
with the rate of expansion of trade transactions and the stage of economic development. 
Whiles recognizing that it takes time to build strong formal institution, Biggs and Shah 
(2006) proceeded to offer some policy options that could help African small enterprises 
in developing private institutional support arrangements. In their view, a prudent strategy 
for institutional development to support market exchanges should include intervention 
that makes the environment as supportive as possible for relation-based contracting, 
building on the existing private institutional arrangements to improve their efficacy and 
the development of other formal institutions to reflect the gradual transition from 
personal to anonymous market exchanges.   
 
These areas of policy interventions are addressed to this study. The lesson learnt from this 
study is that subcontracting relations do not thrive well under unstable and weak 
microeconomic environment characterized by opportunistic risks, capacity constraints 
and bad socio-cultural practices. These factors weaken the incentives for inter-firm 
relations and thus limit the ability of the firms to create and sustain efficient 
subcontracting relations. Linkages programmes in which  firms are linked to small scale 
subcontractors is gaining currency in policy initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa with the 
effort aimed at building private support mechanisms for small enterprises‘ development 
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with donor assistance (see Kuada and Sørensen, 2005 on inter-firm collaborative 
initiatives between Ghanaian exporting firms and Danish firms). The sustainability of 
such initiatives, according to Biggs and Shah, is more than introducing one firm to 
another. They maintain that it should also entail trust building initiatives and efforts 
aimed at upgrading the capabilities of for example subcontracting firms. Trust-building 
initiatives should embody programmes that would enable small firms to understand the 
economic effects of eschewing short-term opportunistic behaviours and the long-term 
benefits of operating in professional and trustful manner in business transactions. In 
effect, such initiatives should stress not just inter-personal trust building but also seek to 
build competence trust e.g. build the capabilities of subcontractors so that they can 
deliver according to the quality standards they promise to deliver. Firms‘ capabilities and 
owners‘ backgrounds are important requisite for building successful inter-firm relations. 
For example, the craft exporters that have succeeded in engaging in qualitative relations 
with international buyers are the very firms that have shown an appreciable level of 
competence in meeting order requirements and the owners having a reasonable level of 
education. International buyers are confident doing business with local producers who 
have demonstrated reasonable level of competence. Likewise the local exporters would 
contract out production orders to subcontractors they can trust to have the capacity to 
produce according to contract terms. Improvements in the quality of subcontracting firms 
as well as lead enterprises would facilitate quality local and international inter-firm 
linkages. Exporter-buyer relationship could serve as important channels for exchange of 
market information about changes in demand trends and for learning about best practice 
methods of production and designs. Therefore initiatives aimed at building exporter-
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buyer relationship would be an appropriate policy response in helping to minimize the 
problem of export market information asymmetries.  
 
Training initiatives should also encompass government sponsored training programmes 
for artisan subcontractors en-mass at the industry level to improve their skills levels and 
to re-orient them to adopt work ethics that are in tune with the culture of the export 
market.               
 
This study points to the insufficiency of informal and private arrangements in dealing 
with modest increases in the complexity of trade. It does not suggest for their replacement. 
With regards to the case study sector there has been a modest increase in volume of trade 
since its formative years as well as the increases in the complexity of quality dimensions 
driven by international demand but the evidence is not adequate to suggest that such 
modest increases would warrant elaborate formal institutional arrangements. Informal 
and private institutional arrangements would continue to be viable though there are limits 
to their sustenance under conditions of market imperfections. The pervasiveness of 
opportunism and mistrust that characterize the transactions between the actors runs 
counter to the notion of the abundance of trust or social capital that is often touted to aid 
economic interactions in less developed markets (Ensminger, 2000). Poor economic 
agents may yield to short-term temptations by cutting corners to survive present 
economic circumstances and therefore may place little premium on the gains of building 
long-term trade relationships.   
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We can extrapolate from this study, though cautiously, that formal institutions would be 
required as market widens and the scope of opportunism and complexity increases (North, 
1991, Dixit, 2004, Biggs and Shah, 2006).  Effective formal institutions would need to be 
developed to protect property rights, enforce contracts, reduce uncertainty and transaction 
costs and enable firms to appropriate gains associated with increasing scale of trade and 
specialization. Personalized trust is often assumed to be a major resource among the poor 
but as evident in the study it could be lacking among the poor and in underdeveloped 
societies. Under such a circumstance, Ensminger (2000) argues that serious economic 
development could be better realized through generalized trust embedded in formal 
government institutions and thus recommend attention to be focused on building formal 
institutions to generate generalized trust in such societies. Formulating intellectual 
property laws or effectively enforcing existing patenting laws and creating awareness of 
their existence could provide the institutional incentives for small-scale exporters to come 
up with innovative product designs that have greater marketability knowing that 
opportunists who attempt to expropriate their designs could face strict legal sanctions and 
penalties.  
 
This study did not set out to examine the role of formal institutions in reducing 
transaction cost due to the initial disposition to explore the functionality of informal and 
private institutional arrangements to the craft export trade. This is not an attempt to 
underestimate the importance of formal public institutions in facilitating complex and 
impersonal trade transactions. As discussed earlier under chapter two, strong formal 
market support institutions are often nonexistent and the very ones that exist are weak, 
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unresponsive and poorly managed in developing economies of SSA. In the particular case 
of Ghana, an empirical study by Jackson (2002) revealed the internal capacity problems 
of formal third party institutions that provide business development services to the private 
sector. Lall and Pietrobelli (2002) also observed the financial and technical constraints 
that hinder the operations of state sponsored standards and quality assurance institutions 
in SSA. There is no clarity either about the efficiency and the effectiveness of the courts 
in SSA when it comes to the resolution of transaction disputes and contract enforcement. 
What makes for effective and market friendly legal framework in Africa is largely elusive? 
What mechanisms are required to make the legal system in SSA supportive of the private 
sector, especially the small and medium scale sector?            
 
Most of the studies that have delved into the implications of global trade on developing 
countries, as exemplified in the global value chain literature, are often concentrated on 
the implications of global trade on (often ignoring the implications of domestic factors 
and circumstances on ) coordination responses of suppliers, employment conditions and 
poverty reduction. This study, with all its limitations, draws attention to how success or 
failure in participating in global trade may not only be determined by the decisions and 
actions of, for example, global buyers, but also the organizational responses and actions 
of local actors, which are embedded in domestic institutional mechanisms and also 
shaped by microeconomic and socio-cultural factors. Domestic factors and efforts have 
implications for the extent to which small-scale exporters can successfully integrate into 
transnational commodity chains. The broad conclusion of the study is that under the 
conditions of imperfect microeconomic environment and endemic opportunism, informal 
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arrangements and loose arm‘s length subcontracting relation feebly enable the small firms 
to integrate into the export commodity chains. The inside-contracting exporters are 
seemingly better integrators into the export market. Since this study was more concerned 
with the effectiveness of inter-firm informal institutional arrangement, it failed to 
adequately address the micro impacts of export participation on employment and poverty 
reduction (Jenkins, 2005; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). This area would require further 
investigation by looking not only at the craft industry but also the horticultural sector, 
where suppliers are required to meet stricter quality standards with far reaching 
implications for local capacities and livelihoods of small enterprises and workers. It will 
also be important to explore whether or not small-scale or large-scale production models 
hold the key for improving local livelihoods in the face of international competitive 
pressures and exacting buyer demands.       
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
The study set out to explore how small businesses in the Ghanaian craft export industries 
coordinate their activities in response to local constraints to trade transactions and the 
requirements of the export market. Private channels via informal subcontracting and 
inside-contracting arrangements remain the primary tools for coordinating craft 
production for export. There are differences in the strengths of both private arrangements 
in enabling the small exporters to overcome local market imperfections and consistently 
meet the quality and timelines expectations of their clients.  The observation in this study 
is that exporters relying on inside-contracting system are able to deal with quality issues 
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better than their counterparts relying on the traditional subcontracting and informal 
relations under the prevailing imperfect market circumstances. In particular, the informal 
subcontracting relations and mechanisms though key in enabling the small craft exporters 
to access resources and integrate into the export market, they remain largely imperfect 
arrangement. With improvements in the microeconomic environment subcontracting 
relations may offer the promise as a production strategy that may enable small business 
as little acorns to grow to become mighty oaks in SSA.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Respondents 
Export Agents (craft) 
Afripeche                     E.K.Asamoah                      
Fritete                           Robert Ellis 
Sankofa                        Nana K. Agyemang 
Getrade                         Nii Ankra Aryee 
Delata                           Mawuli Akpenyo 
Kraft Export Consult    Robert Darko 
 
Craft Exporters  
L‘afrique Concept        Hetty Zakour 
Katalvic Industry          Ramseyer Agyarko-Nyamekye 
Tekura                           Mrs. Josephine Forson 
Neocraft                        Kwesi Asante 
Treasures of Africa       Tina Ellis 
Unity and Progress       Stephen Acheampong 
Agyadu Creations         Joseph Boateng                  
African Dreams            Ralph Ashong 
Kottage Originals         Ofoli Ahinakwah 
Boassan Ventures         Edward Akwesi Boateng 
Delhause                       Del Boampong 
Lorenpee                       Kwasi A. Antwi 
Wild Gecko                  Poem van Landewijk 
Celebate Services Ltd  Myles Quainoo 
All round marketing     R.K Adjasoo 
Hide-Out Enterprise     Ms Grace Mensah        
African Version            Nanasei Opoku  
Joad Enterprise             John Apau Pinamang 
Papsay Enterprise         Alhassan Abukari 
Afwel Ltd                     Mr Coleman 
Marks Impex                M.W. Hanson 
Echoing Hills               William Agbeti  
AACD African Market   Stanley Felten    
Al-Tatma Enterprise        Alhaji T.A.Tahiru 
Acarv Enterprise            Rev Apraku 
Christian O Enterprise     Christian Okyere 
Frank-Pee                      
Ahenfo Classics   
Eleagbe Enterprise                                        
Eddison Sculpture  
Alahet Trading Co. 
 
Machine furniture exporter/producers 4  
Scanstlye Mim Ltd               Samuel Nick Ayison (Operations Manager) 
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Irokko                                   Celia Cann-Anaman   
Ashanti Furniture                  Kwasi Appiah 
Furnart Ghana Ltd                 E.G. Wellington 
 
Lists of informants                                                         
Marcu Clottey (AMC quality Compliance Inspector)                           
Bridget Kyerematen-Darko     
Maxwell Osei-Kusi                
George Adomako                 
Julius Yaw Mensa (Pseudonym)                      
Adu Mensah                               
 
Lists of organisations contacted               
Presidential Special Initiatives Directorate 
Prudential Bank 
Aid to Artisans Ghana 
Ghana Export Promotion Council 
  
Appendix 2: List of Buyers Identified by Exporters  
Appendix 2 is not available in the digital version of this thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Interview Guide for the Focal Enterprises 
This guide for the field interview is derived from the literature on the link between inter-
firm relations and the flow of resources through the linkages. The individual items in the 
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guide are grouped into themes that reflect firm histories, the nature of inter-firm relations, 
meeting quality standards  
1. Firm-level Data 
Date of interview               
Firms Name 
Name of Respondent     
Position 
Address/Production site 
Tel/Email    
 Product or Process specialisation 
 
1.1 Firm’s History 
Date of establishment 
The person or entity that established it 
Ownership/Legal status 
Critical periods in the history of the firm i.e. periods of boom and busts 
 
1.2 Labour force 
Size of labour force and changes from its day of establishment till date 
Size of Management/ Owner(s) and Background 
Skill background of employees or technical staff 
Sufficiency of skill levels to market demands of products and processes 
Mode of acquisition of skills by management/owner and workers 
Labour sharing with other producing firms 
 
1.3 Performance 
Annual output from the date of establishment or since the last 10years 
Volume exported and volume sold in the local market 
Trends in export volume from the date of establishment or the last 10years 
Unit price (US$) of export and changes over time 
Turnover  
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Improvements in product and process quality 
Effect of product and process quality on turnover 
1.4 Finance 
Main source(s) of finance 
Inputs purchase on credit or cash payment. Duration for repayment of inputs if on credits 
Use of letters of credit in business transactions 
Output sold for cash or deferred payments 
2. Inter-firm linkages  
2.1 Linkages with Processes subcontractors 
Contract out components, processes or whole products 
Major subcontractors (name and location) 
Reasons for subcontracting 
Description of the relationship with the subcontractor,   
 Frequent orders to subcontractor (how often) 
 Irregular orders (how irregular) 
 Single batch orders (arm‘s length) 
Intention to carry out all production processes in-house and reasons 
Other ways production is/could be organised 
The capability of subcontractor to meet order requirements 
Consequences for failure to meet orders 
Specific supports provided to the subcontractor(s) and why these support activities aren‘t 
carried in-house if subcontractors don‘t have capability in this area  
 Product development 
 Skills and technology 
 Quality management 
 Input supplies 
 
2.2 Focal Enterprise as Subcontractor 
Main clients and location (Domestic and International) 
 Other producing firms 
 Retailers 
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 Wholesalers 
 
The main product or processes contracted out to (FE) 
The description and the history behind the relationship with the client (repeat as in 2.1) 
Support benefits from subcontractor (repeat as in 2.1) 
Other ways of accessing benefits to boost performance apart through the linkages 
 
2.3 Linkages with the Market (Export Agents/ Traders) 
Business relationship with export agents and Traders  
Name and Location of your main Agents and Traders 
Reasons for selling through agents 
Description of relationship with Agents and Traders 
 Frequent and dense and reasons 
 Occasional, arm‘s length and weak and reasons 
Would you have wished to sell direct to customers and reason 
Benefits from the Export agents and Traders (strong ties) 
 Market access 
 Provision of market information  
 Product development 
 Finance 
 Quality Management 
 Training of workers(in product development, quality management, technology 
diffusion and adaptation) 
Perceived benefits from weak ties with agents and traders 
 
2.4 Linkages with Input suppliers 
a) Suppliers of raw materials, major suppliers and location 
Frequency and reliability of raw material supplies 
Raw materials meet expected quality requirements 
Difficulties arising from supplies and reasons 
Mode of payment for supplies 
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Consequences of supplier failure to meet quality and delivery requirements 
Collaboration and information sharing to improve quality  
b) Major suppliers of equipment, machines and tools 
Description of the linkages with equipment suppliers 
Collaborative benefits in the areas of; 
 Information on new equipment 
 Providing training for workers to adapt to new technology 
 Repair of machinery. 
 
*2.5 Linkages with other firms producing similar products (horizontal linkages) 
Cooperation with other producers of similar products (Name major ones & Location) 
 Areas of cooperation  
 Machine lending 
 Product Development 
 Purchase of inputs 
 Sharing of orders with other producers 
 Sharing of workers 
Forums for exchange of information (e.g. Meetings of Business Association) 
 
Inter-firm competition 
Main competitors and location 
 Large firms 
 Medium firms 
 Small firms 
Competitive strengths 
 Product quality and design 
 Speed and Punctual delivery 
 Price   
 
Detailed benefits that could be accessed through the linkages or through other alternative 
means 
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Product Development 
Type of designs (e.g. authentic traditional designs or functional designs that combines 
traditional designs with designs with foreign functions, foreign designs) 
Sources of Design 
Developed locally 
Developed by external designer 
Design offered by clients 
Designs introduced with inputs from international/local consultants 
Ideas for the designs sourced through 
Local fairs 
Trade fairs abroad 
Catalogues and magazines 
Specifications from clients 
 
Quality Standards (sector specific) 
Quality Standards   
Product-specific standards  
 
Quality Management 
Quality training 
Quality monitoring and control 
Standards setting or specification and enforcement 
Who sets and enforce standards (clients, external independent bodies, private consultants, 
enterprise itself, business association, or NGOs). 
Technical expertise to the implementation of standards or skill support to raise quality. 
Appendix 4: Recession in the West Cuts Off an Economic Pipeline in Ghana 
By Karin Brulliard 
Washington Post Foreign Service 
Wednesday, August 5, 2009  
ADUASE, Ghana -- When the U.S. housing crash triggered economic chain reactions 
around the world, one ended in a lush forest near this village, where on a recent day 
Appendix 4 is not available in the digital version of this thesis 
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